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Religious Studies through A Historical-Critical Approach: An Offer from Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi'

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ABSTRACT:

Related to the 9/11 *tragedy* presenting Islam as accused with a negative image. In the non-Muslim Western view, Islam is justified as a religion that teaches violence, and *intolerance* and is a threat to Western civilization. It's very clear how things have changed the *image* West towards Islam which is marked by the strengthening of the phenomenon of *Islamophobia*, so disturbing Muslims, therefore Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi' tried to clarify that the true face of Islam is not single. At the same time, Abu Rabi' sees that violence and religion are very complex phenomena, thus requiring a critical reading of the dynamics of religion, politics, and economics in the Islamic world, where the complex factors of colonialism, modernism, and nationalism play a role in triggering its occurrence. violence in the name of religion. At the same time, Abu Rabi' saw that many Muslim countries had accepted modernization after the era of independence, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt, which had encouraged modernization in the field of education and their institutions by creating open education for all their citizens. However, in other Muslim countries, there are still a number of policies that reject the modernization of education with the hidden aim of continuing to maintain education and *the status quo*. Seeing this reality, Muslim countries need a pluralistic and inclusive educational environment, where educational institutions accept curriculum updates. Therefore, he believes that there is a need to renew the educational curriculum with efforts to critically read history by utilizing various approaches, such as sociological, anthropological, and inclusive theology and texts. The combination of these various approaches became Abu Rabi's offer in Islamic Study Methods. Ibrahim Abu Rabi' tries to explain why attacks against the West by Muslim groups can occur. Starting his exploration, Abu Rabi' tried to examine the tragedy from a historical perspective. For example, he started by questioning the Islamic education system and the development of Islamic studies, especially those related to social sciences in a number of Arab-Islamic countries, the Islamic response to Western progress, and the response of Islamic elites to all of this.

Keynote: Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', Religion, History, Modernism, Colonialism

Introduction

The destruction of the WTC twin Towers in an attack that became known as the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the 911 *tragedy*, [1] became a very decisive foothold in the history of modern Islam. Event *Black Thursday of September* has changed the *image* of the Western world towards Islam, which is marked by the strengthening of symptoms of Islamophobia, a phenomenon of fear of Western non-Muslims towards Islam - and Islamic society - by creating the *stereotype* that Islamic society is radical, terrorist, anti-Western, anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, rejects democracy and so on.

The link between this tragic incident and the suspect has not yet been fully clarified, but it cannot be denied that as a result of the events of September 11, attention to Islam increased sharply. One response to this attention is the release of information about Islam aimed at Westerners who have minimal information about the Islamic religion. This incident has also overturned the West's belief in the truth of the messages of peace and goodness which are at the core of religious teachings, which have disappeared and been replaced by raging anger, violence, and outbursts of bloody hatred.

This bloody incident also raised questions about whether violence and Islam are (actually) inseparable - or is it true that violence and Islam are two sides of the same coin? It is in this context that Islam has come under sharp scrutiny and has even been made an "accused religion" which is strongly suspected of being behind a series of acts of terrorism. Or also, there are also parties linking Islam as a sacred religion and teaching peace, it even becomes a mercy

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[1] On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the group Al-Qaeda carried out a deadly attack. The devastating attack on the United States, crashing planes into the Pentagon and the World Trade Center (WTC), killed thousands of people. That morning, four teams of terrorists hijacked jetliners departing from Boston, Newark, New Jersey, and Washington DC. Once airborne, the terrorists killed the plane's pilot and took control of the plane. At 08:46 AM, the first plane crashed into the north tower of the WTC in southern Manhattan, tearing the building apart and setting it on fire. Seventeen minutes later, at 9:03 a.m., a second plane flew into the south tower, crashing into it and causing similar damage. At 9:43 AM, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon, Virginia, destroying one side of the military headquarters. The fourth plane flew toward Washington, D.C., but at 10:10 crashed in western Pennsylvania. As a result of this tragedy, around 2,819 people died and thousands more suffered severe physical injuries or psychological trauma.

for all with the violence that occurs in the world.[1] By placing events on *Black Thursday of September* Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', was challenged to explain Western claims about Islam as a violent religion. Violence is considered a phenomenon inherent to Islamic teachings and rooted in religious texts. Westerners also wonder about the relationship between violence and sacredness in Islam. It doesn't stop there, Ibrahim is challenged to explain this problem down to the theological roots that trigger violence (*theology of violence*). Furthermore, Abu Rabi' tried to explain why attacks by Muslim groups against the West could occur. Through his exploration, Abu Rabi' also explains the importance of historical criticism in Islamic studies by utilizing various approaches such as; social sciences, history, critical philosophy, anthropology, and normative-theological approaches, thereby producing a complete understanding of Islam. This paper seeks to explore his thoughts regarding the development of Islamic studies and its relationship with social sciences in a number of Arab-Islamic countries.

The Intellectual Adventure of Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi'

A thought is not born from a vacuum. Likewise, when it comes to understanding a thought, one cannot just dismiss it without understanding the socio-historical background behind it. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi' (Abu Rabi') was born in 1956 in Nazareth, Galilee, Palestine. He holds dual citizenship; United States and Israel. His educational level is Ph.D (1987) from Temple University, Philadelphia (Department of Religion), Islamic Studies, his dissertation was entitled "*Islam and Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: An Intellectual Biography of Shaykh 'Abd al-Halim Mahmud*"; MA (1983) from Temple University (Department of Religion), Religious Studies; MA (1982) from the University of Cincinnati (Department of Political Science), Political Science: Middle Eastern Studies and International Relations; BA (1980) from Birzeit University (Department of English), 1980, English Literature; and Catholic High School at St. Joseph Seminary, Nazareth.

Abu Rabi's academic career includes being chair of the board of the Edmonton Muslim Society in Islamic Studies at the Department of History and Classics, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. In addition, he is co-director of the Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations, and is also Senior Editor of "*The Muslim World*". Has served as Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies at Virginia Commonwealth University Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies and Rockefeller Fellowship at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, co-coordinator of the Luce Forum on Abrahamic religions jointly managed by the University of Hartford and Hartford Seminary, and Program Chair of the Annual Conference of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies.

Abu Rabi' has experience teaching at various higher education institutions in several countries. These include the Al-Fatih Al-Islami Institute in Damascus, Syria, the Becket Institute at Oxford University, the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, the International Islamic University in Daru El-Ehsan Malaysia, the Ecumenical Tantur Institute in Jerusalem, Israel, Virginia Commonwealth University, Temple University in Pennsylvania, the University of Cincinnati and the University of Texas at Austin, and Union Theological Seminary in New York City. In 2006, he was a s*enior Fulbright Scholar* in Singapore and Indonesia at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Meanwhile, the fields of study he teaches include Modern Islam; Al-Qur'an; the Life of the Prophet Muhammad (*Head*); Islamic Mysticism and Worship Practices; Modern and Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History; Modern History of the Middle East and North Africa; Modern Indonesian History, Islam and the West; Christian-Muslim Relations; Comparative Muslim Culture; and History of Islamic Philosophy. His areas of study are Islamic Studies, World Religions, Mysticism, Religion and Sociology, Religion and Political Philosophy, Political Science, and Middle Eastern History. Apart from that, also Religion and Psychology, Religion and Politics, and Religion and Historical Methods. Seeing his study competencies, it is not surprising that he has a special interest in the study and practice of interreligious dialogue between Christian and Islamic religious traditions. He also specializes in issues of contemporary Islamic thought, especially on religion and society, and mysticism. Besides Arabic, he also speaks Hebrew, English, Turkish and French.

