



Interrogating the Nexus Between Business Administrators and Political Leaders in Arresting Herdsmen Crisis and Improving Nigerian Business Efficacy

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ABSTRACT

We have a new wave of law offenders that are killing citizens and breaking most parts of the Nigerian criminal codes without an efficient system to bring them to justice. This new wave is herdsmen crisis. This paper examines herdsmen crisis and the roles business administrators and political leaders can play in arresting it. Data, for the paper, were secondarily sourced from newspaper publications, journal articles, textbooks, and technological blogs. This paper believes that government intervention in the control and management of Fulani herdsmen through the security architecture of Nigeria will minimize the insecurity problem of the country. While the paper sees herding as a private business, it suggests a policy for ranching as an alternative. As a result of this, Nigeria needs to step up by improving on infrastructural development that can pave way for efficiency and innovation so as to enable the country compete effectively in the global economy. No country develops without giving room for a favourable playing ground for the actors and stakeholders in the polity.

Keywords: Fulani-herdsmen, farmers, insecurity, migration, banditry.

1. Introduction

Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historical different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any signs of willingness to unite. – Nigerian unity is only a British invention (Francis, 2017). Neither region wanted nor appreciated the amalgamation. The North despised the idea of amalgamating with the South and the South despised the idea of amalgamating with the North. Nonetheless, the amalgamation gave Frederick Lugard an answer to his economic question but gave Nigerian people a forced marriage. The unification brought a centralized governance and management of resources in Nigeria. Resources in the North and those in the South became national resources that could be used by this centralized government for the betterment of the nation. The central government was headquartered in Lagos and headed by Lugard himself from 1914 to 1918 (Francis, 2017).

As expected, resources were moved from the South to offset deficits in the North and governance was relatively better for the colonial rulers. Probably Lugard had plans to unify both regions not only constitutionally but also culturally and politically, but he never got to implement these plans or any related plans at all. Some scholars have argued that 4 years is too little to implement such complex marriage as the amalgamation of Nigeria. Dapo noted that Lugard's central objective was to design a central administration that would stabilize the nation and achieve better developmental goals, but 4 years was too little to implement such grand strategy (Joseph, 2017).

He succeeded in enacting a constitutional reform that centralized control at a center but the 'supposed' central administration with unique structure to ensure stability and national development was not realized. A centralized political power over regions that are both culturally and socio-economically disconnected meant a natural struggle for control of the center by all regions. Just like the town that lacks water and everyone seeks control of flow of the only water source, each of the Nigerian regions scrambled for absolute control of the centralized resources upon withdrawal of Britain's colonial efforts. This was the first manifestation of the inherit divides that exist in Nigerian union – and the foundation of many violence in Nigerian history. Ahmadu Bello, Sultan of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria argued on the North's behalf that, "The new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather Uthman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We use the minorities in the North as willing tools and the South as a conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us and have control over their future" (Francis, 2017; Joseph, 2017).

He urged his fellow Northern compatriots to aim absolute control of the central government, dominate the Southern Protectorate, and never permit change of power regardless the basis of such change – be it democracy, election or any basis at all. The Southern Protectorate which was more educated

canvassed extensively for the union to be broken. A prominent Southern Leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe noted, "It is better for us and many admirers abroad that we should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces. Should the politicians fail to heed the warning, then I will venture the predictions that the experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo will be a child's play if it ever comes to our turn to play such a tragic role". This differences have escalated the herdsmen crises in Nigeria.

For over seven years, however, a new brand of herdsmen is growing. This brand appears from no given location, actively attack villages – killing men, women, and children – and disappears without trace. Miyetti Allah, the leader of herdsmen organization in Nigeria, has noted that these "new killer" herdsmen are not part of their national herdsmen organization (Olugbenga, 2018). Atiku Abubakar, a former vice president of Nigeria from 1999-2007, bemoaned that anyone who calls the killer herdsmen "Fulanis" commits the error of misnomer and urged an end to such allegations (Toromade, 2018). The Fulani as a tribe has openly reprimanded the killer herdsmen and denied that the killers are part of them. This has created much confusion as there is no agreement on the identity of the 'killer' herdsmen. A renowned lawyer and activist Femi Fani-Kayode who regularly criticises the government on bad governance responded to Atiku and Miyetti Allah. Kayode asked where the "killer" herdsmen came from, if they are not Fulanis (Daily Post, 2018). It is important to note that this paper does not intend to answer the question of "where the killer herdsmen come from," rather the focus is to find innovative ways to bring the already existing herdsmen crises to justice.

