



## **The Role of Political Leaders in the Formation of Kurdish State in Iraq: A Sociological Analysis**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This paper is an attempt to examine the role of Political leaders in the Kurdish struggle for a democratic and independent nation-state in the northern part of Iraq. Since 1918, the Kurdish population ratio has been higher in Iraq than in the other Kurdish countries; they were more independent, had geographically rich areas mostly in mountainous regions, and constituted 20% of the total population of Iraq. Now, there are roughly 8.5 million Kurds in Iraq, covering about 27% of the total Iraqi population (Foundation Institute Kurds De-Paris, 2019). Therefore, this paper highlights the contribution of Barzani leaders in establishing self-government by analysing the various dimensions of the Kurdish movement. Over the course of a hundred years, the Kurds raised their voices against social injustice, struggled to protect their cultural identity, and wanted freedom from the totalitarian Baathist regime under the leadership of KRG leaders. At the time of the First World War, Kurds were at the centre of a nationalist movement for independence. The Kurdish leaders had become vocal supporters of Kurdish rights in Iraq and demanded the formation of a Kurdish province in northern Iraq. The present study will assist in identifying the impact of political leaders on changing Kurdish society through a sociological and critical analysis of Kurdish leaders in Iraq. It stands for an advance planning of the methods to be adopted for the collection of data from secondary sources and available literature; it is qualitative, descriptive, and exploratory in nature. Content analysis would be used as a method of data collection, as per the requirement.

**Keywords:** The role of political leaders, the Kurdish movement, social injustice, and cultural identity in the formation of the Kurdish state

### **Introduction**

This paper will look at the role of Kurdish leaders to find out how political perspectives in Kurdistan have changed both before and after they gained control of the Kurdish region in Iraq. The major focus of this paper is to present the existing landscape of Iraq's major Kurdish political parties, particularly their leaders, political agendas, transitions, and popularity, which have major importance for the Kurdish community (Hevian, 2013). Despite having major experienced internal and external struggle, widespread devastation and oppression of the Kurdish community, and periods of violent internal fighting between rivalries groups, the Kurdish people appear to be more comfort and have more power and influence in modern-day Iraq than ever before. The present study also looks at how the Kurdish political parties and leaders have adapted to the new electoral system and how it has transformed the political landscape and nature in the Kurdistan Region (Bakr, 2021). Since the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, the leading Iraqi forces have accepted the current state of affairs of Kurdish independence. Under the new Iraqi constitution of 2005, Kurdistan was recognised as a federal territory with its own organizations and institutions. For plain areas with diverse populations, such as oil-rich Kirkuk, which have been disputed for years and are undergoing a overstretched demographic transition, Kurdish political leaders have managed to succeed in introducing a policy in the constitution such as the liberalisation process, national surveys, and finally an electoral system that allows such areas to be assimilated into Kurdish boundaries in Iraq (Rogg, & Rimscha, 2007).

The Kurds are considered a major, geographically isolated ethnic group in most West Asian countries, whose right to establish their own nation was accepted in the Sevres Treaty (1920). The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) replaced that pact and divided the Kurdish region. Kurdish people make up a considerable minority, residing not just in Iraq but also in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Since the formation of Iraq following World War I, the Iraqi Kurds have attempted, but failed, to revolt against their central government. Baghdad, on its side, has consistently fought to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state, believing that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would create a precedent for Iraqi disintegration (JÜDE, 2017). This paper deals with how Kurdish political leaders have significantly influenced Iraqi politics by mediating disputes between the country's more fragmented Shiite and Sunni leaders. Kurdish leaders have also advocated for more regional autonomy and further decentralisation of the Iraqi government, along with the granting of visas, the creation of a foreign ministry, and the negotiating of exploration agreements with foreign oil companies in Iraqi Kurdistan (Beehner, 2006). The Kurdistan Region, which includes the provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah, as well as the adjacent areas, has extensive self-rule under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and a strong leader, President Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The peshmerga, the armed units of the two main Kurdish organisations, are a significant military force with a strength of 70,000 to 120,000 soldiers. Barzani's long-time

competitor and present ally, Jalal Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), was elected as the first Iraqi post-war president in 2005 (Rogg & Rimscha, 2007).