Abu Rabi' is also known as a figure who really respects the views of his predecessors, such as Moh. Abduh, Rasyid Ridha, Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, and Hasan Al-Attar, have made many contributions to the roots of thinking that is developing today. Honestly, he called this the root of intellectualism. A number of his works, both in book and article form, have been translated into various languages, including Indonesian.[2] Some of the awards he has received include; 1976-1980: A Four-year scholarship awarded by Birzeit University, 1980-1981: A research scholarship from the University of Cincinnati, 1981-1982 A teaching scholarship from the University of Cincinnati, 1982-1983: A research scholarship from Temple University, 1983-1985: Teaching assistantship at Temple University, 1985-1987: Desertation Research Fellowship from Temple University, 1987-1988: Post-doctoral fellowship from Temple University.

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[2] Among his works are: (1)*Work in Progress Neoliberalism and Its Discontent: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Thought*. (2) *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), (3) *Reprint of Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), (4) *Islamic Resurgence and the Challenge of the Contemporary World: A Round-Table Discussion with Professor Khurshid Ahmad* (Tampa: The World and Islam Institute, 1995), (5) *The Pearls of Wisdom by the North African Mystic Ibn al-Sabbagh* (Albany: State University of New York Press). Meanwhile, his written works in the form of articles include: A Post September 11 Critical Assessment of Modern Islamic History (2002); Between Sacred Text and Cultural Constructions: Modern Islam as Intellectual History" in*Muslim World Book Review*, Volume 20(3), 2000; "Arabism, Islamism, and the Future of the Arab World: A Review Essay" dalam *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Volume 22(1), 2000; "Christian-Muslim Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Indonesia" dalam *Islamochristiana*, volume 24 (1998); "Globalization: A Contemporary Response" dalam *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Volume 15(3), 1998; dan "An Islamic Response to Modernity," dalam *The Islamic Horizons* (March/April 1998).

Research trips he has undertaken include: in 1984 for three months to Turkey, Italy, India, Thailand, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, and Japan; 1985 for five months in Egypt; 1986 for three months in the Philippines; 1987 for three months in Portugal; 1988 for six months in Türkiye; 1991 for two months in Türkiye, Syria, and Jordan; 1995 for two months in Malaysia and Indonesia; 1996 for one month in Indonesia; 1997 for eight months in Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Indonesia, and in 1998 for two months in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.[3]

Abu Rabi' died in Amman Jordan, on July 2, 2011, at the age of 56 due to a heart attack. He leaves behind a wife named Fatima and two children, Yasmin, and Yusuf. He is remembered for his passion for work, for his strong support of his colleagues and students, and for his care and compassion for all." "Abraham's contributions to the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations at Hartford Seminary were enormous and reached throughout the world. We will never forget it." President Heidi Hadsell said.

One of his works in the form of articles that is widely known is the article entitled *A post-September 11 Critical Assessment of Modern Islamic History* an article that explains three important points, which Abu Rabi' wants to elaborate on, namely: 1) modern historical developments, 2) education in the Islamic world, 3) contemporary elites and religious revival in the Arab world.

Modern Historical Development

The history of the modern Western world in the 14th century cannot be separated from its close relationship with the Islamic world. This can at least be seen in the reconstruction of Europe in the early days which was motivated by the desire to fight the hegemony of the Islamic world in North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. For example, in the 15th century, there were three major events that had varying impacts on the history of Islamic-Western relations; *First* conquest of the Turkish dynasty *Ottoman* against Constantinople in 1453;[4] *Second*, the expulsion of Muslims from Spain; *Third* the discovery of the new continent of Europe by Columbus. It is quite difficult to understand the formation of modern Europe apart from these 3 events, which were also influenced by internal European changes such as the Reformation and Renaissance.[5]

It can be said that Columbus's discovery of Europe was an important discovery because it paved the way for European imperialism and colonialism toward the third world, including Islamic countries. Moreover, since the growth of European capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries, Europe has had a strong interest in colonizing the third world to obtain cheap natural resources and at the same time place it as a trade center. The peak of European colonialism occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when almost all powers in Europe sought new colonies.

This colonialism subsequently caused political and religious formations in the Islamic world to begin to weaken at the beginning of the 19th century. Abu Rabi' explained two important reasons for the weakening of the Islamic world: *First*, central government stagnation and failure to modernize society before the rise of Europe, and *second*, the expansion of European power in the Muslim world, as a result of Europe's extraordinary internal development. For Abu Rabi', Western colonization in many parts of the Muslim world in the 19th century was a reflection of internal Muslim stagnation and the victory of the European model of society and economy.

As a response to Western domination and glory in various fields, in the 18th and 19th centuries, Islamic movements emerged which called on Muslims to overcome their disadvantages and backwardness. They attempted to reconstruct the religious, social, political, and economic institutions of the modern Islamic world. In Abu Rabi's view, this response can be identified in at least three movements: *modernization*, *nationalism*, and *religious revivalism*.

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[3] Notes on the life history of Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', especially regarding educational background, his work is extracted from http//www http://www.macdonald.hartsem.edu/aburabi.htm, and his death from http//www.hartsem.edu/2011 /07/seminary-community-mourns-death-ibrahim-aburabi/.htm, accessed 18 October 2017

[4] Politically, relations between Muslims and Christians (Western Europe) reflect continuous confrontation. Since the end of the 7th century AD, Islam began to expand and knock on the doors of Christianity. In this period, almost the entire Mediterranean region - from Anatolia (Turkey) to the Gibaltral Strait was controlled by Muslims. Several years later after annexing the Iberian peninsula, the Muslims took control of the Pyrenees. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, the Crusades lasted for 2 centuries between 1095 and 1291, and ended with a Muslim victory when the Crusaders were successfully expelled from Palestine. But the spirit of the Cross never died. In 1396, around 100,000 Christian troops – the largest army ever assembled by Europe – invaded Ottoman Turkey but were defeated at the battle of Nicopolis in 1453. Europe was once again on the defensive when it fought with the Ottoman Turks for Constantinople, which in 1453 fell to the Turks. Ottoman. See Azyumardi Azra, *Islamic Political Upheaval; from Fundamentalism, Modernity to Post-Modernism* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), 196, 200-201.

