



International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews

Journal homepage: www.ijrpr.com ISSN 2582-7421

The Clockwork Constitution: Exploring the Synchrony of One Nation One Election.

By Naga Suganeswar N^δ, Akshita Singh^δ

CHRIST (Deemed to be University) Pune Lavasa Campus

ABSTRACT :

"Stability is the siren song of governance, but its price may be the soul of democracy." The initiative "One Nation, One Election", crystallized in *The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024*, introduced on December 17, 2024, would bring Lok Sabha and state assembly elections within the fold by 2029, with this promise there would be continuity in execution of government policies. Today, *the Model Code of Conduct* fractures governance by stalling decisions across India's fragmented electoral calendar, a malaise absent during the synchronized polls of 1951-67, albeit interrupted by early dissolutions. ONOE would fix sentences for five years, relegating interruptions to a single cycle and thus leasing 4.5 years of legislative clarity through amendments to *Articles 83 and 172*. This stability, supporters claim, unshackles policy from perpetual paralysis by campaigns, a criticism sharpened by the current Prime Minister's relentless politicking since 2014. However, has a hidden venom. The rigid alignment of *Article 82A* may entomb governments in unaccountable tenure and reduce mandates if dissolutions like those that ruptured the 1960s experiment occur.

The Kesavananda Bharati case's doctrine looms large: Parliament cannot erode the Constitution's basic structure federalism, accountability, parliamentary dynamism; yet ONOE's fixed terms could mute mid-term reckonings, tilting power toward an executive unshaken by legislative will. Critics, for their part, see the deeper wound for wellbeing under governance is impacted not by elections but rather by leaders who are more into rallies than results. The bills now find themselves languishing beneath the Joint Parliamentary Committee as they require a two-thirds majority in order to change the sinews of the Constitution.

ONOE offers the vision of seamless administration; yet, the capacity at which law and democratic price itself subject to judicial testing and political fraught poses the question of whether stability can ever be maintained amidst the vibrant flux of India's pluralistic polity.

Literature Review

"Democracy in India" by Christophe Jaffrelot (2021)¹

The book by Christophe Jaffrelot 'Democracy in India' presents an exhaustive study of the democratic path in the Indian context from independence through the centralism culminating in the present day revival of regionalisms. The main theme of his book is revolving around the notion of federalism as the alleged bastion of India's pluralistic polity, which, according to Jaffrelot, had been made into fractures by the covert designs of the central government for its own empowerment after the Emergency of the 1970s.

He would probably see the idea of One Nation, One Election (ONOE) as possibly furthering such centralizing tendencies, arguing that clocking Lok Sabha elections along with state assembly elections would drown state voices in a national electoral tide. Your findings regarding how election cycles from 1967 onward began to diverge, including such inimical events as dissolution in Gujarat and Indira Gandhi's actions in 1971, would testify to the natural demand for regional autonomy that the ONOE could stand to beat back². Jaffrelot would add that the projected GDP gains of ₹4.5 lakh crore by the Kovind Committee (2023) ought to be considered alongside this erosion of regional agency. For instance, distinct local priorities of states such as Tamil Nadu or that of Assam, say irrigation or flood management, may get sidelined in a synchronized electoral exercise that is dictated by national narratives. Moreover, Jaffrelot's focus on democratic diversity implies that ONOE, in offering stability token or the 1951-67 period of synchronized elections and Bhilai type projects would suffocate the lively political plurality that defines contemporary India. Thus, his work acts as a cautionary lens which places more emphasis on keeping the federal spirit alive over pure administrative efficiency.

^δ Law Student at The CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Pune Lavasa Campus

^δ Law Student at The CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Pune Lavasa Campus

¹ Jaffrelot, Christophe, "India: Democracy in Name Only?", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, <https://mondediplo.com/2024/04/02india>

² Jaffrelot, Christophe, "What Does it Mean to Call Today's India a Democracy?", *The Wire*, <https://m.thewire.in/article/politics/what-does-it-mean-to-call-todays-india-a-democracy>

“The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution” by Sujit Choudhry et al. (2016)³

