



Foreign Intervention and National Security: The United Nations (UN) Role in The Somalia Conflict 2010-2020

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ABSTRACT

A tool used by the international community to handle conflict in a State is foreign intervention. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle holds that in order to stop or prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansings, and crimes against humanity, foreign intervention is required. The reasons for intervening parties' actions and the success of their military, economic, and diplomatic efforts affect the outcomes of external intervention. The impact of foreign involvement on a state's national security is scarcely taken into account by this evaluation. Using the UN's engagement in the crisis in Somalia between 2010 and 2020 as a case study, this study examines foreign intervention and national security from the aforementioned perspective. The study will employ power theory to support its claim that local actors' resistance to foreign intervention in Somalia prevented it from taking hold quickly because they saw it as a threat to their sense of national security. The materials for this descriptive study will come from secondary sources, including books, journals, articles, the internet, etc. These sources' information will be qualitatively examined.

Keywords: Foreign Intervention, National Security, conflict, and Conflict Management

Introduction

The use of a government's discretionary power to handle alleged issues in another State is known as foreign intervention. By addressing these issues, foreign interventions hope to create a situation in these countries that is preferable from their perspective (Coyne, 2011). This may or may not be consistent with what people in the State of intervention view as a desired state of affairs. In fact, 71% of civil wars record at least one foreign intervention, making it the norm rather than the exception (Hironaka, 2005). Foreign intervention can also have an impact on how civil wars develop. The fact that most interventions have taken the form of aiding one side in the conflict helps to explain, in part, why foreign intervention has had such a big impact on how civil wars develop. Over 95% of foreign interventions in civil wars between 1945 and 1994 involved giving money, weapons, or foreign troops to a party fighting the civil war (Regan, 2002a).

Somalia is an ideal example of foreign intervention in intra-state conflict and its impact on national security. Somalia has been without a central government since the collapse of a decades-old military dictatorship in 1991. The bloody civil war that followed utterly destroyed what national governance structures remained, dividing Somalia into a patchwork of clan fiefdoms. Nonetheless, contrary to popular belief, Somalia built a number of loosely functional democratic administrative systems, primarily in the north but also in pockets of the south. Certain economic enterprises began to grow within the fiefdoms as well, particularly the telecommunications and cattle export businesses (Menkhaus, 2016). Several of Somalia's economic development indices were comparable to or better than those of the surrounding countries by the early 2000s (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2017). Attempts by the international community to unite Somalia under a viable national government have failed miserably, owing to a persistent lack of political consensus in Somalia about the form that a national government should take as well as how to equitably distribute political power and resources among the country's fractious clans.

The Somali Civil Conflict was centered in southern Somalia from 2009 to the present. It began in early February 2009 with a confrontation between the Federal Government of Somalia's forces, aided by African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops, and numerous violent terrorist groups and factions. The violence is claimed to have displaced thousands of residents in the country's south. Fighting has also occurred between the Sufi AhluSunnaWaljama'a and AlShabaab (Heinlein, 2011). In 'Operation Linda Nchi' against Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan Army crossed the border into Somalia on October 16, 2011. Its goal was to take Kismayo and establish a buffer zone against Al-Shabaab. Kismayo was apprehended in 2012. The Somali government-led Operation Indian Ocean was launched in August 2014 to clean up the remaining insurgent-held pockets in the countryside

(<https://web.archive.org/web/20140906202740/>). <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/09/somalia-president-says-godane-is-dead-now-is-the-chance-for-members-of-alshabaab-to-embrace-peace/>). In 2017, the Mogadishu explosions on October 14 and October 28 killed over 500 people and injured over 400 more (Kodjo, 2017). These crimes occurred despite the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other intervening foreign entities in the state. Given this environment, it is questionable whether foreign action in Somalia has contributed positively to national security during the period under consideration. The main focus of this research is to investigate this.

