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# Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Somalia, 2010-2018: Lessons for Nigeria

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**ABSTRACT**

The study investigated Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Somalia, 2010-2018: the lesson for Nigeria. The theory of Fundamentalism was adopted as the theoretical model for the study and data were collected from secondary sources. The study revealed that- Religious extremism and Terrorism has negative effects on the development and growth of Somalia and other terror ridden regions in the globe; the strategic responses and counter terrorism approaches adopted by the Somali government did not achieve much because it failed to address critical issues that concern the future of the defectors and their family members, poverty, youth unemployment and illiteracy. The study concluded that it is significant to address the basic issues that exacerbate extremism and terrorism than to implement coercive structures and strategies that only address the symptoms instead of the major causes. Therefore, the study recommended that to successfully neutralize the threat of radical Islamic ideology, the Government of Somalia needs to explore alternative paths by designing socioeconomic and political reforms that will improve on the economic livelihood of the citizenry. The lessons for Nigeria are- there will be no meaningful progress in countering religious extremism and terrorism, if the root causes are not properly addressed by adopting measures and implementing strategic policies that deal with the indices of unemployment, poverty, ethnic inequality, economic deprivation, illiteracy and corruption and more especially dealing decisively with police brutality in the country.

**Keywords**: Religious Extremism, Terrorism in Somalia and Lessons for Nigeria

## Introduction

In today's globe, religious extremism is a key offshoot of terrorism. All religions have experienced varying degrees of violent fanaticism, which has frequently resulted in terrorist movements (Beit-hallami 2010 and Martin 2011). The term "religious extremism" refers to faith-based behaviours that are intended to do harm to others (Mohamedou, 2011).This includes violent religious movements as well as asceticism that is intense enough to exacerbate harmful beliefs. Extremists specifically target religious tolerance and equality. Religion, for the extreme, gives instruction that obscures any secular legislation or sense of human rights. Religious radicals, according to Becker (1976), are willing to murder because they believe in theologies that justify violence in the service of God. They have no sympathy for their victims because they regard them as God's enemies. And they are willing to give up their own lives because they expect massive and instantaneous hereafter blessings in exchange for "martyrdom."

Religious extremism and terrorism are widespread occurrences that have become a moral burden, drawing great attention from religious analysts and researchers. According to researchers, the primary elements that lead people to espouse religious extremism and terrorism are complicated, multidimensional, and interconnected, and may be tied to the institutional framework in which radicalization can potentially take hold (George, 2006). It is also the result of historical, political, economic, and social factors, as well as the influence of regional and global power politics. Growing inequality are also a constant driver of religious fanaticism and terrorism (Turner, 2012).

Sub-Saharan Africa Religious extremism and terrorism are major issues that have garnered national and worldwide attention (Suleman, 2015). These groups' actions vary from organized crime (kidnapping and cross-border weapon trafficking) to suicide bombing and attacks on soft targets (civilians, humanitarian workers, hotels, business areas, etc.), wanton destruction of property, and disruption of government activity (Sarah, 2014). The plan is to depose the current administration and establish an Islamic caliphate. Terrorists' intentions may fluctuate, but their activities follow a consistent pattern, with terrorist occurrences taking a number of forms, including airline hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, threats, bombings, and suicide assaults. Terrorist strikes are designed to put enough pressure on a government to make it act.

Violent religious extremism and terrorism in Africa are causing a major reversal of development achievements and threatens to stymie development prospects for decades to come. From 2011 to 2016, it resulted in 33,300 deaths and massive displacement, resulting in conditions of severe and catastrophic humanitarian need (Mukhtar, 2003). After decades of focusing on militaristic measures, the 2015 United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism invites the global community of states to pay closer attention to the core causes and drivers of violent extremism.

Extremism and terrorism can have a wide range of consequences, including casualties, destroyed buildings, increased fear, and a slew of economic expenditures. Clearly, the September 11, 2001 attacks incurred huge costs, which have been estimated to be in the region of $80 to $90 billion when future economic losses such as lost earnings, workers' compensation, and diminished commerce are factored in (Sandler & Enders, 2016;

Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, and Porter, 2003). Terrorism can inflict costs on a targeted country in a variety of ways. Terrorism has economic implications as well, such as diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, allocating public investment expenditures to security, or impeding trade.If a developing country loses enough foreign direct investment (FDI), which is a major source of savings, it may face slower economic growth. A sufficiently intensive terrorist campaign may drastically restrict capital inflows, just as capital may flee a country ravaged by civil conflict (Collier et al., 2003). Terrorism, like civil wars, can have knock-on effects in adjacent nations, such as when a terrorist campaign in one country discourages capital inflows or a regional multiplier causes lost economic activity in the terrorism-plagued country to reverberate throughout the region (Murdoch, 2002 & Sandler, 2004).