The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, edited by Sujit Choudhry and contemporaries, gives an elaborate analysis of the constitutional structure of India in general, particularly with regard to the 1973 ruling in *Kesavananda Bharati*, which remains the fulcrum of their analysis. Therein, federalism and accountability were specifically envisaged as features of the Constitution’s basic structure, which could not be amended through parliamentary action. Contributing authors of the handbook would likely view ONOE in *Articles 83(2) and 172(1)* with its fixed five year term as a probable threat to democratic responsiveness, a worry evident in your own study. In this instance, should Karnataka’s assembly be dissolved in 2026, then Article 82A could stab the elections to 2029, possibly under President’s Rule, taking away the capability from the electorate to steer the polity onto its rightful path a scenario that rings in the heart of Article 356, misused in the 1980s (e.g., Karnataka, 1989). Choudhry and colleagues would argue that such rigidity would pose a challenge to the fundamental tenets of the Constitution, entailing scrutiny by the Supreme Court. The way your paper refers to the synchronized period of 1951-1967, while efficient, stands in stark contrast to the current complexity of 36 states, suggesting that the logistical demands of ONOE (for instance, 13.6 lakh polling stations) may hold efficiency above accountability. The handbook presents this as a significant trade-off: the savings of ₹30,000 crore and investment of ₹7,951 crore on EVMs (Election Commission, 2019) are indeed tangible benefits, but at what cost to constitutional integrity? These tensions are heightening in the eyes of regional leaders, such as Mamata Banerjee and MK Stalin, who condemned ONOE as “anti-federal” in Your 2025 JPC discussions.

1. Introduction: The Rationale for Synchronization

Elections in India seem endless. The electoral calendar appears to be an uninterrupted chain of regional and national events. For states like Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Delhi, political activity chatter keeps the heat alive throughout the year. So many times, that elections seem like they are unending in India. The electoral calendar appears like a continuous chain of regional-national events. States like Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Delhi keep the chatter of political activity very much alive throughout the year.

With every electoral event, the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) comes into play, barring certain actions—road construction halts mid project, farmer subsidies are deferred, and governance moves to a temporary zone of rhetoric from action. This cycle of disruption exhausts the citizenry and the administration alike.

The latest entry in the list of proposals is the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) initiative, proposed more formally as The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024. This keystone plan seeks synchronized Lok Sabha and state assembly elections by 2029 and claims to present four and a half years for governance unobstructed by elections. It makes a strong case for efficient administration and relief from electoral disruptions⁴. But democracy means not merely streamlined governance, but choices and accountability. The proposal to centralize and synchronize elections raises serious questions about their impact on India’s pluralistic political fabric, and while ONOE may lend some advantage to administrative continuity, it may also dilute the pulse of India’s democratic culture. Well, switching to synchronized elections could amount to a kind of taming of a diverse symphony to a single note.

2. Historical Context

2.1 The Golden Era of Alignment (1951–1967)⁵

The electoral system remained untouched for decades after independence. Elections for the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies⁶ were held almost synchronously from 1951 to 1967. This sort of synchronization could thus continue uninterrupted by any MCC mechanism in the governance process. This period is noted for some of the major milestones in Indian history, including the Bhakra Nangal Dam, which revolutionized Punjab’s agriculture, the Green Revolution of the 1960s, and steel plants like Bhilai. From that time economic records indicate an annual union budget growth of 7 percent in the past years by leaders not engaged in ceaseless campaigning. With just 14 states and a single Congress, this could make a system of lofty planning. The same synchronised elections would give permanence to long term projects while poverty and scant rural representation still exist. ONOE supporters point out this period as testimonial of what ONOE can do.

The High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections (2023) estimates that synchronized polls might increase GDP growth by 1.5 percentage points a

³ “The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution by Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, Pratap Bhanu Mehta”, *Vyoma Online*, <https://vyomaonline.com/studymaterial/the-oxford-handbook-of-the-indian-constitution-by-sujit-choudhry-madhav-khosla-pratap-banu-mehta-559>

⁴ Editorial, “Home | One Nation One Election”, *One Nation One Election Official Website*, <https://onoe.gov.in>

⁵ eddy, B.P. Jeevan, “170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws”, *Law Commission of India*, <https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in>

⁶ “State Assembly Elections: Nudging the Voter in One Direction”, *The Hindu*, <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/state-assembly-elections-nudging-the-voter-in-one-direction/article8438114.ece>

cash equivalent of ₹4.5 lakh crore in terms of 2024 towards funding infrastructure in roads, schools, and hospitals. In history, alignment provided progress but subsequent developments would change it⁷.

