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## **A Review Study on Initial Public Offering (IPO): Global IPOS Market and Indian IPOS Market**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a transformational occasion for an association as it perpetually changes how an organization approaches working together. The Indian IPO has seen something reasonable of high points and low points. On account of the administrative changes and consistence, the organizations need to go through the maze of translation, application and execution with mindfulness and refreshed knowledge unremittingly. Consequently, the motivation behind this investigation is to comprehend the method for posting of IPO in India and the hurdles that the Indian Corporate face as they gear up to pull up an effective IPO. The reason for this paper is to give a survey of IPO movement, pricing and assignments. Initial returns, issue size and market conditions primarily clarify varieties in since quite a while ago run execution of Indian IPOs. As we as a whole strive to comprehend these adjustments in the market, it is particularly critical to comprehend the elements fundamental the IPO process. In this view investment banks allot IPO offers to informed investors as a trade-off for genuine valuation and request data. Informed investors are allocated shares since they help to value the issue. In the event that the process of opening up to the world is too expensive or the IPO mechanism is tormented by such a large number of irreconcilable situations among the different middle people, at that point privately owned businesses may judiciously pick different strategies for raising capital.

**Keywords:** Initial Public Offerings (IPO), Activity, Pricing, Allocations

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### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Opening up to the world is a great choice for any organization. It is the process of offering securities for the most part regular supply of an exclusive organization available to be purchased to the overall population. The first run through these securities are offered is alluded to as an initial public offering (IPO). A public organization approaches more, and regularly more profound, wellsprings of capital than a privately owned business.

Corporate may bring capital up in the primary market via an initial public offer that can be made through the fixed value technique, book building strategy or a combination of both for which organizations need to experience different principles and guidelines which are governed by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). SEBI is a governing collection of securities market in India which sets down guidelines to ensure the premium of investors and assist the improvement of securities market in India. ICDR guidelines of SEBI, 2009 rundown down principles for IPO. An issuer is needed to experience these guidelines prior to posting for IPO. ICDR guideline records following data in 20 guidelines: arrangements and pricing for public issue, eligibility measures, commitment of promoters, least offer that can be utilized, offer report, reservation and general commitments of issuers concerning public. In a notification dated October 27, 2015 SEBI cuts IPO administrative work by notifying a five-sheet abbreviated outline including the application structure will not surpass 5 sheets (printed the two sides) that organizations need to petition for public proposals to make it simpler for investors to comprehend key focuses and to settle on an informed choice. This will be material from first day of December, 2015.

The IPO Scam in the year 2005-2006 made us mindful of the maltreatment and abuse of the IPO allotment process. The purchasing and sharing process in the offers dispensed through IPOs to almost 21 organizations in the year 2003, 2004 and 2005. It included control of the initial public offers (IPOs) by lenders and market players by utilizing invented or benaami DEMAT Accounts. In the year 2005, the IPO trick became known when the private 'Yes Bank' dispatched its initial public offering. Roopal Ben Panchal, an occupant of Ahmedabad, had purportedly opened a few phony DEMAT accounts and hence she raised funds on the offers apportioned to her through Bharat Overseas Bank offices. In the wake of identifying the inconsistencies in the purchasing of portions of YES BANK's IPO, the SEBI began an expansive examination. SEBI chose to deliver the sets of a sub-board of trustees investigating NSDLs job in the IPO trick and instance of inconsistencies in dematerialization of the portions of an organization. Consequently the case comes up as NSDL v. SEBI case spoke to Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). Along these lines, SEBI had arraigned NSDL as far back as in 2006 for being responsible for not appropriately observing the Depository Participants and in this manner being responsible for the trick. With this the SEBI issued ex-parte temporary request under Section 19 of the Depositories Act, 1996 read with Section 11, 11B of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, for finishing the request. The SEBI started mediation procedures against NSDL under segment 15 H of the SEBI Act, 1992 and segment 19 H of the Depositories Act, 1996. Along these lines the SEBI required a monetary punishment of Rs. 5 crores on NSDL.

In October 2010, Coal India IPO came and called as The Mother, all things considered. Coal India Limited (CIL), the biggest coal producing organization on the planet, thought of the greatest actually Initial Public Offering (IPO) throughout the entire existence of the Indian securities exchange to raise

subsidizes near INR 1,500,000 million. CIL, given an IPO reviewing of 5/5, offered 631.63 million equity shares through the IPO. Preceding this, the Reliance IPO had been the greatest IPO ever.

This exploration paper is completed with an expectation to comprehend the issues looked by Indian Corporate in the process of bringing an Initial Public Offer and its posting from that point. The investigation of IPO in this setting had grabbed the specialist's eye consider the energy in the Indian IPO market. With changed demeanor of the Government at the Center, mushrooming of IPOs and dynamic regulatory climate, the organizations that wish to open up to the world are currently pondering the huge advance in a more far reaching and lateral manner. Consequently it requires the investigation of the strategy for issue and Listing of IPO just as the difficulties and obstructions that it presents.

Indian organizations have raised Rs. 4,950 crore through the initial public offerings (IPO) in the main portion of the current monetary year, as per Prime Database. In the principal half of FY15, homegrown organizations had raised Rs. 1,017 crore through IPOs. The raising money through IPO is relied upon to pick up traction proceeding, as in excess of 30 organizations have recorded draft papers with market controller the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). As of now, 19 organizations intending to raise Rs. 11,545 crore are holding SEBI endorsement and another 17 organizations expecting to raise Rs. 6,795 crore have recorded with SEBI and are awaiting endorsement, Pranav Haldea, Managing Director of Prime Database has been cited as saying. Then, Indian organizations raised an additional Rs. 12,916 crore in the initial half year of FY16 through the offer-available to be purchased (OFS) course because of the Government's disinvestment program. This is the best first half for the primary market since FY08, when INR 31,831 crore was raised according to the India Infoline News Service (IIFL) on October 13, 2015. Thus, what follows ahead in this paper is investigation of issue and posting technique and hurdles they make for Indian organizations thinking about an IPO.