The goal of this article is to examine religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia, as well as the lessons learned for Nigeria. This will serve as a springboard for our next thought. Somalia is an East African country that has struggled with security and administration for more than two decades. The emergence of religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia, on the other hand, comes as a surprise, as coherence rather than disintegration was predicted at first (Abdullahi, 2017). The majority of the people in the country are Shafi'i Sunnis, and the country has a religious and linguistic unity that is uncommon in Africa (Menkhaus, 2007).However, the lack of a long-term governmental authority and the country's strategically vital position in the Ogaden region, which was forged via colonial conflict between Britain, France, and Italy, as well as Ethiopia, led to the emergence of informal Islamist power patterns.

To comprehend the ante of Religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia, one must examine the socio-economic and political factors that contributed to the act of terrorism in Somalia, as well as areas where the Nigerian government must take drastic measures to address in order to counter similar circumstances and challenges posed by Religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia, even though there are some similarities with what we now see in the country.The goal of this study is to define variables and evaluate the situations that led to the rise of religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia. Following independence, Somalia experienced a military dictatorship under the ruthless and oppressive administration of Barre, which crushed many social and civil rights. Somalia, aided by the Soviet Union, took a more socialist stance while investing substantially in its military (Alexander, 2004). Weapons and troops were purchased for both foreign and domestic structures. Outside of the military, this resulted in a bleak socioeconomic situation.There were few resources available to spend in critical public services like education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Instead of focusing on social and economic growth, the military was prioritized, which could have enraged an already vulnerable populace (Ingiriis, 2018). Barre utilized the military to further consolidate his political control, and the ruling regime frequently employed violence rather than dialogue to "dissuade" other ethnic groups. As a result, the struggle between ethnic groups and the secular government is unsurprising. In the face of the regime, religion became a unifying factor.

The economy's structure was a crucial factor in the country's demise. There was a misalignment between the population's needs and the state's and market's incentive structures. Conditional foreign loans were used as the sole source of financial development and investment (Hanley, 2004). Those in control dominated the distribution of foreign aid, resulting in theft of finances and embezzlement for their own ethnic clans. There were relatively few public resources dedicated toward improving and growing the agricultural sector, which is a serious failure on the part of the authorities in a country where starvation was visible.The political dispute over Somalia's meager resources caused the economy to almost collapse, fueling social unrest and communal violence (Jaffrelot, 2009).

## Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of the study is to examine the effects of religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia, 2010-2018: lessons for Nigeria. They specific objectives of the study are listed as:

1. Examine the impact of religious extremism and terrorism on the socio-economic and political development of Somalia.
2. Assess the policy measures and interventionist policy approach adopted to address religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia.
3. Identify the reasons why some key places like hotels and public places are frequently attacked by religious extremist and terrorist organization
4. Examine the lessons for Nigeria in the quest to counter religious extremism and terrorism

## Theoretical Framework

Fundamentalism is the theory that this paper is based on. Fundamentalists are identified as Dwight L. Moody (1837–99), an American Evangelist, and John Nelson Darby (1800–1882), a British preacher and dispensationalist. Fundamentalism is the belief that a sacred religious scripture or the teachings of a particular religious leader, prophets, and/or God have total authority over an individual or a group of individuals.Fundamentalists feel that their religion is impervious to criticism and, as a result, should be forced upon others. In these belief systems, logical explanations and scientific evidence have no place. Fundamentalism as we know it today emerged as a kind of Anglo-American millennialism between 1875 and 1914, during the pre-World War I era.

After World War I, the term "fundamentalism" was coined, and it is associated with a number of significant events. Between 1910 and 1915, A. C. Dixon and R. A. Torrey produced "The Fundamentals: A Testimony of Truth," a collection of twelve pamphlets including ninety essays or tracts compiled and authored between 1910 and 1915. Sixty-four conservative Protestant theologians from the United Kingdom and the United States joined forces to combat what they saw as liberal encroachment on their faith.The essential aspects of that liberal violation are as follows: 'The Enlightenment: Individualism, independence, reason, and progress led to a contemporary liberal democracy and freedom of church and state; Biblical criticism:

Christians "have never denied that human beings wrote the Bible. Despite the fact that the Churches have not always paid attention to the historical nature and origin of the Bible; Evolution:The Origin of Species (published in 1859), with its theory of evolution and life arising from random mutations, dealt a crushing blow to the debate over God's design of the universe and Liberal Theology.'