2.2 The Divergence

In 1967, a synchronized system came undone. The Gujarat Assembly was prematurely dissolved in political instability that was followed by the Lok Sabha's termination in 1971 amid the manipulative manoeuvrings of Indira Gandhi. The coordinated electoral calendar became fragmented, and by the time the 1980s rolled around, India's 28 states had followed independent schedules, creating a complex mosaic of elections. Only Lok Sabha cost 60,000 crores rupees in 2019, funds that could pay for disasters like floods in Assam. Now, the MCC obstructs governance for more than 100 days a year with stalled programs from repairs to public health. NITI Aayog stated in 2023 that 2% of GDP was spent on health⁸. The bleak picture is not likely to improve with elections distracting the political system.⁹

This divergence was accounted for by both legitimate reasons (coalition failures, for example) and more contentious interventions (President's Rule, Article 356). ONOE stands firmly committed to its objective of restoring earlier harmony by providing a one cycle answer to this persistent disruption. But, the India of 1.4 billion people, across 36 states and union territories, is very much different, in contrast to its plural version of 1951. So, can such a framework now accommodate this invigorated diversity?

2.3 Present-Day Implications

In the year 2024, five states Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and Haryana held assembly elections that were staggered together with the Lok Sabha polls, denoting a partial success of synchronization. 2025 will see Bihar and Delhi break away, thus propagating the MCC into 2026. Since 2014, Modi has done more than 300 rallies, which box ONOE in relieving the work burden of campaigns.

With 7% inflation (2024) and the repeated flood attacks in Kerala, the voters are now seeking solutions rather than promises. The Election Commission lays down plans for 2029, planning to spend ₹7,951¹⁰ crores for new EVMs and VVPATs to equip 13.6 lakh polling booths, backed by 7 lakh security¹¹. The historical alignment lends credence to the other aspect of feasibility; Kovind Committee (2023) envisaged an increase of ₹4.5 lakh crores in GDP following synchronization. The regional parties TMC and DMK, view it as a centralizing agenda; hence voters caught in the clutches of economic and environmental catastrophes may not care less about the reforms in the electoral system.

3. Constitutional Amendments & its Challenges

3.1 Proposed Amendments

This Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024 proposes very consequential amendments to India's electoral framework: Article 82A (New) mandates synchronization of Lok Sabha elections and state assembly elections by 2029¹². *Article 83(2) lays down the term of the Lok Sabha as five years except for premature dissolution under very special circumstances. Article 172(1) states that the term of state assemblies shall also be five years. Article 356 contains restrictions on the imposition of President's Rule, barring mid-term elections in the interregnum from the synchronized election cycle*¹³.

3.2 Constitutional Constraints: The Kesavananda Doctrine

The 1973 verdict of Kesavananda Bharati cases provided that Parliament would have no power to amend and destroy the basic structure of the

⁷ Editorial, "One Nation, One Election: The Implementation Hurdles", *O.P. Jindal Global University*, <https://jgu.edu.in/one-nation-one-election-the-implementation-hurdles/>

⁸ Editorial, "NITI Aayog Report on Simultaneous Elections, 2017", *Legal Affairs, Government of India*, https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_elections/NITI_AYOG_REPORT_2017.pdf

⁹ Jha, Aditya Mani, "Federalism Should Be Back to What It Was": Christophe Jaffrelot, *Frontline*, <https://frontline.thehindu.com/politics/federalism-should-be-back-to-what-it-was-christophe-jaffrelot/article68268485.ece>

¹⁰ Editorial, "Election Commission of India", *Election Commission of India (ECI)*, <https://eci.gov.in>

¹¹ Editorial, "EC Estimates Rs 10,000 Crore Needed Every 15 Years for New EVMs If Simultaneous Polls Held", *NDTV*, <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/ec-estimates-rs-10-000-crore-needed-every-15-years-for-new-evms-if-simultaneous-polls-held-4898470>

¹² One Nation, One Election Bill: Lok Sabha Bill. <https://www.sastv.in/general/one-nation-one-election-bill-lok-sabha-approves-introduction-of-jamili-bill-2024-12-17-251>

¹³ The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024", <https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-constitution-one-hundred-and-twenty-ninth-amendment-bill-2024>.