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## Review of Literature

Hevian (2013) in his paper on the "*Main Kurdish political parties in Iraq*" in 2013, stated that despite the fact that Kurdistan is divided among many countries and the Kurds are not geographically united, they are divided among a variety of political parties and organizations. While the Iraqi Kurds do not yet have their own state, some of the most significant events in modern Kurdish history have occurred in the last decade. Since 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the Kurds gained control of the Kurdish territory where they lived in Iraq, and a Kurd was elected president of Iraq in 2005. The 13th General Assembly of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) was held in Brussels in May 2013, which was a significant progress in the level of international alliance. The KRG represented itself for the first time among 200 representatives from several Kurdish political parties and organizations.

Marr, (2008) in his report "*Who Are Iraq's New Leaders? What do they want?*" It is evident that Kurdish political leaders have the clearest visions of where they need to go, which is not surprising agreed that they have almost a decade of experience defining and working toward their ideas and goals in the creation of Kurdish society. Almost everyone feels that Kurdish identity is important when it comes to the topic of culture and ethnicity. Unexpectedly, the concept of federalism dominates arguments about Iraq's political structure and the form of democracy that Kurds want within the country. Kurdish leaders, whose principles are enshrined in Iraq's new constitution, want something more like a federation: a powerful and ruling government that deals equally with other Iraqi provinces and groups.

Hassan and Hama (2020) disclose in their paper "*Political Parties and Political System in Iraqi Kurdistan*" that in the Kurdistan region, all political parties and leaders show a lack of democratic values, which demonstrates itself in opaque judgement, illegal sources of funding, civil rights violations, and electoral fraud. This is predominantly true for the ruling parties, which have the most access to the state's resources. In most democratic societies, the actual work of creating a political system is carried out by an official, non-partisan body mainly concerned with safeguarding the national interest and integrating organizations with democratic values. For some factions in the Kurdish region, these resources ensuring benefits for a specific tribe or family, while for others, it means receiving benefits for a specific political monopoly. This has had serious and diverse impacts on the Kurdish region's political stability and development.

Yilmaz (2018), in his paper "*The Changing Dynamics of the Kurdish Question*," claims that the Kurds have come to power as political and military players in the Middle Eastern countries. The upsurge of the Islamic State (IS) and the role of Kurdish fighters in the war against IS has accessible Kurdish political actors a priceless opportunity. Kurdish leaders were now on the political stage, advocating for the Kurdish people with political and diplomatic support from the United States and a few European countries. As a result, it was a notable Kurdish moment, agreeing the Iraqi Kurds to appear to be free of denial, suppression, and coercion. Although Kurdish political factions and leaders lack the ability to unite, they do have the ability and skill to raise internal and regional relationships. Control of Kurdish-populated region by central government is based on services that weaken their legitimacy and uplift the role of Kurdish political parties as a representative of the Kurds' desire and ambitions.

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## The Role of Kurdish Leaders in the Formation of Kurdish Society

Kurdish political leaders have the clearest vision of where they need to go, which is not unexpected given that they have had almost a decade of autonomy and governing experience to explain and work toward their ideas and goals in the formation of Kurdish society in Iraq. A majority agrees that Kurdish identity is important when discussing an essential subject of Kurdish culture. This is particularly true of a younger generation of politicians who spent their early years in a country apart from Arab Iraq and received their education in Kurdish rather than Arabic language. An older age group of Kurds, who went to primary school in Baghdad and Mosul, speak Arabic, and are more faithful about the possibilities for Kurdish dominion in the short or long term, are less optimistic. These earlier Kurdish leaders have a strong loyalty and devotion for Iraq, but their identity is restricted by the framework of the recently established state. Separatist groups will not gain momentum if Iraqi Kurds are likely to take part and play a key role in this new forming state, which must be democratic and inclusive (Marr, 2006).

Unexpectedly, the concept of federalism leads discussions of Iraqi political structures and the form of democracy that Kurds desire within the state. Kurdish leaders, whose ideas and demands are codified in the new Iraqi constitution, try to find something more similar to an alliance: a powerful and dominant government that deals on an equal footing with other Iraqi territories and factions. Kurdish representatives are concentrating their focusses in the northern region on establishing Kurdish governance and expanding it to towns and cities boundaries with a Kurdish majority, such as Kirkuk. In fact, the Kurdish political leaders want a centralized and democratic structure that allows them to retain much of the autonomy and independence that they already have (Marr, 2006).