Statement of the Problem

Foreign intervention is a mechanism used by the international community to handle a state's conflict. The objectives of the intervening parties and the efficacy of the military, economic, or diplomatic actions undertaken define the intervention's impacts. However, the relationship between interventions and conflict is endogenous, making it difficult to distinguish between interventions that cause conflict patterns and interventions that respond to conflict patterns. Within this definition of external interventions, it has been proposed that interventions attempt to control hostilities, and *ceteris paribus*, interventions should reduce conflict and improve security (Regan, 2002a). Therefore, the success of interventions is assessed in terms of their capacity to lower conflict intensity, as in the number of battle deaths, decrease the duration of conflict, as in the days, months, or years the conflict is active, and improve security (Högbladh, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2011). In Regan (2002a:10), "the point of departure for outlining the goals of the interveners works from the assumption that states intervene to stop the fighting between groups in conflict". Furthermore, it is assumed that third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the fighting. The key issue here is the desire of the intervener to bring stability to a specific State or region; one approach for achieving this is the active intervention of a third party into the ongoing conflict in Somalia. For intrastate conflict, Regan (2002a) and Rosenau (1971) define external interventions as convention-breaking military, economic, or political activities in a foreign country's internal affairs that are directed at government authority structures (biased, in support of the government or the opposition, or neutral), with the goal of affecting the balance of power between the parties in the conflict. There are various forms of interventions, such as classic peacekeeping operations with a neutral mandate, as well as military, economic, or diplomatic interventions that can be in support of only one side or Neutral It has been suggested (Regan, 2002a) that the expected effect of external interventions on civil wars is to de-escalate conflict intensity in order to allow a mediation process to unfold. This is attributed directly not only to diplomatic initiatives but also to military and economic initiatives. The underlying assumption is that interveners' motives, regardless of the type of intervention, are primarily peace-promoting (Regan, 2002a). Thus, it is safe to assert that the success or failure of foreign intervention is measured by this yardstick. Be that as it may, one crucial question in the Somalian case is whether continued foreign intervention appears to have minimal effect on national security if there is persistent internal displacement, attacks on civilians, and the existence of factional leaders across the State. Thus, it is pertinent to interrogate what impact foreign intervention has on the military capabilities of Somalia and how the provision of external resources to the belligerents influences the character of the warfare.

Aims and Objectives of the Study

This study aimed to investigate foreign intervention and national security, looking at the role of the UN in the Somalia conflict between 2010 and 2020 as a reference point. The specific objectives are:

1. Investigate the impact of the United Nations mission in Somalia on national security.
2. Determine whether foreign intervention had an impact on the Somalia conflict between 2010 and 2020.

Review OF Related Literature

An Effort is made to review extant literature with a view to ascertaining what other scholars have not captured, either partially or completely.

Foreign Intervention

According to Friend (2014), the rise of civil conflict as the dominant form of global warfare shows that the implications for foreign intervention in other nations are more relevant than ever. Yet, there is very little theoretical work on the actions taken by foreign powers in civil conflicts. The author noted that as foreign interventions in other nations have become increasingly prevalent on a global scale, the implications of these intrusions are more relevant than ever. Domestic conflict and internal power struggles are irrevocably altered by the presence of third parties. To change the behavior of other nations, foreign powers have two policy tools at their disposal: aid and sanctions. Aid helps a faction, while sanctions hurt a faction. Understanding why foreign powers choose to pursue either aid or sanctions and how this choice can affect internal politics is important for shaping actions to promote national interest and, possibly, peace. At the very least, it is salient to know when and why foreign powers pursue aid or sanctions. Friend's findings reveal that sanctions will only be used to support the opposition, that the opposition will never fight a civil war when sanctions are used, and that when aid is used to support the opposition, it can provoke a civil war, but when it is used to support the incumbent, it can suppress civil conflict.

Smith and Shrimpton (2013) assert that the significance of reinforcing State strength has turned into a focal element of ways to deal with global harmony and security throughout recent years. "Country constructing" (or its related but barely centered kin, "state building") is for the most part perceived as a fundamental apparatus in tending to the reasons for struggle as well as in spanning the split between the conventional State-driven idea of force governmental issues and the challenged idea of human security as upheld overwhelmingly by non-State entertainers. Exclusively and all in all, States and

alliances that have participated in expeditionary mediations since the end of the Virus War have looked to accomplish a more lucid, exhaustive, and entire government way to deal with their undertakings. However, in these endeavors, country building has been an item as opposed to a justification behind intercession, and the item has requested essentially more clarity of mind than expected to arrive at the standard expected for strength.