[5] If modern Western history is closely related to the three events above, the arrival of the modern era in the Muslim world coincided with the birth of 3 kingdoms in the Islamic world in the early 16th century, namely: the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, the Safavid Empire in Persia, and the Mughal Empire in India. These three kingdoms were complex manifestations of Islamic entities related to the economic, political, and cultural realities of these kingdoms, far from being a simple religious phenomenon. Compared with the early Islamic period of the seventh century, Islam in the early modern period was no longer simple as practiced by the Prophet and his students. All three kingdoms were multi-religious and multi-ethnic. And interestingly, these governments did not make Islam a *sentry point* them. Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September 11,* 22-23.

Modernization

If examined further, modernization began in Turkey during the reign of Sultan Ahmad II (1703-1730).[6] However, modernization in the pre-modern era[7] did not bring the expected results. Because modernization at that time was only focused on the military sector. Meanwhile, other fields, such as science, are not given much attention. Furthermore, pre-modern modernization was also carried out by Sultan Salim III (1789-1807). Salim introduced a modernization program known as *Nizam-i-Jedid*.[8] However, this modernization met with resistance from the ulama and military groups *Jenniseri*,[9] and finally Sultan Salim III himself became a victim of the boomerang of his modernization program, he was overthrown in 1807.[10]

This failed modernization effort was then continued by his successor, namely Sultan Mahmud II (1807-1839). By taking lessons from the failures of his predecessors, he tried to realize his desires by modernizing various fields, such as the military, law and education. After the death of Sultan Mahmud II, modernization efforts in the Turkish kingdom *Ottoman* continued by a number of intellectual figures in one movement called *reorganization* (1839-1871).[11]

Political and military elite government *Ottoman* realized the importance of taking steps towards total modernity if he wanted his kingdom to remain prosperous. The pioneers of Turkey's modernization were bureaucrats and intellectuals, including religious intellectuals, who were behind this modernization.[12] However, these modernization efforts could not maintain the existence of the Ottoman empire. At the end of the First World War (1914-1918), the Turkish empire *Ottoman* finally collapsed after ruling for almost 7 centuries.[13]

Even though these modernization efforts failed to save the empire, the seeds of secularism emerged from a small group of intellectuals who considered that the only solution to save the country from backwardness and destruction was Westernization.[14] As was done by Kemal Attaturk after seizing power in 1923. Attaturrk carried out de-Islamization through 6 (six) points, including; *First*, republican principles, *second*, nationalism, *third*, principles of statehood, *fourth*, a populist principle which is interpreted as protecting human rights and equality before the law, *fifth*, secularism, *sixth*, revolutionism.[15]

Nationalism

The next Muslim response to Western domination in the 19th century was nationalism.[16] In the middle of this century, nationalism developed rapidly so this century became known as the century of nationalism. Nationalism, as Anderson puts it "is a view of a nation or political community as limited, inherent and sovereign, more limited than the view of ummah as existing in the Christian tradition (*Christendom*) and Islam (*Ummah*)."[17] While Hans Kohn gives the definition, "is a formulation of thought that requires the individual's highest loyalty to be devoted to the nation-state."[18] In other words, the element of loyalty or fidelity is used as a shared political identity to determine common goals through realization in the form of a political

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[6] For example, at that time military exercises were held using modern cannons, which were trained by a trainer from France, Comte de Bonneval, who later converted to Islam. In carrying out his duties, Bonneval was assisted by several military experts from various countries, for example Macarity (Ireland), Ramsay (Scotland), and Mornai (France). Check Nasution, *Reform in Islam*, 16.

[7] The Modern Era began in 1798, namely after Napoleon's French invasion of Egypt. See A. Luthfi Al-Shaukani, "Typology and Discourse of Contemporary Arab Thought" in *Paramadina: Journal of Islamic Thought*, Full. 1 (July, 1998), 61.

[8] Modernization program *Nizam-i-Jedid* included: the creation of a new military corps, expansion of the taxation system, and training to educate the new regime's cadres. See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezelkual Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1. Compare with A. Syafiq Mughni, *History of Islamic Culture in Turkey* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1997), 121.

[9] Jenniseri was a unit of young people taken from several colonial countries of the Empire *Uthmânîyyah*. They are educated and trained like soldiers. Check Mukti Ali, *Islam and Secularism in Modern Türkiye* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1994), 60. This army is also called *Inkishariah*, namely a new model of army that was formed during the Oukhan era (1326-1359), and they were paid a fixed salary. Check Hamka, *History of Muslims III* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1981), 109. The members of this army were Balkan Christian children who grew up in Turkey, and then converted to Islam. For more details see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 209.

[10] Ira M. Lapidus, *A. History of Islamic Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 589

[11] *Ibid. reorganization*, according to the language, means to arrange, organize and repair. Meanwhile, according to the term, it means a movement which is a continuation of the reform efforts carried out by Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) to improve, regulate and formulate new regulations and laws. The reform movement in Turkey in the 19th century was motivated by several factors, namely: 1) European pressure on the Ottomans to protect European citizens who were under Ottoman rule, 2) the imposition of the death penalty for apostate Europeans, and this was not liked by Europeans , and 3) the Tanzimat figures wanted to limit the absolute power of the sultan because they had been influenced by the French Revolution when studying in the West. Check Nina M. Armando (ed.), *Islamic Encyclopedia* (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2005), volume VII, 69. Mustafa Rasyid Pasha and Mehmed Sadik Rifat Pasha (1807 – 1856) were the two figures driving this movement. Due to the influence of these two figures, several laws and regulations were issued, including; in 1839, Abdul Majid, Mahmud II's successor, issued *Hatt-I Syerif Gulhane* (Gulhane Charter) and *Hat-I Humayun* (Humayun's Charter) in 1856. In the introduction to the Humayun's Charter, it is stated that its aim was to strengthen the guarantees contained in the Gulhane Charter, especially regarding the position of Europeans. Further see Harun Nasution, *Reform in Islam History of Thought and Movement* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1992), 97-104.

[12] Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September 11*", 24

[13] Ira M. Lapidus, *A. History of Islamic*, 595-6.

[14] Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September 11*", 24

[15] Syamsuddin Arif, "*Modernity, Secularization, and Religion*" in *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization: Islamiah*, Vol., III No., 2 (Januari-Maret, 2007), 38.

[16] Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September 11*", 24

[17] Ibid

To further discuss the history, theological roots, and politics of Muhammadiyah and NU, check out Khalimi, *Islamic mass organizations; History, Theological Roots, and Politics* (Jakarta: Gaung Persada Press, 2010), 307-40.

[18] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism Meaning and History,* trans. Sumantri Mertodipuro (Jakarta: PT. Pembangunan and Erlangga, 1984), 11.

organizational entity built on geopolitics; consisting of population, geography, and government which is called a country or *state*. The ideas and spirit of nationalism were ignited in the second phase of the 19th century as a response to the difficulties of the Muslim world and the challenges of European nations.[19]

It was these nationalist movements that led the nation to fight against the colonialists to establish a different nation-state in the Muslim world. However, the fact is that nationalist leaders from the Muslim world do not use religious themes in their speeches and slogans. They include Ahmad Sukarno in Indonesia, Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Pakistan, and Jamal Abd al-Nasser in Egypt.[20] Even though in their struggle they showed a political attitude that was against the West, they tried to build society using Western philosophy.