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## 2. Initial Public Offering (IPO)

An Initial Public Offering or IPO is the principal offering of offers to the public. Preceding an IPO, the organization has few investors. You, as a retail investor, can't accept portions of an organization until the organization offers to offer its offers to the public. To purchase the portions of an organization not recorded on the stock market; you can move toward the proprietors of the organization yet they are not obliged to sell you their stocks. Dispatching an IPO is regularly called 'opening up to the world', as public organizations offer a part of their offers to be exchanged the stock market, to the public.

Most organizations begin by raising equity capital from few investors, with no fluid market existing if these investors wish to sell their stock. On the off chance that an organization thrives and needs additional equity capital, eventually the firm commonly thinks that its alluring to "open up to the world" by offering stock to an enormous number of expanded investors. When the stock is publicly exchanged, this enhanced liquidity allows the organization to raise capital on more good terms than if it needed to remunerate investors for the absence of liquidity associated with a secretly held organization. Existing investors can sell their offers in open-market exchanges. With these advantages, notwithstanding, come costs. Specifically, there are sure progressing costs associated with the need to supply information consistently to investors and controllers for publicly-exchanged firms. Besides, there are significant one-time costs associated with initial public offerings that can be classified as immediate and indirect costs. The immediate costs incorporate the lawful, inspecting, and endorsing expenses. Overall, beneath the cost winning in the market soon after the IPO. These immediate and indirect costs influence the expense of capital for firms opening up to the world.

Since initial public offerings include the offer of securities in intently held firms in which a portion of the current investors may have non-public information, a portion of the classic problems brought about by awry information might be available. Notwithstanding the antagonistic choice problems that can emerge when firms have a decision of when and if to open up to the world, a further issue is that the basic estimation of the firm is influenced by the activities that the supervisors can embrace. This moral risk issue should likewise be dealt with by the market. This article portrays a portion of the mechanisms that are utilized practically speaking to beat the problems made by information imbalances.

A well known way for a firm to raise capital is by selling its shares in the public financial markets—a technique called going public. In other words, going public means that the owner gives up private benefits of control for the benefit of being a publicly traded firm (Benninga et al., 2005; Latham and Braun, 2010). It is also referred as initial public offers (hereinafter, IPOs) and unseasoned equity offers, where shares are sold to investors, often at a price below those prevailing on the first day of trading [a phenomenon called under pricing] (e.g. Hanley and Hoberg, 2012; Krishnamurti and Kumar, 2002). Strategically, IPO is a tool for entrepreneurs while moving from private to public ownership (Poulsen and Stegemoller, 2008). Specifically, IPOs help the inorganic growth of a firm—for example, in mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Celikyurt et al., 2010; Hovakimian and Hutton, 2010).


In general, public offers provide a chance for investors to participate in the ownership of a growing firm (Akhigbe et al., 2006). Hence, it is subjected to fads in early aftermarket trading (Ritter, 1991). On the other hand, underpricing refers to the positive returns over the offer price to listing dates of the new issue (e.g. Cai et al., 2011). While Ghosh (2005) states that underpricing captures the difference between investor's willingness to pay and the actual respect of the new issuers. It is a percentage of difference between the closing price on the listing day and the offer price of the issue (p. 45). Empirically, Kenourgios et al. (2007) suggest that underpricing varies from one market to another market, for example, 5.4% in Canada to 388% in China. In fact, it is more costly than under-issuing, because the firm must amplify the number of shares in IPO in order to raise the required amount of capital, which reduces the original owners claim in future earnings; at the same time, it is more effective in signalling quality than underissuing (Cao and Shi, 2006). In a 2010 study, Lowry et al. found significant volatility in initial returns. With regard to developed as well as developing countries, many researchers have found that IPOs assure superior results in the short run but tend to fall in the long run—an observation which has led scholars to declare that underpricing exists. This phenomenon accords with the argument of Rahul Mitra that corporate strategy in India is more likely to succeed by looking beyond stakeholders such as consumers and employees and delving deeper into the organization society relationships (Mitra, 2013, p. 28).

There are extensive theoretical arguments and ample of empirical papers explaining the existence of under pricing in equity markets in various economies, and our paper contribute to this knowledge by focusing on the Indian market. It has been initiated by studies, for instance, on pricing performance of

initial listings in U.S. (Ritter, 1991); Korea (Kim et al., 1995); Germany (Ljungqvist, 1997); India (Ghosh, 2005); UK (Goergen et al., 2007); Hong Kong (Vong and Trigueiros, 2010) and a recent study in Malaysia (Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011). Accordingly, we aim to test if the existence of underpricing in India is a myth or a reality by undertaking 133 public issues [through book building] during 2007-2009. To do so, earnings management method (event-study) is employed to observe price signalling in three groups: house-full collections, short-run period and long-run period. Further, it also notifies the price performance both in segment- and in year-wise to draw a stock trend for insightful findings. More specifically, it compares India and international underpricing evidence to sum-up and conclude the study. Lastly, it brings to a close that Indian IPOs also assure high returns in short-run but tend to plummet in long-run. Therefore, the contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, it investigates the underpricing of Indian IPOs during the period of global financial crisis, which would bring some new insights on investor perspectives (e.g. price signalling) that would help new venture capitalists, investment bankers, and other stock market intermediaries. Second, it specifically breaks up the sample size/duration into three groups: house-full collections, short-run and long-run

## 2.1 Global IPOs market

Worldwide IPOs market (see Figure 1) has been driven generally by Asia and South America in the second 50% of 2009. Consequently, these areas have raised US\$ 68.6 billion (Nov 2009), which represents 72% of the estimation of the IPOs. As per Ernst and Young Global IPO Report 2009 (Ernst and Young, 2009a, 2009b), there were three enormous public issues raised by arising countries. To begin with, Banco Santander SA raised US\$ 7.5 billion, which was the greatest in Brazilian financial market history, second China State Construction Engineering Corporation raised US\$ 7.3 billion, and third Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd raised US\$ 5.2 billion. Further, Hong Kong, New York and Shanghai stock exchanges have accounted roughly 18.7% (US\$ 17.7 billion), 17.9% (US\$ 16.9 billion), and 17% (US\$ 16.1 billion) of capital raised separately. Specifically, the main areas by number of issues incorporate mechanical 77, material 68, and high innovation 55. Regarding offer size, head areas incorporate finance US\$ 21.7 billion, modern US\$ 16.1 billion and land US\$ 9.5 billion. Conversely, the U.S. share has dropped to the absolute bottom of 11% while India, China and Malaysia have beat bunch offers during 2009-10 (Businessweek, 2010).