It should be emphasized that at this point, fundamentalism was used inside Christianity as a self-designation for a movement in the United States with modest offshoots in several western countries (Peter, 1996). Opponents used the phrase as a profoundly derogatory theological term. After that, it was quite calm for decades. This is true of both the term fundamentalism and the groups it refers to.Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, fundamentalism has become a political term for all violent or violent, and often terroristic, Islamic movements aimed at the foundations of Western political theory, such as democracy, human rights, and the separation of religion and state. To my knowledge, no one has explored how the phrase fundamentalism became a slogan that conveyed the horror of terrorism within the Islamic world. Fundamentalism was also a political word used to refer to Islam as a religion in this context.

Fundamentalism is typically associated with religion, implying unshakeable devotion to a set of irreducible beliefs (Nagata, 2001 & UNDP, 2016). Almost every major belief system in the world has adherents who rigidly regulate their everyday lives and viewpoints, sometimes leading to violence. Fundamentalisms often see an ethnically based "good life" as founded on literal interpretation of a sacred scripture; rigorous moral rules of behaviour; and severe consequences for transgressions; for example, amputations for stealing and stoning for adultery.This gives clear-cut standards of behaviour as well as tales of identity – particularly of gender. This not only provides a sense of certainty and stability in the face of rapid social change and cultural contestations, but it also provides a transcendentally based system of meaning. Adherents believe that if these codes are followed, a magnificent future will be built regardless of current circumstances. Strict adherence to scriptural doctrines and lives of purity and virtue promise social and spiritual renewal, restoring the "Golden Age" and purifying the community of virtue (the umma).Thus, after the Rapture, the Kingdom of God will be restored, or the Caliphate will be re-established for Muslims. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, has come to refer to a tendency among certain groups – primarily, but not exclusively, in religion – that is characterized by a markedly strict liberalism as it is applied to specific scriptures, dogmas, or ideologies, as well as a strong sense of the importance of maintaining in-group and out-group distinctions (Altemeyer&Hunsberger, 1992; Kunst, & Thompson, 2004).

In essence, the idea was used in this research to help us comprehend how religious extremism is the expression of extreme and unjust viewpoints or behaviours committed by some members of a religion based on their interpretation of a religious teaching or text. Our starting point is to examine the scope of religious extremists' and terrorist groups' operations and activities in Somalia.

## Conceptual Review

In this aspect of the paper, only related concepts are reviewed. Specifically, related literature and variant opinion from scholars on religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia are reviewed.

### *Concept of Religious Extremism*

Religious extremism is not a new concept; it is a century-old problem with a culture that has existed since the early stages of globalization (Hashmi, 2009). Religious extremism, according to Kazarian (2017), is the manifestation of extreme and unjust viewpoints or behaviours adopted by some members of a religion based on their interpretation of a religious doctrine or text. Religious extremism, according to Kazarian, is the expression of far-reaching viewpoints or behaviours by some followers of a religion that are not based on moral rights but on their own interpretation of a religious doctrine or text. Religious organizations and groups are imposing their ideas on people who belong to different religious groups and attempting to impose them on those who are unfamiliar with such beliefs.This drive and desire for people to belong to and believe in their own faith is the root cause of many religious violent extremisms in the world today. Because of the approach and manner in which the people prefer to extend their views to the rest of the world, the consequences of these activities have been severe.

According to Prus (2005), religious extremism is defined as a "strong sense of ideological zeal coupled by highly focused and prolonged sets of activities that show one or more persons' devotion to their particular belief systems." He also recognizes specific characteristics of religious extremism, such as monastic seclusion of members, extensive proselytization of non-members, vilification of outsiders as well as sinners inside, punishment of non-compliant individuals, and extermination of designated enemies.

Religious extremism is defined as the desire to broaden the scope, specificity, and rigor of religious law; social isolation; and rejection of the surrounding society. Religious extremism can be defined as a process or an institution that expands religious laws to the point where they are included not only in the private world but also in the public realm. In other words, radicals either seek to impose their laws on society, resulting in political warfare, or they isolate themselves and wait for supernatural intervention to make their beliefs a reality (Liebman, 2001).