Nye (2003) opined that exterior activities that impact the domestic affairs of another sovereign state It is a violent entry into another country's domestic affairs (Nye, 2003). Intervention can range from mild coercion to military intervention at the extremes. The more coercive interventions, notably military ones, are of great importance to international relations researchers. Interventions can be unilateral or multilateral in nature, with the case under consideration falling within the former. In the early days of the civil conflict, international engagement was necessary in post-Barre Somalia. The major civil war factions agreed to a UN-mediated truce in March 1992, leading to the foundation of UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) the following month (Kindiki, 2003). Its mission was to restore peace and facilitate humanitarian aid efforts. The UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of its charter, authorizing member states to employ all necessary means to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This resulted in the formation of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), whose success in creating a secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies resulted in the formation of UNOSOM II by Resolution 814 of 1993. UNOSOM II was tasked with restoring peace, stability, and order in Somalia by using all necessary methods, including force. Its mission was to restore peace and facilitate humanitarian aid efforts. The UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of its charter, authorizing member states to employ all necessary means to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This resulted in the formation of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), whose success in creating a secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies resulted in the formation of UNOSOM II by Resolution 814 of 1993. UNOSOM II was tasked with restoring peace, stability, and order in Somalia by using all necessary methods, including force. Its mission was to restore peace and facilitate humanitarian aid efforts. The UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of its charter, authorizing member states to employ all necessary means to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This resulted in the formation of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), whose success in creating a secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies resulted in the formation of UNOSOM II by Resolution 814 of 1993. UNOSOM II was tasked with restoring peace, stability, and order in Somalia by using all necessary methods, including force. The killing of US and Pakistani soldiers of the UN peacekeeping force led to a pullout by the US, France, Italy, and other western nations; thus, UNSOM II crumbled. These were examples of multilateral intervention, the more recent one being AMISOM.

National Security

The concept of national security emerged primarily in the United States following World War II. Initially centered on military might, it today incorporates a wide range of facets, all of which have an impact on the nation's non-military or economic security as well as the values proclaimed by the national society. As a result, in order to have national security, a country must have economic security, energy security, environmental security, and so on. Security threats include not only conventional foes such as other nation-states but also non-state actors such as violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations; some authorities include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category. Among the steps required to protect national security is the use of diplomacy to mobilize allies and isolate threats, retaining effective armed forces and putting in place civil defense and disaster preparedness measures (including anti-terrorism legislation), guaranteeing the resilience and redundancy of key infrastructure by utilizing intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and protecting classified information by using counterintelligence services or secret police to safeguard the nation from internal dangers.

National security is the security of a nation-state, including its inhabitants, economy, and institutions, and is considered a governmental duty. Originally envisaged as a defense against military attack, national security has come to include non-military dimensions such as terrorism, crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, cyber security, and so on. Similarly, in addition to the acts of other nation states, national security concerns include the actions of violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, and multinational businesses, as well as the consequences of natural disasters.

Conflict

According to Stiefel (2008), conflict encompasses more than merely overt behavior. Concentrating solely on its behavioral manifestation is a severely constrained activity. The three-dimensional view of conflict highlights the need to consider the situation in which parties (individuals, groups, or organizations) have incompatible goals, their interaction structure, and the nature of their goals. We must take into account the emotional (e.g., distrust) and cognitive (e.g., stereotyping) orientations that follow a conflict situation, as well as the spectrum of actions taken by any party in a conflict situation.

Conflict pervades all aspects of social existence. It is an unavoidable component of life since it is tied to scarce resources, function division, power interactions, and role differentiation. Because of its ubiquity and pervasive nature, the concept has acquired a multitude of meanings and connotations, presenting us with nothing short of a semantic jungle. Like other terms, conflict generates considerable ambivalence and leaves many scholars and administrators quite uncertain about (1) its meaning and relevance and (2) how best to cope with it.

Conflict is defined as various parties pursuing incompatible interests and aims (Shedrack, 2006). conflict arising from incompatible activity

Conflict management

Deals with the process of minimizing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a variety of measures and collaboration with conflict parties. This notion denotes a process by which conflict is handled or managed in order to rebuild the relationship between parties and address the structural reasons for the conflict (Michelle, 2002).

Shedrack (2006) emphasized that this notion and "conflict regulation" can be used interchangeably. It encompasses the entire area of dealing with disputes positively at all phases, including efforts to mitigate the conflict. According to Bourton (1990), he used the terms conflict resolution and conflict prevention interchangeably. According to popular belief, most conflicts cannot be resolved, so practitioners can only manage and regulate them. Conflict management, according to Shedrack (2006), is the process of decreasing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a variety of tactics and by working with and through the people involved in the conflict. In actuality, conflict management as a concept readily concedes that conflict is unavoidable in social relationships and that, while not all conflicts can be resolved, practitioners may offer value by ensuring they are appropriately managed and regulated. The state's conflict management techniques have taken several forms in the context of the Niger Delta. Each approach has been mostly determined by the type of dispute detected and the parties involved.