(Source: Adapted from Ernst & Young (2009a))

Figure 1: Global IPOs activity: number of deals and capital raised by year

## 2.2 Indian IPOs Market

Since the economic-progression reforms in India during the 1990s, equity market has become a proficient and straightforward value revelation process with high divulgence where the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) is governing the regulatory systems. In this way, numerous proactive advances have been started in the new decade consequently emphatically influenced the capital market exercises, for instance, facilitating exchange costs, enhanced effectiveness, transparency, and security (Bhole and Mahakud, 2009). At the appropriate time of time, the nation has picked up worldwide standing by inviting unfamiliar institutional investors and private equity major parts in the banking and capital market framework.

Indian capital market's development story has grown-up forcefully in numerous market pointers, for example, growing number of intermediaries, recorded stocks, market turnover, instruments, and investor populace. As per SEBI information base (SEBI, 2011), there were 19 stock exchanges, 8922 stock representatives, 4478 corporate intermediaries, 77163 sub-dealers, 1767 unfamiliar institutional investors, 199 shipper brokers, 56 financiers to an issue, 3 guarantors, 30 debenture trustees, 74 enlistment center to an issue, 6 FICO assessment organizations, 205 funding reserves, 51 shared assets, 2 stores, 823 safe members and 19 caretakers effectively partake in the working and development of capital market.



(Source: Author of this paper has designed based on the data reported in SEBI (2011)).

**Figure 2: Indian IPOs market, 1993-94 through 2010-11**

In the main quarter of 2010, 20 firms raised US\$ 1.2 billion through IPOs, while the aggregate sum rose all around the world over US\$ 53 billion (Business Standard, 2010; Economic Times, 2010). Consequently, the main areas incorporate framework (land, coordination and development), information innovation, and retail. The IPOs market has gotten third biggest after China and the U.S., due to proceeding with solid development in Asian market and the incitement of European postings (Asian Age, 2010). Also, we show the pattern line of Indian IPO market; all in all, assets assembled from primary market, 1993-94 through 2010-11.

### 3. IPO ACTIVITY

For what reason do firms open up to the world? By all accounts, the appropriate response sounds self-evident: firms open up to the world to collect capital since they need cash for investments. How about we accept for a second that this is in fact a significant motivation behind why firms open up to the world. Still it can't be the finished answer: An inquiry actually remains. For what reason do firms decide to bring capital up in the public equity market and not in the private equity market or in the debt market? At the end of the day, for what reason do a few firms open up to the world while others abstain from doing as such and raise capital through different methods? In this segment we endeavor to give some point of view about these significant inquiries. We feel that the issues we examine here are significant, yet that our present knowledge is insufficient. These inquiries give fruitful ground to future examination.

#### 3.1 Firms' motives for going public

Our beginning stage is the relation between an association's investment needs and the choice to open up to the world. The striking outcome Pagano Panetta, Zingales (1998) archive is that the response to this inquiry isn't self-evident. They inspect the determinants of opening up to the world in the Italian market and locate that future investment needs isn't the predominant motivation behind why firms open up to the world, at any rate not in the sample of the 66 IPO firms they analyzed. They find that the primary factor influencing the likelihood of opening up to the world is the business market to book proportion. This outcome proposes that maybe firms in enterprises with higher investment opportunities - and subsequently higher investment needs are bound to tap the public equity market. Nonetheless, it might likewise recommend that organizations in businesses that are over-esteemed are the individuals who choose to go to the public equity markets. Perhaps, firms open up to the world since they can. Not on the grounds that they need. Inspecting those organizations' presentation in the years after the IPO, Pagano et al. (1998) locate that both their investment and productivity decrease, recommending over-valuation as the more probable clarification

Pagano et al (1998) likewise locate that bigger firms constantly that have encountered higher development are bound to IPO. These last discoveries might be remarkable to Italy or to the time-frame of the investigation. In a fascinating paper Brau and Fawcett (2006) utilize a study technique and ask 336 CFOs for what reason firms open up to the world. Strikingly, there is no proof that a requirement for money is the main thrust behind the IPO choice. This outcome, that a requirement for money doesn't appear as a prevailing intention in opening up to the world, is intriguing and astonishing. It isn't what we would anticipate. Utilizing a huge arrangement of firms from across the globe Kim and Weisbach (2008) looked again at a connected inquiry: They dissect how firms go through the cash they raise through equity issuances. (So dissimilar to the Pagano et al paper, they don't analyze why firms open up to the world instead of remaining private. The inquiry they pose is the thing that IPO and SEO firms do with the cash they raise.) as anyone might expect, they locate that in the time of the IPO money saves increment by around 50 pennies on each dollar raised.

Four years after the IPO the money holds are as yet huge higher (around 40 pennies on the dollar). The second biggest effect is on investment (capital use and R&D). There they discover an expansion of around 28 pennies on every dollar raised in the principal year and a lot bigger increment following

four years. These are significant discoveries, recommending that a huge part of the cash raised through the IPO is being utilized for investments. Obviously, cash has no tone, so we don't know whether the IPO cash went to finance investments, or came from different sources, for example, earnings throughout the long term following the IPO. Moreover, a portion of this cash may have been diverted back to investors through offer repurchase projects or profits. Kim and Welsbach control for the primary issue (different wellsprings of assets) however not for the second. By and by, the Kim and Welsbach study presents significant proof recommending that a huge segment, however not the larger part, of the cash raised through the IPO financed firms' investments.

Simultaneously note that the investigation, by configuration, doesn't endeavor to address whether or not the IPO firms might have accomplished their objectives through different methods for equity capital raising, be it through VCs or other private equity vehicles that are getting increasingly well known; or through private debt.