The killer herdsmen recently evolved both in technology and human capital. This is shown in increased number of killings and sophistication of styles, even bigger than Boko Haram. For a group that recorded less than 3 machete-wielding fights with local communities per year before 2011 and less than 5 casualties, same group now records over 50 killing cases per year where villages are pillaged with AK-47 and sophisticated techniques that leave thousands of dead casualties. By January 2017, Quartz Africa pronounced Fulani Herdsmen the biggest security threat in Nigeria (Yomi, 2017). As at April 2016, Boko Haram had a record of 202 killings in the first 3 months of the year. The herdsmen terrorists already had 440 people killed within same time (Mayowa, 2016). At the end of first 10 weeks into 2018, the herdsmen had already peddled 487 killings at different locations in Nigeria (Emmanuel, 2018). On 23 June 2018, heavily armed herdsmen attacked eleven villages in three Local government areas in Plateau state, killing over 200 people including pregnant women and children (Musa, 2018). Controversies over the actual number of these killings do exist. These controversies are between the numbers given by governments and those given by individuals, groups, and independent observers. The later three have always had profoundly higher number of fatalities than the numbers published by Nigerian governments. For instance, in the first 10 weeks into 2018, the Nigerian government published that a total of 487 people were killed by Fulani Herdsmen in all parts of Nigeria. An independent local group called Middle Belt Massacres faulted the government figures and indicated that 904 people were killed in two Nigerian states alone within that same period (Eagle, 2018). Writing on British newspaper, The Independent, Femi Fani-Kayode revealed that over 50,000 killings were carried out by herdsmen terrorists in 2017 (David, 2018). These are numbers that the Federal Government of Nigeria will never agree to.

Worries on the rising number of killings have also been expressed by notable scholars within and outside Nigeria. The Nobel Prize Laureate, Wole Soyinka, called the killer Fulani Herdsmen "monster terrorists and enemies of humanity" (Toromade, 2018). Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the renowned economist and Board Chair of Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), called the herdsmen killings "devastating" and tasked Nigerians to "cry out" (Komolafe, 2018). Mohammed Chambas, Special Representative for UN Secretary General for West Africa and the Sahel, revealed that the herdsmen's network of killings has become more sophisticated and deadly (Ndahi & Okolie, 2018). By 2015, the Global Terrorism Index ranked the killer herdsmen the fourth most deadly terrorist group in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). Unlike Boko Haram, which operates mainly in few states in northern Nigeria, the herdsmen terrorists have carried out killings in 32 states out of 36 states in Nigeria – covering the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The states where herdsmen killings have been recorded include Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, Taraba, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Yobe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, and Osun state.

In recent times, herdsmen killing made everyone a target — rich, poor, young, old, foreigners, non-foreigners, male or female. Everyone is at a constant threat of being either a primary or secondary victim. They attack at homes, schools, streets, markets, business places, places of worship, recreational points, highways, morning, afternoon and nights. Nowhere is safe. There are no creeds, no negotiation, no mercy, and no respect for places, age, pregnancy status, or religion. In many ways, it is a new brand of killing – like a group of barbaric maniacs and serial killers. Confessional statements obtained by the Nigerian police have often revealed that the planners of these attacks are highly exposed and knowledgeable of the security and psychological makeup of the Nigerian citizens

2. Historical background to herdsmen issues in Nigeria

The Fulani are the nomadic tribe in Northern Nigeria. They were initially said to come from Egypt. Ibrahim (1966) quoted Lady Lugard, who likened the origin of the Fulani to Hyksos. She believed that the Fulani language resembles the language of the Wahuma of Eastern Africa and the Fulani of Western Sudan. According to Ibrahim, Lady Lugard believed the Fulani to be an alien tribe, whose grazing habits present serious problems to the country's agricultural and forestry practices. They are nomads who, in endeavoring to secure fresh grazing ground, became invaders and conquerors. Lady Flora Shaw was married to Lord Lugard in 1902. Lord Lugard amalgamated Nigeria in 1914. Fulani's beginnings could be traced to the Senegambia area according to Ibrahim (Ibrahim, 1966).