### *A Notable Kurdish Leaders*

Kurdish political leaders have significantly influenced Iraqi politics by participating in struggles against neighbouring countries and demanding a separate nation state since the formation of Iraq. Some major political Kurdish figures in Iraq that are helping to build a Kurdish state:

### *Sheikh Mahmoud Barzani*

The Iraqi Kurds in World War 1 were essentially divided into two groups: pro-British and pro-Ottoman in Iraq. The most renowned member of the first group was Sheikh Mahmoud Barzani, a well-known Kurd who held a position of power in Iraq and within the city of Sulaymaniyah. Due to his pro-British reputation, Sheikh Mahmoud was chosen by the British officials as the appropriate person to maintain strict control over Mosul city (Stansfield, 2006). Sheikh Mahmud tried to utilise his position to advocate for Kurdish autonomy and led a rebellion against the British empire in 1920 as the Iraqi Kurds were worried about Britain's indirect control of them through the Arabs in Iraq. When Sheikh Mahmud Barzani was wounded and taken into custody and expelled to India, the revolt came to an end. After the uprising, the British imposed direct rule over the Kurdish territory, which turned aggressive towards it. In an effort to normalize the situation, Britain was concerned about the security of the northern region due to Turkish threats, so they appointed again Sheikh Mahmud as the ruler of the Kurdistan region of Iraq (Washington Kurdish Institute, 1996).

**Barzani's Insurgency against the British for the Independent Kurdistan:** Sheikh Mahmud Barzani's rebellion was one of the initial efforts to establish a Kurdish self-governing state, which took place in the city of Sulaymaniyah and its surrounding areas in Iraq in 1922. Sheikh Mahmud, who was a well-known Qadiri Sheikh in the region, took advantage of the political void left after the fall of the Ottoman Empire by cooperating and collaborating with the British and taking the position of Kurdistan's ruler. However, the British government in Iraq would realise it would be difficult to restrain Sheikh Mahmud Barzani's desires and ambitions as soon as he declared the ruler of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The Iraqi armed forces marched into the area with the help of the British air force and soldiers during the two-year existence of this undocumented administrative and political structure (Stansfield, 2006).

The Kurdistan Kingdom was ruined by British and Iraqi forces, and Barzani's rule shortly came to an end. But in 1919, Sheikh Mahmoud once again was able to organize a counterattack against the Iraqi militaries, pushing them from the city and regaining control over the region. As a result, in 1920, Barzani was compelled to depart the region by the Iraqi armed forces. He moved to the hills, where he established his new military bases and began a guerrilla campaign that continued there until 1926, when he negotiated a deal with the British to flee Iraq with his family. Eventually, he was sent to India. His influence and uprising in Iraq were completely gone by the time, but the demand for Kurdish autonomy had already started to burn in Iraq when he was sent into another exile in Baghdad in 1941 till his death in 1956. (Ozoglu & Hanso, 2017).

**Mustafa Barzani**, known as the founder of Kurdish nationalism, created the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq while displaced and exiled in the Republic of Mahabad. Since the 1940s, he has been a key leader of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq and one of the most prominent political leaders in modern Kurdish political history. He was the driving force behind the Kurdish revolution against the Iraqi regime. Until his assassination in March 1979, Barzani was the chief political and military leader of the Kurdish movement in West Asia (Rudaw, 2014). He organised armed resistance actions against the Iraqi and Iranian governments. As a Kurdish leader, he worked for 50 years to establish and create an autonomous region for the thousands of Kurds who live on the boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and the Soviet Union. He managed this by expressing a vision of Kurdish nationalism that inspired many Kurds to identify themselves for the first time with national identity. The formation of a Kurdish movement seeking both Kurdish socio-economic and cultural rights to reform these problems, even as Barzani continued to capitalise on his own indigenous tribal and Sufi religious heritage, preserved legitimacy within the conservative Kurdish community. Under Barzani's control, the Kurdish people in Iraq began to see the KDP as a national party that could think and act on their difficulties (Nashville, 2015).