Constitution, things like federalism and accountability. Term limits for ONOE may therefore offend this doctrine. For instance, if Tamil Nadu's assembly dissolved in 1991 under the proposed *Article 82A*, elections would be deferred until 2029, potentially under President's Rule—an erosion of democratic responsiveness.

Article 356, historically misused (e.g., Karnataka, 1989), is curtailed by ONOE¹⁴, but the absence of mid-term elections limits accountability. Legal scholars suggest the Supreme Court may intervene if ONOE excessively centralizes power. Securing two-thirds parliamentary approval and ratification by half the states, as debated by the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) in March 2025, remains a formidable challenge.

3.3 Practical Polity & Implications

YSRCP dominated Andhra Pradesh state polls in 2019 while BJP retained power at the national level, and in such contests, local and national priorities would emerge. The synchrony of the elections would pick out all these fine details and sell a stronger national narrative over regional ones. By 2025, leaders like West Bengal's Mamata Banerjee have labelled ONOE a “centralizing tactic” (*TMC rally, January 2025*)¹⁵, a view echoed by the DMK's Stalin as “anti-federal.”¹⁶ Logistically, equipping 13.6 lakh polling stations for a single event is daunting, potentially diluting localized issues—like Assam's flood concerns—within broader national debates.

4. Evaluating Stability and Democracy

4.1 Advantages: The Case for Stability

Syncing governance activities is expected to improve it significantly from now going forward. The ground should be cleared from MCC to bring back from stoppage a ₹12,000 crore worth of roadworks projects that started in 2019. However exorbitant the first expenditure cost in EMV, it's going to save most of all costs an unprecedented amount of ₹30,000 crore in each five years. The requirement for security personnel is reduced from 2.5 million to merely about 7 lakhs at its best. Between 1951 and 1967, it was shown how alignment assisted in the foundation laying of obligatory projects, e.g., in dam and college construction. “*Committee on Kovind 2023*” adds that the GDP will increase by 1.5 points (₹4.5 lakh crore) besides a rise of 0.5 points in capital formation, which will decipher infrastructure and job creation. Then the political leaders could go from campaigning to governing, yielding tangible results.

4.2 Disadvantages: Democratic Trade offs¹⁷

This provides democracy in open terms, but in case the Karnataka government bends down in 2026 for *Article 82A*, it will likely curse democracy with federalism. Probably state agencies are deprived and the President's Rule will persist till 2029. Probably, the state agency will be deprived, and President's Rule is going to prevail until 2029. Without mid-term elections, accountability is reduced as it had happened in the previous no confidence moves (e.g., Vajpayee, 1999). Threat of much overshadowed regional diversity related flood priorities of Assam get lost in national economic discussions. NITI Aayog¹⁸ notes that health expenditure remains at 2% of GDP, an issue election underline rather than resolve. ONOE reduces campaign burdens, but perhaps stasis encouraged by fixed terms and a projected increase of 1.28% in the fiscal deficit (₹3 lakh crore) cancels out some gain. Efficiency, which stability enhances, could thus be contradicted by the dynamism that democracy architected.

4.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis¹⁹

Factor	Benefit (Pro-ONOE)	Cost (Anti-ONOE)
Governance	4.5 years of uninterrupted action	Prolonged unrepresentative mandates

¹⁴ One Nation One Election”, *Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law & Justice*, <https://legalaffairs.gov.in/one-nation-one-election>

¹⁵ “Parliament of India - Lok Sabha”, *Parliament of India - Lok Sabha*, <https://loksabha.nic.in>

¹⁶ Editorial, “One Nation, One Election: India's Imperative Need”, *Elets eGov*, <https://egov.eletsonline.com/2024/05/one-nation-one-election-indias-imperative-need/>

¹⁷ Review: Modi's India and the Decline of Democracy”, *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/28/modis-india-hindu-nationalism-democracy-decline-book-review/>

¹⁸ ebroy, Bibek & Desai, Kishore, “NITI Aayog Report on Simultaneous Elections, 2017”, *NITI Aayog*, https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_elections/NITI_AYOG_REPORT_2017.pdf

¹⁹ Press Note on One Nation, One Election” (December 16, 2024), <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2086789>.