Now it merits summing up the potential goals for firms to open up to the world and whether those destinations can be accomplished through different vehicles, for example, private equity or debt. We can consider numerous potential reasons, which are not totally unrelated. The first, is the requirement for money for investment. Along these lines if investment is the fundamental thought process in opening up to the world we might want, preferably, to have the option to show that organizations utilize the returns for investments and to comprehend why they picked this channel (IPO) as opposed to different channels. The subsequent explanation is over-valuation. In the event that over-valuation is regular for both public and private equity (as we expect), it very well may be a valid justification for why firms raise equity capital; yet not why they open up to the world

For the last mentioned, there should be another grinding. For instance, over-valuation is more articulated in public than in private markets. Lowry's (2003) finding that more organizations open up to the world when investor estimation is higher recommends that overvaluation is a huge determinant of the choice to open up to the world. In economic terms, her discoveries recommend that it is a higher priority than interest for capital (e.g., for future investments).

The third explanation is capital structure change. This unmistakably can be accomplished both with public and private equity markets.

The fourth explanation is proprietors' requirement for liquidity. Not long after a firm opens up to the world its proprietors, the two people and VCs can exchange (part or the entirety of) their situations with negligible exchange costs. The liquidity arrangement allows holders to purchase and sell their stocks any time after the finish of the lockup period. This objective can be accomplished distinctly through the public equity channel. Selling securities of private firms can be restrictively expensive. This liquidity reason might be much more intense when VCs have stakes in the organization, as they should sell their investments inside a set number of years. (This obviously should be possible either through an IPO or through procurement by another organization.) Using information on modern firms from the evaluation, Chemmanur, He and Nandy (2009) find that organizations in ventures with extraordinary normal liquidity of effectively recorded values are bound to open up to the world. Like Pagano et al, they likewise locate that bigger and more fruitful firms are bound to open up to the world.

Proprietors' enhancement (reason #5 underneath) speaks to another possible motivation to open up to the world. Initial public offerings allow the first proprietors to broaden their possessions and increment liquidity by selling partakes in the optional market. (To the degree that an infrequent optional equity offering is conceivable additionally in the private equity markets, proprietors' broadening, at any rate to a degree, can be accomplished both in the public and private markets). A characteristic expansion of the essential enhancement story is that less differentiated investors have more to pick up from taking their firm public, and subsequently might be eager to acknowledge a lower IPO cost.

Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, and Simonov (2008) study the impact of controlling proprietors' expansion on the IPO cost, explicitly whether they are additionally ready to acknowledge a lower cost for shares. Utilizing Swedish information with nitty gritty information about proprietors' portfolio synthesis between 1995-2001, the paper finds that: (1) private firms held by less broadened controlling investors are bound to open up to the world; (2) less expanded individual investors sell a greater amount of their offers at the IPO; (3) the degree of proprietors' expansion is identified with the underpricing of the IPO. While the information utilized in this examination is restricted, its discoveries are intriguing and smart, proposing that expansion is a significant factor in the choice to open up to the world. Chod and Lyandres (2011) inspect an alternate part of expansion, contending that public firms' proprietors endure higher benefit fluctuation than proprietors of private firms due to their capacity to broaden. Subsequently, public firms can take more hazardous investment methodologies than private firms - which improve their serious position. This adds another viewpoint why expansion through IPO might be gainful.

The 6th explanation in the table underneath envelops a few thought processes, as identified with the presence of a publicly accessible market estimation of the company's equity. It is contended that regularly firms open up to the world since they need to utilize their publicly exchanged stocks as procurement money (as opposed to paying for acquisitions with money). This is a legitimate intention to open up to the world, within the sight of some market contact, for example, financial imperative that may forestall organizations to raise additional equity in the event that they need money for securing. On the other hand, on the off chance that insiders accept the firm is exaggerated, at that point paying with equity as opposed to money might be liked. This rationale is novel to IPOs and can't be accomplished if the organization stays private, regardless of whether it issues partakes in the private market. Brau and Fawcett (2006) utilizing reviews, find that the primary inspiration for opening up to the world is to encourage acquisitions (#6 in the Table above). They additionally discover uphold for the idea that market timing assumes a part in the choice. Relatedly, Hsieh, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2011) recommend that the decrease of valuation uncertainly associated with having a market an incentive through the IPO process drives firms to a more proficient obtaining methodology—and henceforth likewise expands its worth. Some hypothetical examination contends that the opening up to the world choice reinforces the insiders' bartering position on account of a securing (Zingales 1995), and allows insiders to money out at a higher valuation - and subsequently expands the firm worth.

Another explanation (# 7 in the table beneath) that is intently attached to having a publicly accessible market esteem identifies with pay, explicitly the capacity for firms to utilize the cost of their publicly exchanged offers to esteem stock alternatives given to proprietors and representatives. Opening up to the world allows company's partners to have a settled upon firm-esteem which can be utilized for different purposes. Relatedly, the eighth explanation depends on the possibility that since market costs total the valuation of many market investors (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) they can likewise be utilized as a wellspring of information to the firm about its worth or even the game-plan it is taking.

Being a public firm offers an additional advantage to firms, as affirmation and decrease of vulnerability (#9). The examination of the SEC (e.g., Lowry, Michaely, and Volkova, 2016) joined with the steady watching and poking of sell-side investigators, activists, and different investors adds validity to the firm, confirms its worth. The diminished danger and more noteworthy transparency accomplished through the opening up to the world process additionally expands the certainty of providers and purchaser about its worth and prosperity; which thus influence its expense of managing providers, its expense of debt capital and incomes. This worth confirmation diminishes the vulnerability and conceivably brings about high valuation. Notwithstanding, the other side is that for the set in stone reasons, numerous directors don't care for the examination by market members. In one or the other case, it is hard to perceive how this can be accomplished in the private equity market.

At long last, reason # 10 recommends that opening up to the world might be a compelling marketing gadget: it places the firm in middle of everyone's attention both in the financial network and maybe more critically, among buyers. In this way opening up to the world can expand its shopper base, increment buyer dedication—particularly since purchasers would now be able to become investors. This can both increment income and diminishing the expense of capital. The expanding of investors' base can likewise build stock liquidity. Neither private equity nor debt instruments will accomplish these objectives.