According to Salamone (1985), it seems reasonable to estimate 7 to 8 million nomadic Fulani and 16 million settled Fulani in all the countries they spread. They are in all West African countries except Liberia. They are also found in Chad, Cameroun, Kenya, and as far as Ethiopia. The number of Fulani has grown tremendously in Nigeria since 2015. Their nomadic life made them the most dispersed and culturally diverse people in Africa.

Fulani has affiliation with cattle, land and vegetation. They possess a strong cattle-herding tradition that antedates their Islamic allegiance. It is their culture and their life. In Nigeria, they constitute only 7% to 10% of the 200 million-strong Nigerian population yet they wield and control more power and authority than any other tribe or ethnic nationality in the country (Fani-Kayode, 2019). The minority herdsmen in Nigeria operate at will and with sophisticated weapons. The Central ruling government (who are Fulani) in the midst of insecurity treats them with gloved hands. Nigeria of today is insecure. They attack, kill and destroy at will without much effort at arrest and prosecution.

3. Reasons for herdsmen–farmer Conflicts

There are many reasons for the herdsmen and farmers' conflict. Bagu and Smith (2017), argue that political and agricultural advancements are part of the causes of herdsmen and farmer conflict in sub- Sahara West Africa. According to the authors, the ramifications of identity politics and struggles for resource control (both political and economic) in urban areas have influenced the interactions of farming and herding communities throughout the Middle Belt. Furthermore, environmental degradation, security challenges, and rural banditry of the Sahel and Northwest Nigeria have increased organized cattle rustling and forced new waves of migration deeper and deeper southward.

Climate change and environmental degradation have led to the conflict between herdsmen and farmers. Desertification in the North has pushed the herders to migrate southwards for grazing. Otunuga (2016), affirm that Nigerian rivers are at their lowest levels and Northern communities are dealing with droughts. This affects the pastoralists and their herd.

The poverty level in our country Nigeria is unprecedented. Over 70% of Nigerians are poor according to World Facebook (2010). Poverty leads people to migrate to find a greener pasture. This issue according to Ndubuisi, (2018), affects the herdsmen. They migrate to the south with their herds.

The search for land and resources for the herdsmen becomes the source of conflict. During drought raging in the north, there is always competition over the scarce resources between the framers and herdsmen. Mohammed (2016), argues that disagreement over the use of and allocation of food and resources such as grazing areas become intense. Competition for the land is one of the major drivers of conflict and insecurity. The Fulani see themselves as the owners of the land while the farming communities see them as strangers and land occupiers (Clark, 2018).

The fear of the alleged Islamization of Christians is another driving force for the herdsmen and farmers' crisis. The Islamic religion is the connecting identity of the Fulani herdsmen and the Boko Haram terrorists. They are united in their faith and their goal is to create emirates in every part of Nigeria and use Sha'ria's legal system for the administration of the country. This fear and suspicion became the reason why the East, West, South-South and Middle Belt regions of Nigeria rejected the federal government's Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) policy. The implementation of the policy received stiff opposition, even when the government said the reason behind the policy is to put an end to the re-occurring conflict between nomadic herders and farmers.

Terve (interviewed 30 July 2019), said grazing is a private business just like other private businesses in Nigeria. He questioned the reason why the federal government is making a national policy to compulsorily acquire land and compel every State of the federation to key into it. He queried too, why the RUGA policy was stopped even when 11 Northern States showed interest in its implementation in their states. The States he mentioned are Sokoto, Adamawa, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Kogi, Taraba, Katsina, Plateau, Kebbi, Zamfara and Niger. Terve in the interview praised the States in the South for resisting the RUGA policy. He tagged it an Islamization policy that would have triggered war if implemented. Taiwo (interviewed 30/7/2019) accepted the conspiracy theory of Islamization and land occupation as the reason for herdsmen's migration.