Surprisingly, all religions have experienced varying degrees of violent extremism (Beit-Hallami 2010, Martin 2011). Furthermore, their regulations are detailed and severely enforced to the point where leniency in the reading of sacred texts is forbidden. According to Liebman, religious extremism is harmful to collective formation, and all historical faiths acknowledge extremism's destructive capacity and seek measures to restrain it. According to Beit-Hallahmi (2001), religious extremism tends to use violence to agitate secularization movements and those religious groups who oppose it.Violence against secularization and other religions has been seen in various parts of the world, including among Hindus in India, who attacked Muslims and destroyed their mosques; in the United States, religious extremist groups have demanded policies and laws requiring prayers in public schools, as well as the destruction of hospitals and the killing of doctors who perform abortions. In Israel, Jewish religious extremists have also

called for a theocratic state and have attacked and killed Palestinians. The 1979 Iranian revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeni, is a prime example of what religious fundamentalism may lead to.

***Concept of Terrorism***

Terrorism is a complicated concept, but it is absolutely necessary in order to develop a sufficient understanding of the phenomenon and deal with it effectively. The complexities of defining terrorism are numerous. It stems from a number of parties who have used violence to instil fear. There have also been many various explanations given for the use of this violence that we may intuitively characterize as "terrorism," and many different interested parties defining terrorism, each with their own perspectives and, in many cases, vested interests in a particular method of defining "terrorism."As a result, it is not unexpected that there are well over 100 different definitions of "terrorism" in existence (Jeffrey, 2003, UNDP 2016). Terrorism, however, is defined for the purposes of this work as the use of violence with the goal of instilling fear in a larger audience in order to prohibit various parties from doing something or, on the contrary, to coerce them into a certain conduct. For a long time, such use of violence has helped states and diverse regimes.

According to Tilly (2004), there is no unambiguous definition of terrorism or terrorist. The etymology of the term terror, to which the prefix 'ism' has been affixed, provides an important indication of the distinction between the two.Edmund Burke coined the term "terror," which derives from the Greek and Sanskrit meanings for "fear," in a political context when he referred to Robespierre's revolutionary rule (from September 1793 to July 1794) as a "Reign of Terror." Terror, according to Robespierre, was a form of justice.As a result, terrorism has been characterized as an endeavor to dominate or oppose government through intimidation. Terrorism is derived from the Latin word terrere, which meaning 'to fear.' During France's Reign of Terror from 1793 to 1794, it took on its current form of terrorism. According to Maximilien, "horror is nothing other than justice, prompt, stern, and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a result of the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most pressing demands" (cited in Centre for Defense Information, 2003).

The events of September 11, 2001 shown that religiously driven organizations are as eager to use violence to achieve their objectives. These examples are simply a small sample of the wide range of actors and aims linked with the use of violence in a way that has been labeled as "terrorism." Clearly, anarchists in Russia attempted not only to coerce the czarist authorities of Russia via fear, but also to ignite a bigger insurrection. Such an argument is entirely valid, and it just emphasizes the difficulties of defining terrorism in a comprehensive manner. As a result, it is not unexpected that the United Nations Organization (UNO) still lacks an official definition of terrorism as of 2007. It is extremely difficult to find a common denominator for all of these events and make a meaningful generalization. The main impediments to reaching an agreement on a definition of terrorism have been acts of terror committed by states, as well as the distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter activities (Thomas, 2007). One example is the 'academic consensus definition' of terrorism:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inducing form of repeated violent action used by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political objectives, in which the immediate targets of violence are not the major targets, as opposed to assassination. The immediate human victims of violence are typically chosen at random (opportunity targets) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target demographic to act as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes are used to manipulate the main target (audiences), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

**The International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR)**contends that terrorism is a political and criminal act that has an impact on people other than the immediate victim, and that terrorists' aim is to perform acts of violence that draw the attention of the local community, the government, and the globe to their cause. The effectiveness of a terrorist attack thus resides not on the act itself, but in the reaction of the public or government to the act.

**UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004)** gives Terrorism is defined as any criminal act, including acts against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, or the taking of hostages, with the intent to instill fear in the general public or in a group of people or specific individuals, to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act.

