The Rise of Automated Cybercrime: How AI is Redefining Cyber Threats
Author
Harshita Gautam, Ritu Dagar, and Dr. Manju Rani
Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) is changing the economics and operational possibilities of cybercrime, but it is important to distinguish automated activity from activity specifically enabled by AI. This paper examines AI-assisted and automated cyber threats, with attention to phishing and social engineering, credential theft, ransomware, reconnaissance, and vulnerability exploitation. It uses an exploratory mixed-source design: a questionnaire completed by 36 university students is interpreted alongside published evidence from IBM X-Force, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Verizon, and peer-reviewed research. In the student sample, 32 respondents (88.9%) reported awareness of AI-based cyber threats; 19 (52.8%) reported receiving suspicious or potentially phishing-related messages; 22 (61.1%) believed AI makes cybercrime more dangerous; and the most common self-rated cybersecurity-awareness score was 3 out of 5 (47.2%). External reports describe an 84% year-on-year increase in emails delivering infostealer malware observed by IBM in 2024, while WEF reported that 66% of surveyed organisations expected AI to have a significant cybersecurity impact and 37% had processes for assessing AI-tool security before deployment. These figures come from different samples and measurement frameworks and are not directly comparable. The paper argues that AI is best understood as an amplifier of selected attack capabilities rather than a universal or sole cause of cybercrime. It recommends layered controls, identity protection, secure AI adoption, verification procedures, and practical cybersecurity education. Because the student sample is small and self-reported, the primary findings are descriptive and exploratory rather than generalisable or causal.
Keywords
artificial intelligence, automated cybercrime, generative AI, phishing, social engineering, cybersecurity awareness, credential theft
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References
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Evaluation domain
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Example indicator
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Interpretation caution
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Preparedness
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Percentage of accounts protected by MFA
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Coverage should be interpreted alongside account type and authentication strength
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Human response
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Correct identification and reporting rate in safe simulations
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Simulation performance does not perfectly predict behaviour during real incidents
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Detection
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Median time from alert to triage
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Lower time is useful only if accuracy and workload remain acceptable
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Resilience
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Successful restoration in scheduled recovery tests
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A backup is not a proven recovery capability until restoration is tested
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Learning
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Change in scenario-based assessment from pre-test to post-test
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Use comparable instruments and report attrition and uncertainty
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The indicators in Table 6 are proposed evaluation measures, not outcomes observed in the present study. They should be selected in advance, measured consistently, and reviewed for unintended effects such as excessive false-positive alerts or privacy intrusion.
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