These thought processes and how they identify with the choice of whether to raise capital (public equity, private equity, or debt) and how they identify with the choice to open up to the world (versus private equity or debt) are summed up in Table 1. Nine out of the ten reasons we delineated are not identified with the way that organizations exchange stocks for money during the IPO process. That is, they don't recommend that organizations experience an IPO since they need money. The overall significance of these intentions stays an open observational inquiry.

**Table 1: Summary of reasons companies go public**

	Source Of Capital	Public Equity	Private Equity	Debt
1	Investment	+	+	+
2	Overvaluation (market timing)	+	+	0
3	Capital Structure Adjustment	+	+	-
4	Stock liquidity	+	0	0
5	Owners' Diversification	+	+	0
6	Currency for Acquisitions	+	0	0
7	Compensation and Market Valuation	+	0	0
8	Feedback effects from market	+	0	0
9	Certification by analysts, SEC and markets	+	0	0
10	Marketing	+	0	
11	Corporate control	+	0	

So for what reason do firms open up to the world? We accept we know the potential intentions (as we delineated in the Table above), however we need more straightforward proof on the general significance of the different thought processes. Fascinating proof from Sweden recommends that diversification is a significant rationale. The proof we talked about on the requirement for money as a purpose behind IPO is mixed, yet it is probably going to assume some job. There is more reliable proof that having verifiable market esteem is a significant thought process, be it for obtaining cash, stock choices, or ability to take more forceful systems. Why firms go (or don't open up to the world) is maybe perhaps the main inquiries identified with IPOs, with critical conceivable ramifications on policies, administration, and on firms' expense of capital. It is superb to have more, and more complete proof on this issue.

### 3.2 Changes in benefits vs costs of going public, in recent years

A significant number of the models depicted above incorporate the costs just as the benefits of opening up to the world versus remaining private, just as how these costs and benefits may change over the long run. The Maug (2001) model, for instance, recommends that an IPO happens when insiders' information advantage over outcasts vanishes; a characteristic movement over the association's life cycle. All the more for the most part, the opening up to the world decision is a harmony result with the end goal that at the hour of opening up to the world, the benefits exceed the costs. It is hence essential to consider the circumstance of opening up to the world just as the kind of firm that chooses to go this course.

The reduction in the quantity of public firms over the most recent 25 years (Grullon, Larkin and Michaely, 2016) and the reduction in the quantity of firms opening up to the world (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013) propose that the costs of being public may have expanded as well as the benefits of being public diminished throughout the most recent a very long while. A few papers have endeavored to reveal insight into this issue.

With respect to costs of being a publicly recorded firm, announcing prerequisites have gotten more convoluted and tedious, and there is expanded tension on administration to seek after present moment, as opposed to long haul goals. Strangely, neither Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) nor Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2013) discover uphold for expanded guideline assuming a significant job: they discover no proof that either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or the 2003 Global Settlement materially affected IPO action. Nonetheless, Ritter (2011) guesses that such regulatory changes have likely had probably some impact.

Doidge et al (2013) guess that financial globalization has contributed toward the lower quantities of organizations opening up to the world in the U.S., i.e., that the net benefits of opening up to the world in the US versus in different markets have diminished. Predictable with this, the division of overall IPOs happening on US markets has tumbled from half or more in the mid 1990s, to roughly 30% in the last part of the 1990s, to 10% or less in the 2007 – 2011 periods. Simultaneously, financial globalization has expanded. While these patterns seem predictable with expanded globalization adding to the fall in US IPO volume, a more basic assessment provides reason to feel ambiguous about this end. In particular, while the fall in US IPOs is altogether identified with the expanded globalization, Doidge et al's discoveries are not steady with IPOs in the remainder of the world at the same time expanding. At the end of the day, they discover no proof that organizations are deciding to open up to the world in different markets instead of in the US.

Gao et al (2013) feature that the abatement in the quantity of organizations opening up to the world is concentrated among little offerings, and they offer economies of degree contention for the noticed patterns. They guess that it is progressively hard for little firms to work autonomously in the present quickly evolving markets. Subsequently, little firms discover it progressively ideal to sell out to bigger firms, who have a more extensive organization to create items all the more rapidly and to put up the items for sale to the public quicker. Predictable with this, both Brau, Francis and Kohers (2003) and Gao et al report that adventure supported firms are progressively prone to be obtained: the level of VC-sponsored firms leaving by means of securing instead of IPO has expanded from the 25-35% territory over the 1991 – 1996 period, to the 40 – 60% territory more than 1997 – 2000, to over 80% since 2001. In addition, these patterns are especially solid among little endeavor supported private firms. Similarly, Grullon et. al (2017) report that the normal US firm significantly increased in size (in genuine terms) since the turn of the century, reliable with the thought of economies of degree. We note that these examples are instructive, and we might want to support future exploration that could analyze the causal impacts of such impacts.

At last, while truly a vital advantage of being a public firm was more extensive access to capital from a scatter gathering of investors, lately such capital has gotten progressively accessible to private firms. At the end of the day, a few analysts proposed that the spread between the open door cost of capital for private and public firms had limited in the most recent decade. In an investigation of 13 common asset families (103 special assets) across the 1995 – 2015 period, Kwon, Lowry, and Qian (2017) archive that these assets in total held under \$20 million in VC-moved private firms in 1995 and 1996, \$70 – 120 million somewhere in the range of 2000 and 2010, and \$7 billion out of 2015. They discover some proof that this expanded availability of subsidizing empowers organizations to remain private for more. Significantly, shared assets speak to only one of a few sources of subsidizing accessible to private firms, with different sources including annuity assets and sovereign abundance reserves. The degree to which changes in the market keep on making such capital progressively accessible can possibly generously impact the IPO market later on.

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## 4. IPO ALLOCATION

Stock exchanges have rules on the minimum equity level and the minimum number of shareholders that are needed to list publicly. Most private organizations that need to list publicly should issue equity to have the option to meet these minimum necessities. Most organizations that rundown on the Oslo stock exchange (OSE) are confined to offering shares in an IPO to a huge gathering of scattered investors or in a negotiated private placement to a little gathering of particular investors. Initial equity offerings have high expected returns and this makes them exceptionally mainstream investments.

Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) contend that there are three perspectives on how shares are allocated in the IPO setting. To start with, is the scholarly view based on Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In this view investment banks distribute IPO shares to informed investors as a trade-off for genuine valuation and demand information. Informed investors are allocated shares since they help to value the issue. Second, is the pitchbook see where investment banks allot shares to institutional investors that are probably going to hold shares over the long haul? It is contended, by investment banks, that purchase and-hold investors will make value stability that is useful for the issuing organizations. At last, is the lease looking for view, or profit sharing perspective, where investment banks dispense shares to investors as a trade-off for payoffs? There are four sorts of IPO lease looking for that have been researched by U.S. controllers (the SEC and the NASD), see Liu and Ritter (2010).

Initial public offering designations can be attached to future corporate business for the banks (IPO turning), in the wake of posting acquisition of the IPO shares (IPO laddering) and stock-exchanging commissions. Investment banks and organizations can likewise concur on high under pricing as a trade-off for in the wake of posting organization share inclusion from a star investigators gave by the bank (examiner irreconcilable circumstance). Undervalued

shares are then allocated to bank customers that produce high stock-exchanging commission for the investment bank. In the paper 'Laddering in Initial Public Offering Allocations' is examined if IPO distributions are attached to subsequent to posting acquisition of the IPO shares (IPO laddering). In the paper 'Utilizing Stock-exchanging Commissions to Secure IPO Allocations' is examined if IPO designations are attached to investor stock-exchanging commission.

Private organizations can, as an option in contrast to the IPO, issue shares in a negotiated private placement to a little gathering of specific investors. Most hypothetical papers on equity offerings, nonetheless, show that IPOs will quite often be wanted to the negotiated private placement by the dealer, see Bulow and Klemperer (1996), Bulow and Klemperer (2009) and French and McCormick (1984). Why a few organizations utilize private placements has thusly been the focal point of numerous experimental investigations in finance, see Wruck (1989), Hertz and Smith (1993), Barclay et al. (2007), Anshuman et al. (2010) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005). The examination question tended to in the paper 'Initial Public Offering or Initial Private Placement?' regardless of whether private placements are utilized, rather than IPOs, to move private benefits of control from venders to buyers. A typical commitment of all papers is that we present new and one of kind information on private organization share ownership. This information allows us to examine share allotments addresses it has recently been hard to research.

#### **4.1 Laddering in Initial Public Offering Allocations**

Initial public offering laddering is where share allotments are attached to the in the wake of posting acquisition of the organization shares. Initial public offering laddering has been known by controllers for quite a while (the SEC conveyed alerts to investment banks that laddering is illegal the first run through in 1961), however there has been restricted exact examination on IPO laddering. A likely explanation behind this is that it is hard to explore laddering in light of the fact that investment banks infrequently appropriate information about portion rehearses. In this paper we utilize special information from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) that allow us to notice the subsequent to posting trading of investors that are allocated IPO shares. The information comprises of 16,593 combinations of investor IPO designations, stock-trading commission and subsequent to posting trading on the OSE in the period from 1993 to 2007. This information allows us to explore laddering at the investor level. The primary commitment of this paper is that we show a solid and strong relationship between IPO allotments and the quantity of shares that are bought after new postings at the investor level. This relationship is more grounded for investors that sell all shares again just after the posting, in undervalued IPOs and in IPOs with a positive float in the share cost after the posting. These are the investors and the IPOs that the current exploration recognizes as the most probable laddering investors. These discoveries are steady with the doubt that IPO shares are allocated to investors that purchase shares directed by the investment bank after the posting (laddering). This discovering reaches out to Hao (2007) and Griffin et al. (2007).

#### **4.2 Using Stock-trading Commissions to Secure IPO Allocations**

Another worry for controllers is that IPO designations are attached to unnecessarily huge stock trading commissions and that such a training is illegal payoffs from investors to investment banks. Utilizing similar information as in 'Laddering in Initial Public Offering Allocations', we can interface stock-trading commission and IPO assignment at the investor level. The fundamental finding of the paper is a solid and strong positive relationship between the degree of stock-trading commission produced by an investor before the IPO and the quantity of shares a similar investor gets through the IPO allotment. This finding shows that investors can purchase IPO portions by trading exorbitantly to create commission. The discovering reaches out to Reuter (2006), Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2006), Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) who all contend that investment banks are probably going to dispense IPO shares as a trade-off for stock-trading commission.

#### **4.3 Initial Public Offering or Initial Private Placement?**

Organizations can, as an option in contrast to the IPO, sell shares in a negotiated private placement. Most hypothetical exploration on equity offerings show that barterings that are like IPOs will as a rule be liked by the dealer of an organization. Practically speaking, nonetheless, there are numerous organizations that utilization negotiated private placements to raise equity. A few investigations have proposed clarifications to this private placement decision. A few papers contend that private placements are utilized to draw in specific investors, to keep the executives in charge, to lessen undervaluation or to diminish problems associated with information imbalance (Wruck, 1989; Hertz and Smith, 1993; Barclay et al., 2007; Anshuman et al., 2010; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005). Different papers propose that private placements are utilized when buyers esteem private benefits of command over the independent income estimation of the organization (Zingales, 1994; Zingales, 1995; Zwiebel, 1995 and Damodaran, 2005). The primary commitment of our paper is that we show a solid and hearty relationship between private benefits of control, before the initial offering, and the utilization of private placements. This shows that private placements are utilized to move private benefits of control from venders to buyers. This discovering underpins Zingales (1995) in that private placements are utilized to move organization control rights.

## **5. IPO PRICING (Listing day underpricing)**

Aristocrat (1982) built up an "information unevenness hypothesis" in which the investment broker is preferred informed over the issuer with respect to the market conditions and pricing of the issue. The issuer should compensate the investment broker for the predominant information. Therefore, the decision to set the issue cost is assigned to investment investor which is set by him underneath its actual incentive for his own benefits. Nonetheless, testing Baron's model Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) locate that even IPOs of investment banks (self-marketed offerings) are portrayed by factually huge underpricing when contrasted with different IPOs; in this manner, repudiate the model. Likewise, Cheung and Krinsky's (1994) study neglected to set up lower level of underpricing for the sample of investment financiers' IPOs. Rock (1986) built up another adaptation of information unevenness



hypothesis in which he asserted underpricing is required due to the information imbalance between two gatherings of investors—informed and uninformed. Informed investors buy in just to "great issues" and they remain away when "terrible issues" go to the market. Along these lines, the uninformed gathering gets just terrible issues; thus, they avoid the market. In this manner, to draw in even uninformed investors to the market, all the issues are mandatorily undervalued. Utilizing a sample of IPOs recorded on Stock Exchange of Singapore, Lee, Taylor, and Walter (1999) demonstrated that huge investors (better informed) will in general specially demand cooperation in IPOs with higher initial returns which is steady with Rock's model.