On March 17, 2005, a United Nations panel defined terrorism as any act "designed to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the intent of frightening a community or pressuring a government or an international organization to conduct or refrain from doing any act."

The **United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000** Terrorism is defined as any act "intended to significantly tamper with or seriously disrupt an electronic system." Under this concept, an act of violence is not even required.

**US Patriot Act of 2001:** terrorist activities include

• Threatening, conspiring or attempting to hijack airplanes, boats, buses or other vehicles

• Threatening, conspiring or attempting to commit acts of violence on any "protected" persons, such as government officials

• Any crime committed with "the use of any weapon or dangerous device," when the intent of the crime is determined to be the endangerment of public safety or substantial property damage rather than for "mere personal monetary gain

**FBI (2006)** definition of terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence against people or property in order to frighten or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any sector of it in order to achieve political or social goals.

**The International Encyclopedia of the Social &Behavioural Sciences (2001),** Terrorism is defined as the systematic use or threat of violence to convey a political message rather than defeat an opponent's military forces. Many definitions of terrorism say that it involves excessive violence: terrorism goes beyond the accepted limits of violent political agitation in a given community. Terrorists are frequently forced to use means of violence that are outside of the modes of political struggle that exist under some existing regimes (Tilly, 2004). This is precisely what distinguishes terrorism from other types of political violence in terms of its warlike nature (Black, 2004).

**Religious extremism and Terrorism in Somalia: the lesson for Nigeria**

The fall of SiyaadBarre's government triggered a deadly civil war in the country (Africa Briefing Report, 2010). Movements such as the Liberation Front of Western Somalia, the Democratic Front for the Safeguard of Somalia, the National Somali Movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United Somali Congress that formed in the 1970s and 1980s lacked a religious identity (Mohamedou, 2011).The first Somali Islamist movement, Al Jama'a al Islamiya (the Islamic Group), was founded in Mogadishu in the 1970s, under Saudi Wahhabi influence. This group then linked up with the Wihdat al Chabab al Islamiya, a local student movement (the Union of the Islamic Youth). The new organization, known as Al Itihad al Islami (the Islamic Union), had a Salafi bent and played a crucial role in the opposition against the SiadBarre dictatorship.

In the upheaval that followed the overthrow of SiadBarre in January 1991, the Islamic Union established training camps and began preaching (da'wa) around the country with Saudi financial backing. This did not go well, as its list of prohibited activities alienated a huge portion of the Somali population. Notably, the Islamic Union attempted but failed to establish an Islamic Emirate, which was challenged by the National Somali Front (Holzer, 2008).

As an offshoot of the Islamic Union, the first transnational undercurrents emerged (the Islamic Union of Western Somalia). It carried out intermittent operations in Ethiopia in the name of liberating the Ogaden region in 1990–1996, eliciting a military response from Ethiopia, which put an end to these activities. The establishment of the Islamic Union represented the matrix of contemporary political Islam in Somalia, which was limited by: a population that rallied only temporarily and partially to the project; powerful political groups and tribal actors actively opposed to the religious project; and an expansionist desire that ended the initial cohesion, often violently.In the 2000s, a second wave of religious-driven groups, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and, later, Al Shabaab, arose in Somalia.Whereas the Islamic Union movement was principally influenced by post-September 11 international developments, the second movement was primarily influenced by an essentially local reaction to the arbitrariness of a fallen state. As a result, contemporary Somali Islamism arose in an already militarized, criminalized, and atomized environment. ItihadMahakem al Islamiya (the Union of Islamic Tribunals) was founded in 1999 in response to a pressing need for order.The UIC, which took the shape of a networked system of courts, quickly took over the state's justice function, as well as education groups (150,000 children were educated during this period) and health services overseen by militias paid for by tribal donations. By 2004, a presidency had been established with the formation of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts of Somalia, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. However, this sparked criticism from Somali warlords, who formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. In 2006, the Alliance and the UIC engaged in armed conflict.The significance of the UIC tale was its federation of varied actors, as well as the fact that three-fourths of the country (north, south, and east) came under Islamic rule over a seven-year period. To be sure, the UIC benefited from the popular belief at the time that only Islam could unite Somalia, and it did offer a potential response to tribe, clan, and ethnic difference. However, most Somalis were drawn to it because of its capacity to address insecurity within a conservative, if not radical, theological framework. The UIC had evolved a south (reconciliation) and simah (pardon) jurisprudence, which had been temporarily handed to local tradition (xeer) and the main position of traditional leaders.However, the international world neglected to engage with the one institution that has been able to offer a powerful alternative to the warlords since 1991. The US, in particular, viewed the UIC as a Taliban-like entity and branded it as a terrorist actor. With mounting internal schisms between moderates and radicals, and the UIC's resistance to the AU's 2006 intervention in Somalia, the UIC veered toward extremism, aided by a string of military failures. The organization was disbanded on December 27, 2006. The emergence of a political centre of gravity would have aided in the reconstruction of the Somali state, but the US-led reconciliation movement was hostile to the revival of the UIC.