Overall, nationalism in the Islamic world according to Abu Rabi' aims to free itself from imperial colonialism in two important ways, namely spiritual and institutional. According to Partha Chatterjee's view, as quoted by Abu Rabi', at a spiritual level, nationalism seeks certainty in the country's sovereignty, past, and cultural identity. Meanwhile, at the institutional level, nationalism tries to build the country by learning Western science and building Western institutions.[21]

India is an interesting example of nationalist efforts, as most of the nineteenth-century Indian intelligentsia, regardless of their religious affiliation, united around the ambitious nationalist program of ridding the country of British domination.[22] But this "harmony" did not last long, because in 1938 Ali Jinnah (from the Muslim League) presented the theory of "two nations" and officially expressed the demand for a separate Muslim homeland. In a 1940 resolution, the Muslim League called for the creation of the state of Pakistan.[23]In 1971 East Pakistan separated from Pakistan and established the country of Bangladesh.[24]

Islamic Revivalist

The next response to the challenge of European colonization was revivalism. Revivalist movements in the modern Islamic world can be divided into four groups:

a. Pre-colonial

The *pre-colonial Islamic revivalist* movement can be seen in the Wahabi Movement of the early 18th century. A movement pioneered by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1787) was formed as a reaction to the internal decadence of Muslims that had infected *bid'ah* and *khurafat*. Therefore, this movement seeks to purify religious practices in the fields of Islamic law and theology that have deviated (deviations). For this purpose, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab allied with the Saudi rulers at that time.[25]

b. *Colonial Revivalism*

Colonial Islamic Revivalism was represented by the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations in Indonesia[26], these two large organizations that were founded in the first half of the 20th century were grouped into the religious revivalism movement during the colonial period.[27] Organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (*The Moslem Brotherhood*) in Egypt which was founded in 1928 and *Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* in India, which was founded by Abu A'la al-Maududi (1903-1979), can also be categorized into these two groups (Muhammadiyah and NU). All of these organizations are mass movements founded in the era of colonialism. As a response to colonialism, these organizations were oriented towards the socio-religious field, committed to ambitious programs such as reforming Islamic education, controlling political power, and preparing for the implementation of Sharia in the wider Islamic society.[28] Unfortunately, Abu Rabi's article, in the colonial period, does not include the work of Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1897) who attempted to

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[19] Abu Rabi', *"A Post-September 11"*, 24-25

20 Ibid., 25

[21] Ibid.

22 Ibid

23. Although Pakistan succeeded in seceding from India, since separation there has been some confusion about the true identity of Pakistan. Was Pakistan created for Indian Muslims or was it created as an Islamic State? The work background of Pakistan's founders (such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah) and the movements behind the creation of the state reflect this uncertainty. What is certain is that only a portion of Indian Muslims were interested in migrating to Pakistan after partition, and initially, the Jama'ah Islamiyyah—founded by Abu al-A'la al-Maududy in 1941, stood against partition on the grounds that the creation of a Pakistani state would limit the future of the Islamic State lies solely with Pakistan. The movement to establish Pakistan was spearheaded by class *employee* (salary earners) North Indian Muslims, a class that was "a product of the transformation of colonial India's social structure in the nineteenth century and consisted of those who had received an education that would equip them for work in the colonial state as scribes and functionaries." This class does not represent the interests of the majority of Muslim farmers in rural India or those who are Muslims in southern India. This helps explain why the majority of Muslims in the South and in rural areas did not migrate to Pakistan after the partition. The founding of Pakistan, however, did not solve the problems of Muslims in India. In 1971, Pakistan lost East Pakistan, and Bangladesh was founded under the name of Bengali Nationalism. Ibid 25.

24. Lapidus, *A. History of Islamic Societies*, 621.

25. Abu Rabi', *"A Post-September 11"*, 25. Regarding the notes on Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab read Khaled Abou Fadl's work,*Save Islam from Puritan Muslims*, especially in the chapter "the rise of the Early Puritan Period: The Origins of the Wahhabis", see Khaled Abou Fadl,*Save Islam from Puritan Muslims*, trans. Helmi Mustafa, (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2005), 61-92

26. To further discuss the history, theological roots, and politics of Muhammadiyah and NU, check out Khalimi,*Islamic mass organizations; History, Theological Roots, and Politics* (Jakarta: Gaung Persada Press, 2010), 307-40.

27. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and*Jama'at al-Islami* in India can also be included in the group of movements that emerged at this time.

[28]. Abu Rabi', *"A Post-September 11"*, 25.

introduce*unity* or*one* known as Pan-Islamism (Islamic unity). The concept of Pan-Islamism is the most revolutionary in that it includes religious feelings, national feelings, and radicalism towards Europe which will later be united in all Muslim individuals.[29]

c. *Post-Colonial Revivalism*

Islamic revivalist movements during this period emerged as a reaction to the following conditions: the establishment of nation-states in the Islamic world in the mid-20th century; supervision of religious institutions by the state; and failure of nation-states in various fields. Facing these conditions, some of them carry out extreme interpretations of religion and resort to violence to achieve their goals. An important case in point is the Jihad in Egypt (*The Egyptian Jihad*) in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the Taliban movement in Afghanistan which emerged in the context of the disintegration of nation-states and states*chaos* after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the late 1980s and the United States in the 1990s. The Taliban was founded in response to the failure of a secular and constructive nation-state civil *society* the new one.[30]

d. *Post-Nation-State*

The Taliban movement if you look at the background of its founding, was disappointed with the failure of a secular nation-state to create *a society* new ones, can also be grouped into Islamic revivalist movements in the nation-state. The main goal of the movement is to end domestic violence and chaos, stop all forms of foreign intervention, and restore the dignity of civil society, asylum seekers, and women.[31] Osama bin Laden's movement[32] with the Al-Qaeda network can also be categorized in this group, as can the Egyptian Jihad. These movements emerged at a time when secularism and the nation-state had failed and when the possibility of building a new Islamic order emerged.

These movements (the Taliban, Egyptian Jihad, and al-Qaeda) were all born in a state of despair over social dislocation. Supporters of this movement feel they are victims of ambitious state modernization programs, such as Saudi Arabia in the 1970s, and the absence of democratic institutions in their home countries. These movements have at least two things in common: *First*, the movement aims to restore the orthodox discourse of Islam as they understand it, and *second*, a backdrop of social and military violence. Neither the Egyptian Jihad, the bin Laden movement, nor any other Islamic movement in the contemporary Arab and Islamic world has been absorbed by the ideology of the mainstream country. They are not allowed to exercise freedom of expression in a democratic environment. As long as conditions of dislocation, injustice, and lack of democratic freedom continue to prevail in the Muslim world, extreme interpretations of Islam will become the norm.[33]

Conditions of Education in the Islamic World

The discourse on Islamic education has given rise to controversy, especially when linked to classical Islamic sciences in the modern Islamic education system in Arabia and other countries. The 14th-century Arab historian, Ibn Khaldun, tried to help understand Islamic thought and Islam itself. Islamic thought refers to all developments in Muslim science such as the interpretation of the Koran,*hadîth*, fiqh, kalam, and Sufi.[34] While Islam refers to eternal revelation, Islam remains a holy religion. The significant difference between Islamic thought is that Islamic thought is an issue that is constantly changing, not the essence of Islam that is changing.