**Mustafa Barzani's Nationalist Movement for Kurdish State:** Mustafa Barzani, who comes from a long line of renowned Naqshbandi Sheikhs in the area, is one of the most well-known Kurdish nationalists of the 20th century. In 1958, after Barzani and his supporters left the Soviet Union for Iraq, they soon created a close relationship with General Abdul Karim Qasim, who was considering Barzani as a suitable partner in the Kurdistan region. Kurdish disunity has long been one of their weak points. Iraq and outside powers frequently take advantage of this division to the detriment of Kurdish nationalism. In addition to tribal conflicts, Qasim decided to capitalize on the political rift between Barzani's KDP and Jalal Talabani's PUK in the Kurdish region. Mustafa Barzani led numerous rebellions against the Iraqi government in opposition to this non-recognition and exploitative policy. These uprisings began in 1961 and didn't stop until a Kurdish sovereignty deal between Baghdad and Barzani was signed in 1970. The Iraqi regime saw a government transition at this time, and Kurdish internal fighting grew more intense in the whole region of Iraq (Ozoglu & Hanso, 2017).

Barzani strongly opposed the new government after the last Baathist ruler in Iraq in 1968, which agreed to select Saddam Hussein as president. Barzani received funding and support from Iran throughout this campaign, and he was successful in reaching a new contract and agreement with Iraq. The proposal of this new agreement states that Baghdad sought an autonomy pact with Barzani and accepted his control over the KDP in Iraq. In 1974, Mustafa Barzani staged another revolt because he realised that a Kurdish government could not survive without the economic resources that could be generated from Kirkuk's huge oil resources. Baghdad and Tehran negotiated the Algiers Agreement in 1975, which included an establishment to essentially stop Iran's funding for Barzani, despite the fact that he had tried to push regional participants against each other. The CIA and Mossad cut off their financial and military funding for the Barzani insurgency at this point, bringing an end to the vision of a Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq (Ozoglu & Hanso, 2017).

### *Jalal Talabani*

Since the failure of the revolt, there are divisions among Kurdish people. Jalal Talabani, who decides to call Barzani a reactionary, splits from the KDP to form the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). He was a key member of the Interim Iraqi Executive Council, which was formed after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. For more than fifty years, Talabani has fought for Kurdish democratic rights in Iraq. He headed a Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein's regime that failed when US-led soldiers refused to intervene to help the insurgents in Iraq. Talabani then negotiated with the US, UK, Turkey, and France to create a "safe haven" for Iraqi Kurds in the region, which is located in the country's far north and northeast. Talabani tried

to minimize sectarianism and corruption in Iraq, as well as to strengthen relations with Turkey, which had held responsible Iraq for supporting Kurdish fighters operating from camps in Iraqi Kurdistan for attacking Turkey. He also advocated for a peaceful settlement to the Kurdish Civil War, as well as a comprehensive discussion of Kurdish rights in the contemporary regional context. He collaborated with other Kurdish leaders as well as other opposition groups in Iraq. Talabani and the Kurds worked closely with Masoud Barzani and played a major role in creating an independent state as followers and supporters of the US-led Alliance in the invasion of Iraq (Hiltermann, 2016).

### ***Masoud Barzani***

Since 1979, Mr. Barzani has served as the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), working to achieve the party's goals of democracy for Kurdish control as well as for Iraq and then federalism for Kurdistan. He worked to bring the Iraqi opposition closer during the 1990s and until Saddam Hussein's dictatorship collapsed in 2003. He was very keen in getting the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officially recognized in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). He later advocated for a federal system with some other Kurdistan Coalition members during the development of the Iraqi constitution in order to create a more well-organized and democratic governance system and avoid a reappearance of the repressive regime from the centre of Iraq. Barzani has formed several organizations in the Kurdistan Region under his president to help the region's emerging democratic structure, strengthen coalitions, and improve decision-making. He also contributed to the formation of the Council of Kurdistan Political Factions, which he led and incorporates the leaders of all of Kurdistan's major political parties (Mamzada, 2020).

### ***Nawshirwan Mustafa***

He is from a city, not a village, and is not a member of a tribe, unlike Kurdistan's two major political figures, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. He shaped his image as a republican who fought against family domination and dynastic political parties in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Nawshirwan's goal was to turn the Kurdish political system into a parliamentary one, thereby weakening Barzani and the presidency. Soon after, Barzani and the KDP disallowed his attempts to reform the government's power structure, and the parties' long-term struggle and chaos re-emerged. By dividing Kurdistan, Mustafa is unlikely to give up his vision of forming a unified, democratic Kurdistan until there is a real opportunity to reform itself. He is sick, but behind his sickness is strategic planning for a campaign of radical civil disobedience. This peaceful resistance and anti-corruption movement may be commenced alone or as a part of an opposition group and party (Chomani, 2016).