Cost	₹30,000 crore saved long-term	₹7,951 crore initial investment
Federalism	Streamlined Centre-State alignment	Reduced state autonomy
Accountability	Emphasis on delivery	Loss of mid-term corrections
Economic Impact	₹4.5 lakh crore GDP boost	1.28% fiscal deficit increase

The basic financial argument is compelling the savings exceed the initial costs, and gross national product benefits are substantial. However, moving from federalism and accountability has latent risks which may outstrip economic benefits in a diverse polity²⁰.

4.4 Current Dynamics

In the JPC discussion on ONOE, leaders like Mamata Banerjee, MK Stalin, etc. will raise their objections against such centralizing measures. People want results at 7% inflation and regional crises rather than the mechanics of elections. If the issue is about the stakes of federalism, the Supreme Court is the contentious deciding authority. Programme activities pertaining to 13,60,000 polling stations are underway but approval on the parliamentary and state levels remains to be seen²¹. ONOE which means all facets of administrative and economic advancement, but perhaps India will never outgrow its pluralistic reality²².

5. Kovind Committee²³

A high-level committee on simultaneous elections, headed by ex-President Ram Nath Kovind in 2023, makes quite a strong economic argument in favor of ONOE. Among other estimates and inference, the committee maintains that synchronizing the Lok Sabha and state assembly elections will reduce inflation by 1.1 percentage points. Such an estimate is predicated on the premise of an individual electoral cycle that can minimize the frequent disruption to government spending and policy implementation for about 100 days every year due to the imposition of the MCC. With this, the argument advanced by the Kovind Committee is that ONOE may render macroeconomic conditions more predictable, help keep peaks in election linked expenditures down, and increase investor confidence. Proponents of this argument further link this inflation reduction with an overall GDP gain of 1.5 percentage points—the equivalent of ₹4.5 lakh crore in 2024 terms—and a half a point increase in Gross Fixed Capital Formation, signifying better infrastructure investment²⁴. These much-publicized accounts, as in India Today (2023), depict ONOE as a serious and giant reform to shift India's economic balances toward meeting and serving her developmental objectives. But, these estimates of the economy come with several qualifying conditions. The Kovind Committee acknowledges a possible trade off, with an immediate debt being fine that could jump by 1.28%, putting a cost of ₹3 lakh crore²⁵ on the governments that could fund election related expenditures, alongside changes in infrastructure development (like ₹7,951 crore for EVMs and VVPATs by 2029)²⁶. If extra long-term savings of ₹30,000 crore every five years would ultimately reciprocate this initial strain, yet the strain underlays how unwieldy implementation goes in the scenario of concerted efforts. This assumption of an inflation reduction by the committee also presupposes a smooth culvert implementation of ONOE, especially those around the synchronization of 13.6 lakh polling stations and 7 lakh security personnel.

Simultaneously, the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) which was constituted to consider and review The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024 remains in session discussing as of March 2025. The very essential part of discussion evolves between administrative efficiency and federal diversity. The very anticipated implications of ONOE are encompassed in such conflict. Some proponents within the JPC endorse the economic rationale of the Kovind Committee arguing synchronization would free governance from MCC constraints and allow for 4.5 years of uninterrupted implementation of

²⁰ Prakash, Bhaswat, "One Nation One Election: A Comparative Analysis From Voter Behavior to Political Polarization", *SSRN*, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=5007991>

²¹ Editorial, "The Future of Democracy in India", *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/article/future-democracy-india>

²² "The Congress May Be Able to Reinvent Itself if India Remains a Democracy", *India Today*, <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/interview/story/20200803-the-congress-may-be-able-to-reinvent-itself-if-india-remains-a-democracy-christophe-jaffrelot-1704288-2020-07-25>

²³ "High Level Committee Submits Its Report on One Nation, One Election - Simultaneous Elections Core to Aspirational India" (March 13, 2024), <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2014917>.