4. Herders and Farmers conflict: Its security implication for Nigeria

Security is important for the protection of life and property of individuals and communities of nations. It is the reason governments and people spend money to protect themselves and their properties. Human security is as important as the protection of animals. Nigerians are however afraid of seeing the image of Fulani young herders carrying A-k 47 rifles and other dangerous weapons while herding other than the traditional long sticks they carry. Isola (2018) affirms that this has reinforced a public image of the Fulani as violent perpetrators in farming communities. They are regarded now as dangerous cattlemen.

Some of the interviewees such as Terve (interviewed on 30 July 2019), argues that the conflict between herdsmen and farmers has political implications. It is the politics of the central government in promoting a minority ethno religious group against the interest of the many ethnic groups of the country. He imagined that this could spark off hatred, division and war. He imagined too, why the government has not stopped the carnage, rape, kidnapping and banditry committed by the herdsmen every day as it is creating enabling policies to quicken the Fulani spread. He averred that the government should have made policies to control the movement of the herders, establish ranches and help the herders to manage the Ranches. He accused the government that has rather taken side with the herdsmen as when Dan-Ali, former Minister for Defense blamed people for blocking grazing routes, which gave rise to conflict with him.

Economically the conflict has created an unpleasant situation for Nigeria. According to Okigbo, (2019) the country has lost an estimate of over \$13.7 billion aside from the killings and the destruction of farmlands. The dairy production, including milk, has gone low. Most Farmers are no longer farming for fear of insecurity while herdsmen are now restricting their grazing areas.

Another reason is that the Nigerian future farming is unpredictable and cannot be relied upon for the sustainable supply of any food commodity. Sobowale (2019) added other factors, such as globalization, and seasonal cropping to worsen food insecurity and a worsening economy. The rate of unemployment will widen, thus creating social problems for the country.

Herder and farmer conflict has created social problems in relationship. The conflict has created acrimony between herders and the Christian farming communities. There is that suspicion of each other. Muslim groups are in support of the herders, while Christians are against them. Hate speeches against each religion are rife on social media. Government policies and programmes are checked with the eye of suspicion. Global attention is on Nigeria as the conflict escalates.

5. The concept of business administration

Business administration, also known as business management, is the administration of a commercial enterprise. It involves the coordination of company operations, encompassing employee management, strategic decision-making, daily oversight, goal alignment, and efficient organization. This expansive field is integral to the success of businesses, regardless of their size.

It includes all aspects of overseeing and supervising the business operations of an organization. From the point of view of management and leadership, it also covers fields that include office building administration, accounting, finance, designing, development, quality assurance, data analysis, sales, project management, information-technology management, research and development, marketing and communication studies.

The administration of a business includes the performance or management of business operations and decision-making, as well as the efficient organization of people and other resources to direct activities towards common goals and objectives. In general, "administration" refers to the broader management function, including the associated finance, personnel and MIS services.

Administration can refer to the bureaucratic or operational performance of routine office tasks, usually internally oriented and reactive rather than proactive. Administrators, broadly speaking, engage in a common set of functions to meet an organization's goals. Henri Fayol (1841–1925) described these "functions" of the administrator as "the five elements of administration". According to Fayol, the five functions of management are planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. Without proper business management a firm cannot utilize its resources properly so, it is the most important term in running a business firm.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

Herdsmen terrorism is not new. It usually starts small and grows big, then overwhelms instituted authorities. In some cases however, it starts small, grows big and turns into protracted battle between instituted authorities and terrorist groups. Every form of terror begins with a discontented party, a party aggrieved by the existing order. Once this party resorts to use of violence to gain control or resolve disagreements, terror usually results. In today's Nigeria, a new brand of herdsmen is growing. This brand appears from no given location, actively attack villages – killing men, women, and children – and disappears without trace. The killer herdsmen recently evolved both in technology and human capital. This is shown in increased number of killings and sophistication of styles, even bigger than Boko Haram. For a group that recorded less than 3 machete-wielding fights with local communities per year before 2011 and less than 5 casualties, same group now records over 50 killing cases per year where villages are pillaged with AK-47 and sophisticated techniques that leave thousands of dead casualties. For the past few decades in Nigeria, phrases like "providing an enabling environment", and "ease of doing business" have become clichés, due to the general realisation that government cannot turnaround and prosper the economy without the active participation of the people. This active participation of the people is made difficult by herdsmen crisis. Hence, the article calls for better corporate governance, professional management, and transparency in the operations of government enterprises.

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