Dissecting "hot issue" market of the 1980s in the US (between January 1980 and March 1981), Ritter (1984) records normal initial return of 16.3% for the remainder of the 1977–1982 period, as against 48.4% for the hot issue period. Taking a sample of 664 solid responsibility and 364 best endeavors offers, Ritter (1987) discovered underpricing of 14.8 and 47.78% for these two sub-gatherings.

Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) created "flagging model" clarifying why under pricing happens. As per the model, underpricing is an intentional activity by the issuers to flag the prevalent nature of the issuing firms. They do as such with the expectation of recovering this misfortune by methods for charging greater cost for follow-on public offerings. Inferior quality firms can't do this in light of the fact that their actual picture will be uncovered before they approach the market once more. Discoveries of Hameed and Lim (1998) upheld the flagging hypothesis, that is, top notch firms undervalued their IPOs to flag their quality. In any case, Garfinkel (1993), through reports of underpricing of IPOs, archived that underpricing is definitely not a sign of the nature of the issuing firms. Welch (1992) has created "grouping" hypothesis clarifying why IPOs are undervalued. As per the hypothesis, IPOs go to the market successively and later potential investors take their decisions by noticing the buying decisions of prior investors. The demand for issues is flexible to such an extent that even danger impartial issuers undervalued their issues to evade disappointment. Testing both Rock's victor's revile and Welch's grouping hypothesis, Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003) found that under pricing is contrarily identified with the pace of assignment to uninformed investors which affirms the presence of antagonistic choice. Likewise, investors either buy in overwhelmingly or to a great extent go without new issues which affirm the crowding impact.

Affleck-Graves, Hegde, Miller, and Reilly (1993) found that in the US NYSE recorded IPOs, on a normal, are undervalued by 4.82% while AMEX recorded IPOs are undervalued by 2.16%. Testing the "claim shirking" hypothesis of IPO under pricing, Lowry and Shu (2002) archived that organizations which have more noteworthy lawful presentation are probably going to undervalue their issues by a fundamentally bigger sum. Notwithstanding, Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) found that IPOs that were sued for mis-articulations in the IPO plan or enrollment proclamation in the US were not overrated; truth be told, were undervalued as different IPOs of comparable size. Michaely and Shaw (1994) ascribed under pricing to the presence of information imbalances among informed and uninformed investors; consequently, uphold the information deviation hypothesis. Notwithstanding, the investigation discovered little help for flagging hypothesis. Firms with more noteworthy under pricing are associated with more vulnerable future earnings execution, less and more modest profit inceptions, and less incessant outings to the capital market.

Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) found that IPOs of state-claimed organizations in the UK are fundamentally more undervalued than their private area partners, while on account of Canada and Malaysia the inverse is valid. Inspecting why directors don't sell any of their own shares in an IPO, however stand by until the finish of the lockup period, Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) found that organizations with more prominent underpricing get fundamentally more proposals from the examination experts in the months which are nearer to the lockup lapse than do firms with less underpricing. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) found that initial returns (underpricing) are straightforwardly identified with information creation and conversely identified with institutional designations. In their possibility hypothesis, Loughran and Ritter (2002) found that IPOs that are undervalued are typically those where the issue cost and the initial market cost are higher than what was initially anticipated.

Inspecting the pricing of US IPOs by unfamiliar firms that are as of now prepared in their nations of origin, Burch and Fauver (2003) found that these IPOs are undervalued (on a normal) encountering a first day return of 12.7%. Demers and Lewellen (2003) analyzed the effect of IPO underpricing on the site traffic of web organizations and found that underpricing is decidedly associated with post-issue development in web-traffic for the IPO organizations. In their similar investigation of the pricing and aftermarket execution of IPOs by ADRs and a coordinating sample of US firms, Ejara and Ghosh (2004) found that ADR IPOs are altogether less undervalued than practically identical US IPOs. Initial public offerings from created nations are more undervalued and privatization of IPOs is less undervalued than non-privatizations. Analyzing the intraday examples of IPOs in Hong Kong, Cheng, Cheung, and Po (2004) found that under pricing of IPOs happens just at the pre-posting market and vanishes a while later for example Hong Kong market is effective in changing for IPO under pricing. Cook, Kieschnick, and Ness (2006) found that initial returns (underpricing) are decidedly corresponded with pre-issue publicity for IPOs. Testing the relationship among under pricing and share ownership scattering in the aftermarket, Hill (2006) found that IPO under pricing didn't assume a huge job in deciding the extent of square holding in the share ownership structure of the firm, either at the IPO or as time goes on.

Lowry and Murphy (2007) found no proof that organizations which open up to the world in the US (with IPO choices to their top heads) are undervalued when contrasted with firms not allowing such alternatives. This infers that the top chiefs of firms with such alternatives don't intentionally set the offer cost low to expand the estimation of these choices.

In India, Narasimhan and Ramana (1995) discovered critical under pricing of Indian IPOs reliable with worldwide perceptions. Study additionally uncovered that excellent issues are undervalued than standard issues. Endeavoring to recognize the causal factors responsible for under pricing of Indian IPOs, Chaturvedi, Pandey, and Ghosh (2006) found that the degree of oversubscription of an IPO decides the principal day pick up; signals that lead to oversubscription are market file during the time of IPO, type and nature of business, unfamiliar joint effort, or the history of promoters/organization. Garg, Arora, and Singla (2008) additionally reported that Indian IPOs are altogether undervalued and noticed that the degree of under pricing doesn't fluctuate much in the hot and cold IPO market. Contemplating book-assembled and fixed-value IPOs in India, Bora, Adhikary, and Jha (2012) discovered under pricing of 21.42% for fixed-value IPOs and 18.22% for book-constructed IPOs. Notwithstanding, when changed for market development, the relating figures are 16.71 and 16.75, individually. Einar (2015) utilizing a sample of in excess of 5,000 IPOs, reported huge irregular returns up towards

5% (barring Initial Day Returns) during the main long stretches of trading. These strange returns are more noteworthy and more tireless if general market conditions are solid, supporting a limited levelheadedness clarification.