Minorities are divided among Kurdish nationalist organisations' domination. Other Kurdish factions, such as the Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU) and the Kurdish Socialist Party, share this sentiment, and the youth of Kurdistan are fed up with the lack of true democracy and the region's stronghold by two parties. As a result, the leadership of the two Kurdish parties, which are more moderate on the Iraqi landscape, are facing true unhappiness with their own rule in the north. The major goal of these organisations is to promote more democratic values and freedom. Kurdish political leaders are doubtful of their bordering regions, mainly Turkey and Iran, although Turkey is now seen as a country whose past antagonism to Kurdish self-rule can be influenced by European pressure. Relationships with the Arab and neighbouring world are considered problematic due to Arab unwillingness to support the newly shaped system in Iraq, specifically the Kurds' desire and wish for a federal and decentralised Iraq (Marr, 2006).

The Kurds are now a unified and mostly homogeneous people. Despite this fact, Kurdish society is religiously and ethnically diverse, and the Kurdish cultural identity has coexisted, overlapped, and even challenged other communities of the region. Kurdish organizations have varied political and ideological viewpoints and sources, signify different pressure groups, and have fought together at times. A large number of Kurdish people are currently represented and belong to political currents other than Kurdish nationalism (Rogg & Rimscha, 2007). Dissimilar visions and dreams exist among the newly elected Kurdish political leaders. The emphasis has been given to sectarian and ethnic identity, while nationalism and the spirit of Iraqi nationality have declined. Kurdish leaders emphasise Kurdish identity and seek a centralized region that includes Kirkuk, which is extremely decentralised. The majority of Kurdish political leaders are secular in nature and pro-Western in orientation (Marr, 2006).

### ***Kurdish Political Leader's Visions for a 2017 Referendum on Kurdistan Region's Independence***

After getting international support for resolving the region's internal issues and conflicts, the KRG held a referendum for independence on September 25, 2017, including the disputed territory of Kirkuk. In the constitution, article 143 remarks the oil-rich disputed territory as a part of the northern part of Iraq. The KRG ask for that the 2005 constitution recognized Kurdistan as a federal region and granted it the authority to exercise its own entity and establish embassies and appoint ambassadors abroad. It was revealed that Baghdad is not interested in power sharing and corporations, whereas KRG blamed those 55 articles, which are all about the economic system and profit sharing, for not being given by the Iraqi government because the central government indulges in political and economic corruption (Driscoll & Baser, 2019).

The emergence of Kurdish desires above highlights the historical importance of the referendum held on September 25, 2017 in the Kurdistan region. It should be noted that this referendum for Kurdish autonomy is not the first to be held in Kurdistan since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. Following the US-led attack of Iraq in 2003, a new independent state was recognized in the northern part of Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was created for the Iraqi Kurds. The KRG started planning a referendum on Kurdistan's independence on January 30, 2005. As per the unofficial statistics of this referendum, 98.88 per cent of Kurds voted and supported the independence referendum. The KRG, led by Mustafa Barzani's son, Masoud Barzani, started the referendum for independence on September 25, 2017, which was similar to 2005 efforts for independence, to put pressure on the central government for economic and political benefits (Ozoglu & Hanso, 2017).

During this time, Masoud Barzani made the first moves toward autonomy for Kurdish region. According to Barzani, Baghdad has been incapable to accept the Kurds' essential demands and it is necessary for Kurds to take the internal and external matters into their own hands. He urged the Kurdish national assembly to set up an independent electoral body to conduct the referendum voting. In 2017, Kurdish region reached its regional, diplomatic, and political peak. Barzani gained advantage of this enthusiasm by declaring that the referendum would take place on September 25, 2017. National and international organisations reacted severely to the announcement. Delegates from the UN, the US, and the UK met with Barzani two weeks before the referendum to advise him to postpone it. The White House advised Barzani that supporting the referendum proposal would jeopardise the US-led coalition's anti-terror operations. Kurdish opposition political parties campaigned against the Kurdish referendum, in contrast to regional and international objects. While all Kurdish political groups want independence, they disagree on the timing and how it should happen. While Barzani planned to go down in history as the creator of the Republic of Kurdistan or honestly put an end to Kurdish misery, millions of Kurds rallied and united behind him and voted in favour of an independent Kurdistan on September 25, 2017. The KRG was well aware of the situation and was aware that neither those countries nor the international communities would support the areas where Kurdish people resided because they were worried and afraid of the referendum, as the slogan of statehood encouraged people to seek greater autonomy in that particular area. None of the neighbouring countries want to give Kurdistan independence, despite 93% of Iraqi Kurds voting for their freedom in a 2017 referendum, and Kurdish people marched to express their gratitude for their votes. On the other hand, Iraq and its neighbours strongly opposed this referendum (Esposti, 2021).