According to Onuoha (2005), the overarching objective of the government's reaction to Niger Delta conflicts is to suppress the conflicts with such a hard hand that no other Niger Delta community will ever agitate again. Although conflict is unavoidable, early warning can be identified and thus reduced, deflected, and/or resolved. Early warning systems are linked to conflict prevention in the same way that diagnostic systems are linked to medical treatment and epidemic monitoring systems are tied to public health activities. "For the purposes of conflict prevention, early warning in the United Nations is intended to collect information on the symptoms of dispute as early as possible, analyze that information accurately, and choose appropriate measures for preventive diplomacy before any dispute or conflict occurs" (Hideo, 2003:172).

Methodology

For this study, a descriptive research design was chosen. This method was used to monitor the variables' spontaneous activities without altering them in any way. The information gathered for this study is primarily based on secondary sources such as journals, textbooks, newspapers, unpublished theses, research initiatives, and the internet. These were commonly utilized to compile relevant statistics in order to offer trustworthy and verifiable work.

The qualitative methodology was used to collect data for this study, which comprises logically breaking down the data acquired to draw inferences about the relationship between the variables of interest to the researcher.

Data Presentation and Analysis

United Nations and National Security in Somalia

On March 5, 2007, the first AMISOM forces arrived in Somalia on a peacekeeping mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The troops arrived with a mandate to help the transitional government institutions, implement a national security plan, train Somali security forces, and assist in creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief delivery. Two years later, in response to the mission's rising logistical needs, the UN Security Council enacted a resolution establishing the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, and UNSOA was created. The United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS) established UNSOA in January 2009 as a logistical field support mission to AMISOM and its force of a few thousand troops located in Mogadishu. Over the next five years, AMISOM would develop into a force of over 22,126 troops and police from seven African countries, and UNSOA's role and size would evolve alongside it, as reflected in a series of UN Security Council Resolutions. Food, water, health and sanitation, gasoline, infrastructure and engineering, vehicles and other equipment, communications and information technology, property management, capacity building, aviation, and medical services were initially included in the UNSOA-authorized help package. A Trust Fund was established to allow member countries to make voluntary contributions to AMISOM. This was the first time the UN Security Council has supported a peacekeeping operation led by a regional organization. It resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation between the UN and the African Union. UNSOA got right to work, successfully building a supply chain to transfer crucial supplies straight from its Mombasa Logistics Support Base to AMISOM troops in Mogadishu. The following year, in January 2010, the UN Security Council allowed the inclusion of public information support as part of AMISOM's logistical support package (Resolution 1910). This resulted in the founding of the AU/UN Information Support Team, which was eventually overseen by UNSOA. Later that year, AMISOM boosted its force strength from 8,000 to 12,000 troops (Resolution 1964), and by February 2012, it had grown to nearly 17,000 uniformed personnel (Resolution 2036). AMISOM was also mandated to expand its area of operations outside of Mogadishu and create a presence in four sectors in South-Central Somalia, in accordance with AMISOM's Strategic Concept 3 of January 5 and CONOPS 4 of February 14. Resolution 2036 also voted to enhance the UN support package to incorporate payment of contingent-owned equipment (COE), including force enablers and multipliers (up to 12 air assets), as well as support for 20 AMISOM civilian personnel.

Plate 1: United Nations troops in Somalia



Source: bbc.com

The Impact of Foreign Intervention on Somalia's Conflict between 2010 and 2020

Tilly's 1975 course work delineated how war production brought together state power in early modern Europe through two key cycles: tax collection and enrollment. To successfully duty and recruit to fuel a conflict exertion, the state should identify areas of strength for organizations that can infiltrate into the open country and concentrate assets from its homegrown populace. Through the improvement of these concentrated establishments, the cutting-edge state makes and solidifies its political power.

