Beyond the Presumption: Rethinking Bid-Rigging Enforcement in Indian Public Procurement

Author

Shilpee, Akansha Toppo, Prerna Shakya, Astha Bhalavi


Abstract

 Public procurement accounts for a substantial share of government expenditure in India, and its integrity depends on genuine competition among bidders. Bid-rigging, where competing firms collude to predetermine or manipulate tender outcomes, distorts this process, inflates costs to the exchequer, and erodes quality and innovation. This paper examines how Indian competition law addresses bid-rigging in public procurement, with particular attention to Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act, 2002, which presumes an appreciable adverse effect on competition from such agreements. Using a doctrinal methodology based on statutes, case law, regulatory reports, and secondary literature, the paper explains the principal forms of bid-rigging (collusive pricing, cover bidding, bid rotation, bid suppression, market allocation, and proxy bidding); surveys the approaches of the OECD, the United States, the European Union, South Africa, and Australia; and analyses the investigative powers of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) together with the penalty, individual-liability, and leniency provisions of the Act. Landmark decisions, including Excel Crop Care, the LPG cylinder case, and the Delhi Jal Board case, are reviewed to identify trends in evidentiary standards and penalties. The paper argues that bid-rigging persists not only because of weak deterrence but also because of difficulties in detection and proof, limited institutional capacity, weak coordination between procurement authorities and the CCI, and a lack of preventive measures. It concludes that a combined strategy of detection, deterrence, and prevention, supported by data-driven screening, compliance programmes, certificates of independent bid determination, and capacity building, is needed to strengthen India's public procurement regime.



Keywords

bid-rigging, collusive bidding, public procurement, Competition Act 2002, Competition Commission of India, cartel enforcement, deterrence



Full Text:

Download Paper PDF


References


  1. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2019, December). Ex-post review of ACCC merger decisions.
  2. Competition Commission of India. (2019). Market study on public procurement in India: Spotting the red flags.
  3. Competition Commission of South Africa. (2018). Annual report 2017/18.
  4. Dugar, S. M. (2020). Guide to Competition Act, 2002(8th ed.). LexisNexis.
  5. European Commission. (2017, February 8). Antitrust: Commission fines car battery suppliers €110 million in cartel settlement[Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_246
  6. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2016). Fighting bid rigging in public procurement: Report on implementing the OECD recommendation.
  7. Sandeepan, N., & Pradhan, A. (2024, August 8). Bid-rigging in public procurement: An Indian perspective. Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan Attorneys. https://www.lakshmisri.com/insights/articles/bid-rigging-in-public-procurement-an-indian-perspective/
  8. Satapathy, S., & Raizada, S. (2025). Regulation of bid-rigging in government tenders under the Competition Act, 2002. LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, 3(1).
  9. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
  10. S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. (n.d.). Criminal enforcement trends chart through fiscal year 2020. Retrieved September 8, 2025, from https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts

 

 

 

 

Share your valuable work from Social Media Buttons