### **The Reasons and factors that Hampered Kurdish Leaders' Attempts to Create an Independent State**

There are a number of reasons that hampered Kurdish leader's efforts to form a state in the 2017 referendum on independence. There is a significant internal disunion among the Kurdish leaders. The Iraqi Kurdish people lack a coherent strategy, ideology, and leadership structure for getting independence. The referendum's supporters underestimated these difficulties, and the political movements that developed around the referendum in 2017 deteriorated and intensified these transformations. Moreover, since the fight against ISIS between 2014–2017, the KRG's economy has been unstable, and it has been unable to resist the restrictions and economic sanctions imposed by neighbouring and international powers. The Kurdish Region's reputation and political influence in the West Asian countries and worldwide have been severely damaged due to the extensive complications that the 2017 referendum encountered. The region has lost control of disputed areas as well as the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Due to these issues, the Iraqi region is now in a difficult position with the central government of Iraq and is facing a severe economic crisis. Additionally, the Kurdish region has lost its worldwide sympathy and political support (Mohammad & Alrebh, 2020).

The security council has once again indicated that sustaining Iraq's regional stability and integrity is much more vital than supporting the Kurdish leaders in their quest and mission for creating an independent state (Mohammad & Alrebh, 2020). The major factors for the failure of the referendum was that Iraq and bordering countries like Iran, Turkey, and Syria rejected the proposal of Kurdish leaders for self-determination, by condemning the referendum, and deciding to take necessary action. All courtiers have diverse opinions and interests, and they are exploited subjugated in different ways, but they have similar ideas and are united shoulder to shoulder when it comes to opposing the determinations of freedom and sovereignty of a state (Esposti, 2021).

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### **Objectives**

- To identify the role of Kurdish leaders in the formation of Kurdish state
- To examine the circumstances that hampered the Kurdish referendum independence
- To point out that how Kurds experiencing difficulties in Iraqi region

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### **Methodology**

A research design is developed to outline the sort of data that will be collected and the techniques used to assess the information about the subject matter. Research design is the process of carefully determining the approaches to be taken for data collecting and the methodologies to be applied for data analysis while keeping in mind the objective of the study. The present research paper is exploratory and descriptive in nature. According to the requirements, content analysis will be used as a method of data gathering. This study is qualitative and focuses on collecting information through words and language. This paper is based on secondary sources by including Journals, government websites, news articles, books, theses, and media that cover Kurdish chaos, social uprisings, and specifically the changing status of Kurdish people in Iraq.

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### **Conclusion**

Based on the above-mentioned studies, the conclusion of this paper is that it is not surprising that the Kurdish political leaders have the clearest vision and ambitions of where they need to go seeing that they have over ten years of self-government and governing experience to express and work toward their objectives and goals in the establishment of Kurdish society in Iraq. There are a number of groups with different agendas with regards to the Kurdish leaders and parties in the middle eastern countries. This is considered one of the most exploited vulnerabilities of the Kurdish nationalist movements for most of the last century. Despite the Barzani family's strong leadership of the KDP and the fact that there are still significant divisions in the Kurdish political system, the establishment of an independent Kurdistan has always been hindered by this lack of unity within the Kurdish nationalist parties and leaders. In these difficult environments, few political leaders have the ambassadorial and diplomatic skills necessary to realize and evaluate the challenges of forming an autonomous Kurdish region. They are aware the fact that the neighbouring countries, such as Turkey and Iran, would create major obstacles

and difficulties for this Kurdish region if it were to be established independently in Iraq. While Baghdad has a conferred interest in Kurdish self-government, the collaboration of Baghdad's, Ankara's, and Tehran's agendas challenges how the KRG's parting from the whole of Iraq might unfold. Whereas the Iraqi Kurdistan still do not have their own independent state, some of the most important groups and organizations are using media briefings, seminars and online forums to create awareness of the problematic issues in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

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