Abu Rabi' felt it necessary to put forward the idea of "what is Islam" first before talking about the history of education in the Muslim world. The theoretical discussion of Islam in Western and Muslim literature is very incomplete. As a result, Islam became the object of ideological disagreement between different writers.[35]

'Abd al-Majid al-Charfi (Tunisia) in his book "*The Modernization of Islamic Thought*", as quoted by Abu Rabi' distinguishes between "Islamic thought" and "Islam". According to him, Islamic thought refers to all branches of Muslim knowledge that develop in stages of growth, such as Qur'anic

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29 Albert Hourani, *Liberal Thought in the Arab World,* trans. Suparno et al (Bandung: Mizan, 2004), 175.

30 As a military and political phenomenon, the Taliban is a post-colonial movement (*post-colonial revivalism*). The emergence of the Taliban with military and political superiority should be attributed to the Pakistani state's active involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs and the Pakistani army's support to the Taliban after the different Mujahideen groups failed to reach an agreement on the future of Afghanistan. Ibid, 27.

31 In the chaos that engulfed Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, society called on the clerics to face challenges and install leaders. It was based on these people's aspirations that the Taliban was founded in 1990. Unfortunately, to get out of the deep suffering caused by a long period of violence in the history of modern Afghanistan, the Taliban took drastic, un-Islamic steps, namely by ordering all women to stay at home, thus losing education and job opportunities. they. According to the Taliban, the Islamic State decided to pay the women's salaries in their homes, so that they could stay and look after their families and their children. This policy aims to help revive the Afghan family and household, as the foundation of Afghan society, a foundation that the communist regime has deliberately destroyed. The Taliban movement can be said to be the only one in modern Afghan history that has succeeded in mobilizing violence to control violence in society and to create a new society and politics based on two things, namely fear of Allah and the possibility of new violence breaking out. They were able to create "a primitive egalitarian society," suspicious not only of communism, capitalism, and the West but of urban educated Afghans who, in their view, were responsible for borrowing foreign ideas that destroyed the traditional basis of Afghan society. Ibid, 26-28.

32 The bin Laden phenomenon is a product of tensions between Saudi modernization and Islamic values. Due to unlimited oil resources, the modern Saudi nation-state under the leadership of the royal family was able to launch a very ambitious modernization program in the 1970s, namely westernizing (*westernizing*) their society. The Saudi royal family has created a form of modernization without a traditional component, and without paralleling democratic institutions to guarantee political participation in society. Although the royal family enlisted the support of major clerics in its modernization program, younger clerics, primarily from the Hijaz region, were uncomfortable with the rapid pace of modernization and the inevitable impact of what they considered "orthodox Islam" manifesting itself in the bin Laden movement. Ibid.

33 Ibid, 28

34 Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah an Introduction to History, Vol II* (New York: Pantheon Book, 1958), 436.

35 Ibid., 29

interpretation, hadith studies, kalam, fiqh, and Sufism. While Islam refers to something sacred and holy. Islamic thought is subject to change, while Islam is not. [36]

According to Abu Rabi', such a selection is very useful, even though the final discussion/analysis is not satisfactory. Therefore, in discussing Islam, in Abu Rabi's view, four important points need to be considered, namely:

1. Philosophical/theological/ideological realm

On this plane, Islam has become a philosophical, theological, and ideological problem in Arab and Modern Islamic thought. Some people talk about the face of elite Islam, namely official Islam (*official Islam*), while others discuss Islam from the other side, popular Islam, namely opposition Islam (*oppositional Islam*). Both opinions above agree that Islam can be a passive or revolutionary force in society. However, others are more extreme in stating that the concept of Islam is "revelation." *revelation*)" – as defined by 'Al-Charfi above can no longer be maintained, because what is called Islam is nothing other than what Muslims make or do (*Islam is what people make of it*). Islam can be used as a movement tool to achieve progress or as a tool to justify economic and social disparities in society.

Because according to this opinion, Islam cannot be characterized as "*a sacred core*". In other words, according to this opinion, Islam cannot be privileged as a "holy" entity. Practically speaking, it can be said that Islam has been infiltrated by more than one meaning or definition. Thus, practically it can be said that Islam has more than one definition.[37]

2. Theological field

In the realm of theology, Islam acquires an open meaning (*open-ended*), from belief in one God to theological connection with all the revelations that preceded it, while the other, can be understood in a simple sense as "surrendering oneself as one God". In other words, one can research and test the basic nature of Islamic theology from the perspective of the history of religions, especially Christianity and Judaism. Or, people can see Islam from an inclusive theological perspective, namely the oneness of God. Islam can be interpreted in three ways: *First,* related to the oneness of God; *second,* theological continuity with all previous revelations; *third,* Islam can also be defined simply as submission to one God (*the submission to one God*). In other words, one can research and examine the basic nature of Islamic theology from the perspective of the history of religions, especially those of Christianity and Judaism. Or, people can see Islam from an inclusive theological perspective, namely the oneness of God.[38]

This view is in line with Nurcholis Madjid when explaining the meaning of Islam which means "submission or surrender" which according to him, the meaning of Islam is "an attitude of surrender to God." This attitude is not only God's teaching to His servants but it is taught by Him in connection with human nature itself. In other words, it is taught as a fulfillment of human nature, so that the growth of its manifestation in humans is always internal, not growing, let alone forced from outside, because this method causes Islam to be inauthentic. After all, it loses its most basic and profound dimensions, namely purity and sincerity. There is no religion without this attitude, that is, religion without submission to God is not true.[39] Thus one can see Islam from an inclusive perspective *Abrahamic religion*.

3. Text dominance (*nash*).

Text (*nash*) is the core of Islamic culture. According to the general opinion of Islamic law experts, both the Qur'an and *hadîth* form the textual foundations of Islam, which contain the basic foundations of Islamic theology. Therefore, it is justified to say that since the beginning of Islamic history, there has been a dialectical relationship between texts and human history and between texts and human thought. The tendency towards texts in the Islamic tradition is very dominant. The world of texts is so dominant in Islam that a statement was made by Ali Harb and Nasr Abu Zayd, that what forms Islamic civilization is text civilization.[40] However, religious texts do not appear in a vacuum but always appear in dialectic with the historical realities of human culture. Thus it must be understood the dialectical relationship (*dialectical relationship*) between the text and socio-historical reality as well as between the text and human interpretation. Islamic history is also the product of a complex relationship between human aspects and revelation, or between religious texts and socio-economic-political factors. The text of the Koran and *hadith* is a source of Islamic law that forms the main basis of Islamic theology. Therefore, it is justified to say that since the beginning of Islamic history, there has been a dialectical relationship between texts and the history of humanity. In other words, Islamic history and thought are the result of a complex combination of "human" (*human*) and "divine" (*divine*), or between religious texts (*religious text*) and socioeconomic and political factors.[41]

3. Anthropological realm

Some present Islam as a comprehensive anthropological fact or reality. Islam indeed has a normative side. However, in the evolution of its historical development, Islam has encouraged the birth of complex cultural, social, literary, philosophical, and political traditions and to this day still shapes the way of life of Muslim communities. Islam has become an issue of interest in matters related to power and social and political organization.