Conversely, bombed states are exemplified by the breakdown of focal overseeing establishments and the shortfall of a restraining infrastructure on the genuine utilization of power. Bombed states are likewise frequently dependent upon fierce rivalry among warlord-driven groups, which look for command over part or the entirety of the state. With the end goal of this review, the definition by Ahmad (2012) that a warlord is an independent political figure characterized as a person of authority and an imposing business model on the utilization of actual power over a sub-state regional unit, however, who isn't lawfully perceived by the global local area as a genuine government entertainer, is taken on.

Warlords in bombed states remove assets from their populaces, as did the leaders of early European states. Tilly's portrayal of the state as a security racket closely resembles the connection between a warlord and his constituents in a bombed state (Anderson, 2018). To start with, warlords should separate assets from their homegrown populaces to solidify their hold over their area and shield their turf against invasions from adjoining gatherings. Second, likened to

In Tilly's model, warlords extricate assets from their homegrown populaces in return for security from viciousness, frequently from savagery executed by the warlord himself. In a nationwide conflict rivalry, the actual endurance of a warlord security racket is in many cases dependent upon its capacity to extricate rents from its enslaved populace.

In a bombed-out environment, this tax collection-security relationship limits the brutality of warlords and makes pockets of political request. As a matter of fact, when a warlord depends on the neighborhood populace for cash, his constituents have a more notable capacity to arrange the provisions of their restraint. As Bates (2017) makes sense of it, political requests happen at a balance at which both the security supplier and his constituents settle on the pace of tax collection and the nature of insurance. All in all, when a warlord is monetarily reliant upon the local neighborhood, both the warlord and the resident have the same unquestionable requirement of consenting at some level to the terms of enslavement. This relationship, on the other hand, fundamentally shifts when warlords no longer rely on the local populace to maintain political power. The quantity and source of a warlord's resources directly influence the extent to which he preys on his subjects. Jeremy Weinstein makes sense of the fact that groups that have outer wellsprings of financing are bound to participate in savagery against the regular citizen populace more than those that depend on the neighborhood populace for assets. The nationwide conflict writing obviously shows that bunches that approach normal assets participate in various kinds of brutality more than bunches that rely upon different types of revenue. In the event that a warlord never again needs to extricate assets from his homegrown populace, the tax collection-security relationship does not exist anymore (Leeson, 2018). The warlord system starts to act less like an insurance racket and more like a tyrannical rentier state. At this point, the neighborhood economy is not the warlord's monetary base, and subsequently, the collaboration between the warlord and his constituents shifts from an inserted independence to a ruthless relationship. The accessibility of outer rents makes it feasible for a warlord to take advantage of and stifle his populace with far more noteworthy exemption and decreases the need to train a typical volunteer army that might mishandle the general population.

Worldwide mediation makes a comparative difference. Overwhelmingly of money into the casual economy, worldwide intercessions essentially change and rule the nearby economy. From the second worldwide associations show up in a country, the greatest type of revenue for the neighborhood populace turns into the actual mediation. The sheer power of the monetary interruption of bringing billions of dollars of venture cash and a great many far-off nationals into a bombed state directly affects the casual economy (Andreas, 2018). Improvements in significant urban communities and shocks to neighborhood markets work out by accident, more or less. The best positions and greatest agreements come from worldwide associations. The presence of generously compensated worldwide specialists twists neighborhood costs of property, products, and work. The bigger the command and association of a worldwide mediation, the more significant and pulverizing the financial effect of its presence.

The infusion of this much cash into the local economy provides immediate incentives to exploit the international intervention. However, capitalizing on these foreign resources requires that warlords find local partners. Unlike natural resources, which a warlord may be able to exploit independently, generating revenue from an international intervention requires a more complex business model that includes obstruction, racketeering, and fraud. These actions are best accomplished with the help of local business partners that have bought into the warlord protection racket. Elite members of the local business community in failed states are well positioned to engage in criminal exploitation of foreign aid resources, whereas warlords are able to provide an accommodating security environment in which businesspeople can operate. Together, warlords and the business community can collaborate to capitalize on the corruption opportunities created by large international interventions, which can finance state failure for years.

Aid diversion in conflict environments is a well-known problem. Anderson's (2018) influential field manual identifies some of the many ways that aid can inadvertently finance conflict, including theft, co-option, and disruption of the local economy. Andreas's (2018) book provides a detailed empirical account of how aid diversion from the UN intervention in Bosnia inadvertently funded the siege of Sarajevo, extending the war for years longer than it would otherwise have lasted.