²⁴ Prakash, Bhaswat, "One Nation One Election: A Comparative Analysis From Voter Behavior to Political Polarization", *SSRN*, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=5007991>

²⁵ Kumar, Ashwani, "Simultaneous Elections: A Policy Debate", in *Electoral Politics in India: The 21st Century Context*

policy. It is said to be in tune with historical evidence from 1951 to 1967²⁷ when aligned elections yielded dividends for landmark projects like Bhakra Nangal Dam and the Green Revolution. Yet the debates going on in the JPC talk much about the questions of deep-seated federalism-the pillar of India's constitutional framework according to the 1973 Kesavananda Bharati judgment.

Critics were concerned that ONOE could centralize electoral powers and silence state specific voices, which included representatives from regional parties like the Trinamool Congress (TMC) and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). Thus, Mamata Banerjee is screaming against the "BJP chokehold on states" (Kolkata rally, February 2025) while MK Stalin said the proposal is "anti-federal," suggesting fears that national campaigns would overshadow regional priorities such as Assam's flood management or Andhra Pradesh's irrigation needs²⁸.

Discussions in the JPC thus highlight a broader philosophical divide whereby ONOE induced efficiency may streamline governance but perhaps at the price of democratic pluralism. Here practical questions with which the committee wrestles relate to a vision of how to bring fixed five-year terms under Articles 83(2) and 172(1) into the picture of accountability at mid-term, or in what way Article 356 (President's Rule) could not become a device to enforce synchronization.

6. Conclusion

ONOE provides a radically different vision: synchronized elections, savings of ₹30,000 crore, a GDP boost of ₹4.5 lakh crore, and 4.5 years of focused governance, akin to the stability of the years 1951-67²⁹. But the essence of democracy itself-federalism, accountability, and diversity-may be curtailed by Article 82A's rigidity, bordering states' autonomy, the voters' power to correct as well as the regional issues themselves. Such tall claims may see the light of day when JPC meets in March, 2025, although convincing broad consensus on the proposals may be tough deliberations. With the economic incentives being very tempting, the fact remains that there is also a 1.28 percent increase in the deficit and regional dissent, which do temper optimism³⁰. India has fashioned a democratic vitality out of its diversity, and probably, cannot be moulded into a synchronous model. Thus, the challenge remains: achieving stability without forgoing the country's pluralistic core.

References include Books, Journals & Websites

Books

1. Jaffrelot, Christophe, Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021). The Centralization of Power" (Chapter 5, pp. 187–234)
2. Choudhry, Sujit, Khosla, Madhav & Mehta, Pratap Bhanu (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2016) "Federalism" by Louise Tillin (Chapter 11, pp. 239–262).
3. Singh, M.P. & Saxena, Rekha, Federalizing India in the Age of Globalization (Primus Books, 2013). "Elections and Federal Dynamics" (Chapter 6, pp. 135–168).
4. Kumar, Ashwani, Electoral Politics in India: The 21st Century Context (Routledge India, 2020). "Simultaneous Elections: A Policy Debate" (Chapter 9, pp. 201–225).

Websites

1. One Nation One Election Official Website, <https://onoe.gov.in>
2. Press Information Bureau (PIB), <https://pib.gov.in>
3. PRS Legislative Research, <https://prsindia.org>
4. Election Commission of India (ECI), <https://eci.gov.in>

Journals

1. Tillin, Louise, "Federalism and Democracy in India: The Challenges of ONOE", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 59, No. 10 (March 9, 2024), pp. 45–52.
2. Prakash, Bhaswat, "One Nation One Election: A Comparative Analysis From Voter Behavior to Political Polarization", SSRN (November 2,

²⁷ Editorial, "One Nation, One Election: Kovind Panel Report Set to Be Placed Before Cabinet", *Hindustan Times*, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/one-nation-one-election-kovind-panel-report-set-to-be-placed-before-cabinet-at-the-earliest-101718>

²⁸ Editorial, "Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs", *Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs*, <https://mpa.gov.in>

²⁹ Press Note on One Nation, One Election" (December 16, 2024), <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2086789>.

³⁰ Jaffrelot, Christophe, "Populism Against Democracy or People Against Democracy?", *Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)*, <https://www.csdn.in/events/lecture-christophe-jaffrelot-populism-against-democracy-or-people-against-democracy>

2024),

3. Debroy, Bibek & Desai, Kishore, "Simultaneous Elections: Economic and Administrative Implications", NITI Aayog Working Paper (2017)