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36 Ibid., 29-30

37 Ibid

38 Ibid

39 Nurcholis Madjid, *Islamic Doctrine and Civilization: A Critical Study of Issues of Faith, Humanity and Modernity* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000), 426-427.

40 Ali Harb, *Hermeneutics of Truth*, trans. Sunarwoto Dema (Jogjakarta: LKiS, 2003), 31.

41 Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September 11*", 30.

Some present Islam as a comprehensive anthropological fact or reality. Islam indeed has a normative side.[42] However, in the evolution of its historical development, Islam has encouraged the birth of complex cultural, social, literary, philosophical, and political traditions and to this day still shapes the way of life of Muslim communities. Islam has become an issue of interest in matters related to power and social and political organization. It is important to note that various intellectual and political movements have interpreted this tradition differently. In this sense, tradition can be interpreted as a passive or revolutionary force.[43]

Based on these things, observers say that Islamic thought (*Islamic thought*) and Islamic history (*Islamic history*) are the two main dimensions that accompany the essence of Theological Islam, and encourage the emergence of various religious-ideological forces and attitudes, which position the Koran and Sunnah as the main sources. Perhaps it would be useful if we were reminded of the various meanings that Islam carries with it: Islam as text (manuscript) and theology/kalam; Islam as a humanitarian thought; Islam as history, and Islam as one or many institutions (*institution*). With various understandings of Islam in the minds of socio-religious observers, it is legitimate if someone mentions or raises the issue that Islam is indeed "problematic".

Understanding Abu Rabi's ideas regarding Islam above cannot be separated from various things. M. Amin Abdullah said that to understand human diversity as a whole, an interconnectivity approach is needed, for example, theology, anthropology, and phenomenology. The fundamentalism and exclusivism that have emerged to the surface are the logical consequences of the separation of the three scientific approaches to the phenomenon of human diversity which manifests within a person or group.[44] Like Amin Abdullah, in that context, Abu Rabi' through his historical survey, apart from recommending these three approaches, also saw the need for a sociology of religion.[45]

The efforts needed to build an understanding of Islamic education, Abu Rabi', quoted Ibn Khaldun's opinion, "Scientific reasoning is a product of settled culture".[46] If a civilization experiences a loss of group feeling (*Ashabiyyah*), scientific research tends to be poor. Ibn Khadun's proposition regarding the creation of scientific discourse in the Muslim world as a whole remains valid in the contemporary or Muslim context because the Muslim world was once the center of civilization. If the conditions are different now, it is because the practitioners of traditional sciences are dull or at least do not want to try so they are dull.

Post-Independence Education

After independence, several Muslim countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan tried to modernize educational institutions. Whether we realize it or not, religious education has not been modernized sufficiently. There are several premises for discussing the question of whether education is modern or traditional in the Muslim world above. ***First,*** military and political elites actively provide support to traditional educational institutions just to survive *the status quo*. There is a kind of symbiotic mutualism between education and power.[47]

Second, Because of the centrality and sensitivity of Islam, the state intervenes in the modern construction of Islamic studies to ensure religious neutrality in social and political problems. As a result, the study of Islam was confined to a closed field, Arabic rhetoric and *naȟw* (Arabic grammar).

Third, social science perspectives and critical philosophy are absent. The majority of students who receive government scholarships to continue their studies abroad, especially in the Gulf countries, only study hard sciences or business administration, which are grades-free and criticism-free subjects. During his approximately twenty years living in the US, Abu Rabi' did not find a single student from the Gulf studying political science, philosophy, or history. [48] The field of modern Sharia studies remained close to that perspective. He does not require the application of concepts such as class, social structure, criticism, and modernity in his philosophical views. The rationalism glorified in classical Islamic thought was reduced to a very narrow technical effort, only used in the area of study *naȟw* and fiqh. This fact makes it increasingly difficult for several Arab countries to pursue the growth of scientific traditions.[49]

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42 On the issue of the normative side of Islam, Fazlur Rahman differentiates between "normative" and "historical" Islam. Normative aspects are maintained, while historical developments can be criticized. Thus, all constructions and formulations in the Islamic sciences, such as kalam, fiqh, philosophy, and Sufism are manifestations of thought products in their important historical evolution. Check M. Amin Abdullah, *Islamic Studies in Higher Education with an Integrative-Interconnective Approach* (Yogyakarta: Student Library, 2006), 27-31.

43 Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September*", 30-1.

44 See M. Amin Abdullah, *Religious Studies Normativity or Historicity?* (Yogyakarta: Student Library, 1999), 28.

45 Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September*", 36.

46 *Ibid.*, 29.

47 Ibid., 32

48 Ibid., 36

49 Ibid

Fourth, Islamic studies only revolve around the study of shari'ah and fiqh which is empty of political-critical content and empty of relevance to the current situation.[50] Commenting on this reality, the Algerian thinker, Malek Bennabi, as quoted by Abu Rabi' said, "In independent Muslim institutions, the syllabi and teaching methods are like a waste of time; the principles have been the same since the Christian Middle Ages."[51]

Fifth, there is a very clear distinction between theology and politics or between theology and the social. Theology is understood as rites, symbols, and only historical texts. This creates tension between thought and reality, between Islam and reality. According to Abu Rabi', this fifth condition creates a backward class of Muslim intellectuals in society; know Islamic texts very well but do not know how to examine the texts critically about the surrounding social and political conditions. These state-controlled intellectuals only seek pleasure by discussing profound theological issues or raising questions that died hundreds of years ago.[52]

The next impact is the birth of intellectuals who are blind and insensitive to the problems around them. They are more interested in the authenticity of the teachings than in the real problems of society. Education that emphasizes memorization as a daily menu encourages the creation of a text-based culture.[53] However, there was the fact that a small number of traditionally educated intellectuals opposed the ruling regime. This may explain in part the reason for the use of sacred texts as ideological weapons in the hands of the state against those who try to criticize the state and its supporters.

One important fact in the history of contemporary Muslim awakening can perhaps be explained by the depoliticization and pacification of Islamic studies that several prominent Islamic activists did not come from the Sharia or social sciences campus but from the exact sciences. Often, social science campuses produce leftist students, while actual campuses are dominated by radical Islam. This explains why even though millions of dollars have been spent to modernize the field of Islamic studies in the Arab world, very few scholars are known internationally.