The idea that aid has unintentional consequences in conflict zones has long been the subject of much discussion among scholars and policymakers alike. This article builds on these contributions and argues that the way that aid diversion exacerbates conflict is by replacing the taxation-protection social contract between security provider and constituency with a warlord business relationship that serves the interests of a small group of elites in the failed state. By infusing cash into the informal economy, international interventions change the relationship between society and local power holders from reciprocal to predatory.

The Somali case provides a useful opportunity to explore these changing relationships. Somalia has been a failed state for 27 years and has experienced various degrees of international intervention, ranging from minimal engagement to large-scale international intervention (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2018). Through this lengthy period of state failure, the Somali business community has become a political force in its own right, with significant ties to powerful Mogadishu-based warlords. Over the course of the civil war, international resources in Somalia have fluctuated in volume, type, and regional distribution. This variation has led to political change over both time and space. As the following two sections illustrate, the greater the volume of international resources available to Somali warlords, the less they have to rely on a taxation-protection relationship with their constituents and the more they forge elite-level relationships with the local business community.

The state's collapse had a profound impact on the local economy. The absence of government put an end to nepotism, taxation, industry regulations, and crippling bureaucratic red tape. This opened the door to new businesspeople who wished to capitalize on tax- and regulation-free trade opportunities in both licit and illicit goods. Amid the chaos of the early war period, looting and smuggling created a windfall for a new group of criminal entrepreneurs in Mogadishu. The aggressive and illicit nature of these new business entrepreneurs required that they establish relationships with local warlords who could shield them from economic and political rivals. Longstanding members of the Mogadishu business community were pushed out. As Mogadishu-based businessman Haji Ibrahim Tajir explained, "I was in business for around 40 years, from when I was 16 years old. After the fall of the Siad Barre regime, a new phase of business started, which was very dangerous. All rules governing business were destroyed. All illegal business was possible [and], with no taxation, people got rich" (Anderson, 2018:33). Tajir and several other Mogadishu businesspeople explained how new businessmen who sought to dominate the failed state economy allied with local warlords to specifically target the established business class and push them out of the market. A prominent Mogadishu-based warlord from the early civil war period explained: "After the civil war, all the businesspeople were thrown out. Property was looted and stolen. The old business community left the country with whatever they had" (Andreas, 2018). The new businessmen supported and gave money to the warlords so that they could secure their transactions.

The aid resources created an extraordinary boon for this new criminal class. A prominent trader from the Yaqshiid district's Su'uqBa'ad market in Mogadishu explained: *UNOSOM brought heavy investment and money. After 1990, the greatest opportunity was UNOSOM. Many businesspeople got contracts. There were contractors for everything. Without UNOSOM, the business community couldn't make any money. Small businesspeople became millionaires. Aid helped the humanitarian and business sides too* (Clarke & Herbst, 2016:22). It was also revealed by some of the largest business owners in Somalia that virtually all of the biggest businesspeople in Mogadishu made their first fortunes from international aid contracts during the UNOSOM mission.

Neighborhood business people took advantage of UN help in two key ways that have been ignored by the customary examination. To start with, warlords and the new business class benefited from food assistance conveyance contracts. Second, warlords and organizations conspired to make counterfeit NGOs to secure money and food assets from the global local area. Both of these open doors set the stage for first-class business-warlord collusion, which funded warlords to be free of their homegrown populaces and hence propagated the nationwide conflict. To start with, the most rewarding global agreements were for food aid conveyance, worth countless dollars. During the starvation and nationwide conflict, interest in food was incredibly high. In that capacity, the enormous flood of food gifts transformed food help into a fluid resource. Food help hence turned into the casual cash of Somalia. Food assistance is the main wellspring of income for most of society, according to bleeding-edge compassionate clinical specialist Deqo Mohamed from Afgooye (Andreas, 2018). Deqo further made sense of the fact that in the entire country, there is no pay aside from food dispersion. Everybody is attempting to bring in cash from this food dispersion. Assuming you are living in the hedge and you need sugar or fabrics, you need to sell a portion of your sack so you can purchase something different. Where are you going to get the means to purchase the weapon? There is no bank to go to. There is just the World Food Program.