## 6. Long-Run Performance of IPOs

To examine the conceivable deciding elements of since quite a while ago run-execution of IPOs, correlations of factors are figured and introduced in Table 2. The correlation network uncovers the bearing and degree of huge bivariate relationship between different free and dependant factors. Initial return and number of times bought in are fundamentally and adversely associated with long run returns (both BHRs and BHARs). Age and posting postponement of the organizations are decidedly related with the two proportions of five-year returns, while, offer value, issue size and market condition are adversely related. The free factors are likewise associated with other autonomous factors yet there is no multi-collinearity among them.

**Table 2: Correlation Matrix**

Variables	BHR	BHAR	Initial Return	Age	Offer Price	Issue Size	Listing Delay	Times Subscribed	Market Condition
BHR	1								
BHAR	.973**	1							
Initial Return	-.290**	-.261**	1						
Age	.004	.011	-.151**	1					
Offer Price	-.060	-.060	-.045	.226**	1				
Issue Size	-.055	-.058	-.186**	.286**	.616**	1			
Listing Delay	.058	.025	-.144**	-.120*	-.184**	-.186**	1		
Times Subscribed	-.141**	-.112*	.481**	-.024	.094	-0.72	-.169**	1	
Market Condition	-.066	-.032	.097*	.165**	-.329**	-.447**	.276**	.006	1

\* Significant at the 5% level

\*\* Significant at the 1% level

Regression model of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) has been applied to decay execution variety into different components. This strategy helps in recognizing the degree and course of relationship between the dependent variable and a few independent factors. The R square and the changed R square created by it shows the extent of variety in the dependent variable explained by the independent factors. Following regression model has been utilized to analyze the relationship between the since quite a while ago run execution of IPOs and its potential determinants.

$$\text{Return}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{IR}_i + \beta_2 \text{Age}_i + \beta_3 \text{OfferPrice}_i + \beta_4 \text{IssueSize}_i + \beta_5 \text{ListingDelay}_i + \beta_6 \text{TimesSubscribed}_i + \beta_7 \text{MarketCondition}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Based on the earlier examination, initial returns, age, offer value, issue size, posting delay, times bought in and market condition have been taken as the independent factors with the end goal of regression investigation. Table 3 reports the aftereffects of the model for OLS regressions utilizing the crude long term purchase and hold returns and purchase and hold anomalous returns as independent factors.

**Table 3: Results of Multivariate Regressions**

Independent Variables	Five-Year Equally Weighted Buy and Hold Returns			Five-Year Equally Weighted Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns		
	Estimated Coefficient	SE	P value	Estimated Coefficient	SE	P value
Intercept	0.9508	0.9611	0.3231	0.8292	0.9391	0.3778
Initial Returns	-0.7244	0.1325	0.0000**	-0.6646	0.1295	0.0000**
Age	-0.0257	0.0772	0.7389	-0.0102	0.0755	0.8920
Offer Price	-0.0005	0.0015	0.7398	-0.0005	0.0015	0.6973
Issue Size	-0.1762	0.0729	0.0161*	-0.1492	0.0713	0.0368*
Listing Delay	0.0652	0.1673	0.6969	-0.0576	0.1635	0.7248
Times Subscribed	-0.0003	0.0039	0.9478	0.0010	0.0039	0.7962
Market Condition	-0.5483	0.2422	0.0241*	-0.3010	0.2367	0.2041
R <sup>2</sup>	0.1099			0.0871		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0936			0.0704		
F-Value	6.7549**			5.2189**		
Durbin Watson	1.8414			1.9344		

\* Significant at the 5% level

\*\* Significant at the 1% level

The coefficient of assurance is very low, which is in accordance with the earlier proof. The outcomes show that initial returns, issue size and market condition have a huge negative impact on the long term crude purchase and hold returns. Notwithstanding, if there should arise an occurrence of five-

year purchase and hold unusual returns, varieties are primarily explained by initial returns and issue size. The initial returns of IPOs have negative impact on since quite a while ago run execution which is predictable with Levis (1993) and Paudyal et al. (1998). The essentially negative impact of issue size on since quite a while ago run returns recommends that more modest firms develop at a quicker rate following the IPO.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

Our investigation shows that there are procedural hurdles in setting up an IPO. As the legal prerequisites are profoundly thorough, it is hard to decipher the necessities in obvious sense. Consequently the requirement for consistent and firm arrangement stems up. The pretended by Merchant Banker can represent the moment of truth the whole IPO issue. Accordingly, coordinating with the regulatory prerequisites is the essential obstacle in making an IPO. Anyway the relationship between the age and since quite a while ago run execution doesn't follow a specific example instead of the apparent higher under pricing by the more youthful firms. The consequences of the multivariate regression investigation on the determinants of since quite a while ago run execution of IPOs show that initial return, issue size and market condition have huge and negative impact on the aftermarket returns. Organizations opening up to the world, particularly youthful organizations, face a market that is liable to sharp swings in valuations. Pricing arrangements can be troublesome, even in stable market conditions, since insiders apparently have more information than potential external investors. To manage these likely problems, market members and controllers demand the divulgence of material information. The IPO organization's administration, who as a rule speak to the association's authors, are by and large spurred by a combination of augmenting shareholder esteem and holding some private benefits of control that they may have appreciated while the firm was private. Private benefit of control is assessed based on existing ownership and friends explicit factors. An all the more straightforwardly detectable proportion of private benefits of control would have been best. It is additionally unrealistic to identify burrowing in the information. In any case, this administration additionally as a rule has restricted involvement in the IPO process, which possibly makes them more dependent on intermediaries.

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