Meanwhile, the secular education system in Muslim countries is also no better than the traditional system. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi[54]—a former Pakistani education minister, for example, sharply criticized Pakistan's secular educated elite by saying, "Our secular educated elite are people who have no independence of attitude, do not pay attention to morals, and are just hired intellectuals. What has been going on for a quarter of a century in our society and our leaders is only a continuity of mistakes, no purpose, and no sense of responsibility, other than self-centeredness, corruption, and cowardice."[55]

Intellectual Elite Groups in the Contemporary Arab World

The Arab defeat of Israel in 1967, a crucial event in the history of the contemporary Arab world, became the point of Abu Rabi's analysis of the rise of contemporary elites and religious revivalism in the Arab world. Although this defeat did not result in drastic political changes in the Arab world, it did influence the formation of new social, religious, and intellectual movements, as well as many other responses to them. In this case, Abu Rabi specializes in studying the relationship between religion and society which, according to him, is the key to uncovering the revival of religion in the Arab world at the end of the 20th century.

Several responses emerged regarding this defeat; **First,** a response demonstrated by modern political elites. Modern political elites are a long tradition of modernization that began in the Arab world before the advent of official colonization. Overall, they are not elites who are at fault, but who exploit religious symbols in the public sphere. They use Western rationalization and religious symbols to maintain and maintain their power.[56]

They tried to hide their defeat with religious symbols and ideas. For elites like this, religion is not a form of piety, but rather a means to obtain political and social goals. Because of their reluctance to relinquish power and admit defeat, this modern elite betrayed its modernization scheme by raising Islamic symbols as a dishonest act.

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[50]　Several contemporary Muslim thinkers, including Fazlur Rahman, Muhammad Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, Muhammad Sharur, Abdullahi Ahmed al-Na'im, Riffat Hasan, and Fatima Mernisi, have sharply highlighted scientific paradigms. *Islamic Studies*, especially the scientific paradigm of fiqh and kalam. He considers Fiqh and its implications for the order of thought and social institutions that it presents in Muslim life to be too rigid and therefore less responsive to the challenges and demands of contemporary developments. Several things are mentioned, especially those related to problems hudud, as human rights, public law, women, and views on non-Muslims. Strictly speaking, fiqh science which has implications for the perspective and order of social institutions in Muslim society has not dared and has always refrained from coming into direct contact and dialogue with new sciences that emerged in the 18th-19th century, such as anthropology, sociology, culture, psychology. , philosophy, and so on. For further information, read M. Amin Abdullah, "Development of Islamic Study Methods from a Social and Cultural Hermeneutical Perspective" in *Paper*, presented at the UIN/IAIN/STAIN Postgraduate Program Development Seminar on 26-28 December 2002.

[51]　Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September*", 33.

[52] Ibid., 35.

[53] Ibid

[54]　Prof. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi was born on 20 November 1903 in Patiali, Uttar Pradesh, British India. It is is historian, educator, and scholar from Pakistan and also a prolific writer. Alumni Cambridge University and lecturer at the University of Karachi, he served as Minister of Refugees and Rehabilitation and was later appointed as the first Minister of Education Pakistan. He died on January 22, 1981 in Karachi, Pakistan.

[55]　Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September*", 34.

[56] Ibid

Second, a response expressed by the secular intellectual elite. The intellectual elite is grouped into three main orientations, namely: (1) *Arab nationalists*, such as Constantine Zurayk[57]; (2) *critical Marxist* represented by Adonis, Ghali Syukri, Abdallah Laroui, al-Afif al-Akhdar, Sadiq Jalal al-Azm[58], Tayyib Tizine, and Halim Barakat[59]; dan (3) *liberal* (enlightenment) represented by thinkers such as Zaki Najib Mahmud, Fouad Zakariyya [60], and Jabir 'Asfur.[61]

The criticisms from the intellectual elite group focused on the following premises:

a. The Arab defeat in 1967 was caused by Arab states and societies not being modern enough, or their level of modernization not being the same as that of the Zionists. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict of civilizations centered around technological competence. The Arab world failed to achieve technological and scientific supremacy over Israel.

b. The cause of the Arab defeat was the national bourgeoisie because of their class position and because they were inexperienced in the world of politics, and

c. Religion (Islam) is the main obstacle to the development of Arab society. This extreme point goes very far, namely linking "everything Islamic with the destruction of civil society".[62]

Third, the response took the form of a shift from several influential Arab intellectuals from critical Marxism and nationalism to Islam. This response boils down to a collective demand from Arab society to return to the authenticity of Islam and its strictness, and then learn from the universality of these ideas. These thinkers lost so much trust in the political elite that they sought a way out of the Koran as the main source for an unstable world.[63]

As a result of their theoretical confusion, these thinkers created a rational Islamic discourse that was not tainted by *takhayul* the ulama developed through petro (oil) from the Gulf States. Their discourse is characterized by an honest and direct approach, namely a new approach born out of defeat and the hope that a civilized Islamic approach can save the Arab world and humanity in general from the ills of modernity and NATO rule.

Fourth, the response was in the form of Islamic revival (Islamization). There is a dividing line between the response of organized Islamic movements and mass movements. This is the difference between what is termed "political Islam" and "Islamic religious phenomena". The latter is a more common idea and practice than the former. According to Ghazali Syukri, as quoted by Abu Rabi', Arab society practices Islam in everyday practical life without

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57 Constantine Zureiq, born in Damascus in 1909, was an Arab intellectual and academic figure, and also one of the pioneers of modern theoreticism.Arab nationalism. He obtained a doctorate in History from Princeton University, USA in 1930. He developed several ideas, such as the "Arab mission" and "national mission", which became key concepts for Arab nationalist thinkers. He introduced the concept of "Arab mission" through his first publication,*The Arab Consciousness* (1938). According to him, the goal of every nation is to convey messages about their culture and civilization. So, if a nation does not have a mission, it is not worthy of being called a nation. Meanwhile, "national consciousness" will bring the Arab independence struggle as a new force and give meaning to world civilization. This intellectual, who died in 2000, was also a strong supporter of intellectual reform in Arab society which emphasized the need for rationalism and ethical revolution. Lookhttp://en.wikipedia.org/constantine zureiq, accessed on 10 November 2010.

58 Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm Lahir diDamascus, Syria, 1934 isProfessor Emeritus Modern European Philosophy inDamascus University in Syria. He has been a visiting professor in the department of Near Eastern Studies atPrinceton University until 2007. His area of specialization of study is philosophyImmanuel Kant with more emphasis on the worldIslam and its relationship with the West. Apart from being known as a fighterhuman rights and intellectual freedom and speech, he is also known as a critic of Edward Said on Orientalism. He received a PhD in Modern European Philosophy from Yale University in 1961. In 1963, he began teaching at the American University of Beirut. His book is entitled*Self-Criticism After the Defeat* (1968) analyzed the impact of the six day war in Arabia. Lookhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sadiq Jalal Al Azam. accessed November 10, 2010.