Those organizations that had the most grounded connections to warlords were best situated to make the most of the full scope of opportunities to take advantage of food help. Since warlords controlled security on the streets, project workers who had associations with warlords had the option to show the way that they could get help into the generally out-of-reach open country, at a cost. A Mogadishu-based financial specialist who worked in water

conveyance portrayed how this helped circulation function: 'Say they need help conveying from point A to point B. The worker for hire lets them know that it is too perilous to be out and about, so he says that he is compelled to take a significantly longer, rougher route to get to point B. As the financial specialist drew a guide for this long and superfluous side trip, he explained. Since the guide offices can't freely check the security out and about, they should pay this additional transportation cost. Critically, these guide project workers were not really repressed on the streets, nor did they take the more extended side courses' (Leeson, 2017). As a matter of fact, what these money managers did was fashion concurrences with nearby strongmen to guarantee conveyance into the open country and then charge exceptionally high expenses to incorporate the phony additional transportation and a security risk premium. The top notch on conveyance was utilized essentially to back the security relationship with warlords and to create a gain. Subsequently, it tends to be construed that unfamiliar mediation seemed to adversely affect the personality of the contention in Somalia somewhere in the range of 2010 and 2018.

It is fascinating to take note of the fact that, as of 2018, Somalia was as yet entangled in weakness, coordinated generally by al-Shabab. At its peak, somewhere in the range of 2009 and 2011, al Shabab controlled the vast majority of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. Beginning around 2012, a worldwide military mediation by the African Association Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), made out of powers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti, in blend with Somali tribe volunteer armies and the remnants of Somali public powers (SNF) upheld by the bigger worldwide local area, has prevailed with regards to wrestling control of enormous pieces of Somalia from al Shabab. In any case, beginning around 2015, military endeavors against al Shabab have slowed down, the limit of Somali public powers remains negligible, and AMISOM is lessening its presence. In the mean time, al Shabab, in view of its conveyance of skilful group administration, remains profoundly settled in and undefeated, so the possibility is for struggle to heighten and frailty to decline.

Al Shabab actually controls plots of rustic focal, southern, and western Somalia, remembering the areas of Lower and Center Juba, Lower and Center Shabelle, Hiraan, Gedo, Inlet and Bakool, Mudug, Galguduud, and Puntland, as well as significant streets all through the country. It routinely assumes control over significant towns, especially as some AMISOM powers, for example, from Ethiopia, have begun to pull out. AMISOM has been tormented by insight, strategic, and order lacks and contentions among contributing individuals. It needs hostile capacities, quick strike powers, sufficient transport and portability resources, and power-empowering influences and allies. Financing vulnerability additionally keeps tormenting the mission. In January 2016, the vulnerability and AMISOM disappointment with installments deteriorated when, in light of various factors, the European Association (EU), the sole element paying the compensations of AMISOM fighters, diminished its allowance commitment by 20% (from US\$1,028 per trooper each month to US\$822) [<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-experiences/the-influence-of-new-funding-uncertainties-on-amisom>]. As of September 2018, the EU was at this point to characterize its financing obligation to AMISOM past 2018.

In May 2017, the public authority of Somalia, with support from worldwide accomplices and purchase from Somalia's government states, introduced a public safety settlement characterizing Somalia's public safety engineering. Under the Security Agreement (<https://unsom.unmissions.org/destinations/default/documents/london-somalia-meeting-2017security-pact.pdf>), which imagines Somalia's security mechanical assembly to be "capable, responsible, reasonable, and satisfactory" to Somali society, government states were to incorporate their territorial powers into the SNA (Ali, 2018). In any event, a portion of the civilian armies were likewise to be coordinated into state and public police powers. Be that as it may, as the arranged size of the Somali Public Armed Force (SNA) is to be 18,000 and the size of future government and state police covered at 32,000, there won't be sufficient room in the proper security area for some current state, faction, and warlord volunteer army individuals. Numerous different difficulties with respect to the power structure endure. Additionally, given the emergency in relations between the central government and bureaucratic states that has continued all through the vast majority of 2018, the administrative states' obligation to such a mix of powers seems to have dispersed. In 2018, AMISOM started the progress cycle for more prominent dependence on Somali powers, somewhat decreasing its presence in Somalia following the casual withdrawal of Ethiopian powers in 2017. Yet, in July 2018, perceiving the sad absence of the Somali security powers and the entrenchment of al-Shabab, the Joined Countries Security Gathering expanded AMISOM's command. Rather than AMISOM's main goal finishing in 2020, as recently arranged, Somali security powers are to remain in charge of Somalia's security (https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc_13439.doc.htm). AMISOM, whose country contingents are to different degrees implanted in various legitimate and unlawful types of Somalia's political economy, like charcoal, fuel, and sugar exchanging and sneaking, has taken part in just restricted change arranging with the global local area and the Somali government (Columnists for Equity, 2015). The unannounced withdrawals of a few Ethiopian military contingents in Somalia had abandoned huge power vacuums, quickly filled by al Shabab and essentially deteriorating the security of neighborhood regular citizen populations. Al Shabab has, in this way, had the option to extend its regional reach and recover some recently lost domains. In mid-2018, a few components of a progress plan were consented to, but execution has lingered significantly behind (Williams, 2018).

Besides, al-Shabab isn't the main assailant entertainer in Somalia. In excess of 60 fighting gatherings are available in the country, from family and warlord civilian armies to different aggressor gatherings like the Sufi al-Sunna or the Islamic State (UNOCHA, 2018). A splinter group of al Shabab, the Islamic State has been based generally in Puntland, a significant passage point for different unlawful and carrying networks and a previous center for Somali privateers. Recently, the Islamic State seems to have extended its tasks to Mogadishu. Regardless, in contrast with al Shabab, it remains a much more fragile aggressor bunch (Felbab-Brown, 2017).

The public authority of Somalia and the worldwide local area have mainly depended on militarily crushing al Shabab, and there is no prompt possibility for Somali government dealings with al Shabab. Notwithstanding, mindful of the constraints of the tactical counterinsurgency endeavors, the Somali government has finished the tactical endeavors with announcements of acquittals for jihadi assailants, specially appointed political arrangements with splinter gatherings, and demilitarization, retirement, and reintegration (DDR)-like projects for deserters and populaces living under aggressor rule. Their

motivation is to debilitate al-Shabab in the war zone. Somali government authorities and executing worldwide accomplices report that al-Shabab turncoats numbering in the low thousands have gone through such projects.

Conclusion

The long-running violence in Somalia has had a significant influence on the East African region. The main conflicts in Somalia include inter-clan clashes and rivalries for power; warlords attempting to assert control over various regions of the country; piracy off the Somali coast; acts of terrorism perpetrated primarily by al-Shabaab; and border conflicts with neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. Although conflict in Somalia began earlier in 1991, the overthrow of military ruler Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 The following collapse of governmental order accelerated civil unrest, culminating in the country experiencing nearly two decades of conflict. Thousands of lives were lost, property was damaged, and people were forced to escape their homes and seek safety in other countries, while others became internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia. In 2012, a reported 1,017,649 Somali refugees were hosted in other countries, primarily in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen, while approximately 1.4 million people were internally displaced and settled in Somaliland and the country's south-central regions (UNHCR, 2012). It is also worth noting that Somalia has completed its transitional period, ushering in a new administration and parliament, as well as a new constitution. Many regional actors are hopeful that a stable post-transition government will put an end to insecurity in the country.

However, the political situation in Somalia is as tense and fragmented as the military battlefield. Although Somalia has been forming sub-federal states since 2015, a positive step, the process is fraught with inter-state and state-federal government rivalry over territories, control of the armed forces, resource sharing, and power delegation. Clan discrimination and rivalry persist and debilitate governance, resulting in hung governments unable to develop legislation and policies at the federal level, as well as ongoing political infighting and discrimination against minorities at the federal level (Felbab-Brown, 2017).

The 2012 interim constitution, as well as several of Somalia's six existing states, have yet to be legally formalized. Recent efforts to form pan-clan political parties as a result of new electoral legislation, attempts to change the rules of impeachment to limit this common tool of political and financial extortion, and mechanisms to strengthen the federal government's capacity to provide revenues to federal entities are beacons of hope that political and clan infighting can be reduced in the future.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that:

1. To reduce violent conflict and enhance stabilization, the Somali government and international actors can encourage the federal government and federal states to increase efforts to formalize the constitution and agree on an acceptable division of resources between the federal government and the federal states. Involving civil society, including women, in constitutional discussion is crucial.
2. The international community can also help sponsor broad-based societal conversations in Somalia about justice, accountability, and reconciliation to inform the formalization of the constitutional and other political processes. Such processes can include the development of disarmament, demobilization, justice, accountability, and reconciliation processes for Somali armed actors beyond al-Shabab.
3. The international community can also help foster a more cooperative regional environment by assisting in reconciliation between the federal government of Somalia and its neighbors.

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