59 Halim Barakat is a novelist and sociologist. He was born in1933 OfKafroun, Syria, and grew up inBeirut. Barakat acceptsBachelor's degree Sociology (1955), andmaster's degree (1960) in the same field, both fromAmerican University of Beirut. While the titlePh.Dinsocial psychology received in 1966 fromUniversity of Michigan at Ann Arbor. From 1966-1972, he taught at the American University of Beirut and taught at the University of Texas at Austin (1975-1976). From 1976-2002, he conducted research on society and culture at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at GeorgeTown University. His publications are mainly concerned with the difficulties faced by modern Arab society, including alienation, crises in civil society, identity crises, freedom and justice. Lookhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/halim barakat, accessed on November 10, 2010.

60 Prof. Dr. Zakaria, born in Port Said in 1927 and died in Cairo on Thursday, March 11 2010. Studied philosophy at Cairo University and obtained a Ph.D degree from Ain Shams University, Cairo (1956). Worked as a lecturer at Ain Shams University (1957-1974), then at Kuwait University and became Chair of the Philosophy Department, Faculty of Letters, Kuwait University. His thoughts have greatly influenced the liberal thought movement in this oil-rich country from the 70s until now. The results, among others; Kuwait is the first country in the GCC whose members of parliament are elected through elections, so a vote of no confidence in the government (PM) held by the King's family is a common sight, even a frequent occurrence. Many members of parliament are also women. Checkhttp://sosbud.kompasiana.com, accessed November 10, 2010.

61 Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September*", 38-39.

62 Ibid., 39

63 In Abu Rabi's notes, some of these thinkers were 'Adil Hussain, Tariq al-Bishri, and Muhammad Imarah from Egypt, Rashid al-Ghannoushi from Tunisia, and Munir Shafiq from Palestine.

problematical theology and law. The collective memory of the masses is based on a simple Islam, namely one that is based on tolerance and acceptance so it has become a cliche when talking about political Islam, fundamentalist Islam, or radical Islam in its pejorative sense.[64]

The response of the Islamic masses to Israel's defeat was strengthened by several factors. *First*, the failure of nation-state modernization programs that came to the fore following the colonialization recession. In several Arab countries, modernization has given rise to dualism, namely between advanced urban communities and underdeveloped rural communities. In addition, the mass education adopted by many Arab countries has not lifted them out of poverty. *Second*, the accumulation of various powers in the hands of a few people and the loss of public freedom.*Third*, the absence of democratic freedom. *Fourth*, The state tries to silence dissent and hide the real problems of society by utilizing mass media technology, namely by encouraging the creation of a superficial artistic environment, where songs only reflect the real world. *trivial* from Arab culture.[65]

In North Africa, especially in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, the defeat of 1967 did not have as significant an impact as in the Middle East, but the same policies, such as state-building and modernization, have been underway since those countries achieved independence. The long history of French colonization in North Africa and the bitter struggle to gain independence brought these countries into economic inequality.

In short, contemporary states in North Africa impose nationalism-modernization on traditional societies that are still in the process of healing from the long trauma of colonialism. This is made worse by serious facts, namely the concentration of power in a few rulers, high population growth, and failure of economic development.

Seeing all this, according to Abu Rabi', the reconsideration of Islamic teachings as part of a global phenomenon is something that cannot be postponed. Even if later, from the consideration process there is unwanted access, it is the "spice" of every important event, which will one day dissolve. For this, Abu Rabi' offered a "big goal" by building a study *of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, saying, "because Islam and Christianity (Western, *pen*) have the same roots, even if there are differences, they are not too great. But now, the differences are getting bigger and sharper, this is suspected by the occurrence of various conflict incidents in several regions in Indonesia, for example, or also in other parts of the world."[66]

Closing

The Muslim world today is characterized by social, ethnic, and cultural complexity that has been influenced—since the modern period—by three main factors: modernization, nationalism, and Islamic revivalism. These three things have been present in the Muslim world since the end of the 19th century. These three movements mutually attempted to achieve independence from colonialism and reconstruct the Arab Muslim personality. Nationalism emerged as a major force in the Muslim world from the 1950s to 1960s. However, the modernization project among nationalists is not perfect, in the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, the policy of the elite adopting quickly and ambitiously its modernization programs can be used as a reference for this assessment. Even in the case of Islamic revivalist movements, the most moderate ones often suppress and prohibit participation in political life.

Three main reasons can be used to help explain the widespread spread of authoritarian politics in the Muslim world, namely first, the failure of nationalist movements—after the collapse of colonialism—to maintain democratic government; *second*, increasing military interference in the political arena; And third, complete support by the West for authoritarian regimes.

On the other hand, the rapid development of technology and science, including the development of social sciences, has relatively shortened the distance between cultural differences between one region and another. In the current era, any type of religious approach—whether historical-empirical-critical or theological-normative—does not pretend to be able to resolve and solve religious problems completely. Each approach cannot stand alone, apart from the others. Each type of approach can be debated and questioned, and is dimensional so that it does not reflect holistic integrity.[67]

Abu Rabi' emphasized the need to use various approaches in Islamic studies, including the sociology of religion. He sees and understands violence unleashed by radical Islam as a multi-cause and multi-interpretation phenomenon, through a historical approach. It is hoped that empirical-historical-critical religious studies and approaches can contribute their services to reducing the level and intensity of tensions between religious adherents, without having to pretend to eliminate them. A critical historical study and approach to religion, namely through a sharp analysis of the historical aspects of the teachings of revelation, will help clarify the problem of human religion. Acts of terror carried out by Islamic extremists, for example, were born not only because of religious fanaticism but there were other factors behind them.

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64 *Ibid*., 41. In Abuddin Nata's observations, those who adhere to this Islamic ideology are often considered a dissident group, committing many acts of violence, such as terror, intimidation and even murder in achieving their goals. See Abuddin Nata,*Religious Map of Islamic Thought in Indonesia* (Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo, 2001), 9.

65 Abu Rabi', "*A Post-September*", 42-3.

66 Quoted from the results of an interview with Ummat Magazine with Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi' in Jakarta, 7 August 1997 which was published in*Ummah Magazine*, No. 8 Th. III, 8 September 1997.

67 M. Amin Abdullah,*Religious Studies*, 12. Not to mention considering the development of discussions on the philosophy of science in the post-positivistic era. In the post-positivistic era, there is not a single scientific building in any area - including the area of religion - which is separated and completely unrelated to the cultural, social and even socio-political issues that lie behind the emergence, development and operation of a scientific paradigm. . Check M. Amin Abdullah, "Development of Islamic Study Methods", 11.

Apart from that, based on his reflections on the phenomenon of the revival of modern Islam, he offers a breakthrough as a solution to various problems that have arisen in the contemporary era. Abu Rabi' felt the need for dialogue between Islam and the West which would indirectly revive an intellectual tradition that was free, dialogical, innovative, and creative. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi' tries to offer a new hermeneutic, namely the study *of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*.

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