As a result of the UIC's implosion, many factions emerged, including a short-lived moderate group led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a national wing known as Hizbul Islam, and a militant branch known as Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab, formerly known as Hizb Al Shabaab (the Party of Youth) or HarakatShabaab al Mujahidin (Movement of the Fighters' Youth), was established as a recognized extremist organizational entity in March 2007. (although their presence was noticeable as early as 2003 with the killing of four humanitarian workers in Somaliland attributed to the group).Al Shabaab, led by Aden Hashi Farah Ayro (a UIC member who had spent some time in Afghanistan in the 1990s), marked a significant turn in the history of Somali Islamism by overtly linking their acts to both global jihad and hardlineSalafist philosophy.

So far, international efforts to construct a viable central government have been unsuccessful and unhelpful. Despite the UN-brokered Peace Agreement in Djibouti in 2008, the situation on the ground remains extremely difficult, particularly in southern and central Somalia. The internationally supported Transitional Federal Government has yet to extend its authority beyond a few blocks of Mogadishu. The humanitarian situation is grave, and the resumption of violence since 2006 has exacerbated it (Africa Briefing Report, 2010).

The influx of migrants into surrounding nations strained the region's political stability, while Al-affiliation Shabaab's to al-Qaeda in 2007 fueled fears that Somalia would become a safe haven for transnational jihadi terrorists planning strikes in the region and possibly in Western countries. Given these factors, Somalia has become a rising source of concern for the international community, which has concentrated on the visible and recurring consequences of these crises (anti-piracy, regional containment, counterterrorism).However, a more comprehensive strategy to the Somalia problem that addresses the core causes of conflict and bloodshed should be taken. Somalia crises are caused by a complex web of local, regional, and worldwide forces; these links must be considered for long-term crisis resolution.

The Boko Haram group, which has come to dominate the Nigerian and West African security scene over the past 15 years, exemplifies the same hybridity that presides over new groups in East Africa, North Africa, and the Sahel. Boko Haram is a multifaceted movement that is the outcome of ethno-religious tensions, has separatist aspirations in the setting of a federal state, and is becoming progressively radicalized with a terrorist approach

to a rigid neo-Salafist entity.In Nigeria, resentments between Christian and Muslim identities have been one of the most significant political difficulties that the country has faced in various historical epochs. Opposition between the two ascendant religious groups grew worse in the early 1980s, when many Christian extremist individuals concluded that the mostly Muslim north of the country possessed an unequal share of political power and economic resources (Ibrahim cited in Haynes 1996:213). This was exacerbated by the government's intention to join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Furthermore, the state was immersed in a contentious controversy over the Sharia judicial system during 1987 and 1988. The Sharia Court of Appeal was established as the issue. The Christian identities expressed their concern that Nigeria's membership in the OIC, as well as the plan by Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly to incorporate Sharia law into the Nigerian constitution, were part of a conspiracy to Islamize Nigeria by the Muslim identities in collaboration with the state. In the late 1980s, tensions between the two religious communities erupted into various types of political violence. Following anti-Christian riots in several sections of Northern Nigeria in the early 1990s, this trend continued (Maeir 1991).In the early 2000s, another violent religious extremist group, Al-SunnaWalJamma, that is, "Followers of the Prophet, "Jama'atulAlhulSunnahLidda'watiwal Jihad", popularly known as Boko Haram, and splinter group Jama'atuAnsarulMuslimina Fi Biladis- Sudan, popularly known as (JAMBS), emerged to perpetrate even worse forms of violence. Since its inception, the group claiming to be fighting for the imposition of Sharia throughout Nigeria has engaged in unrelenting acts of terrorism against the state and innocent civilians (Adesoji, 2010).

In response to this socioeconomic setting, the movement known as Boko Haram (formerly known as the Yusufiya – follower of Yusuf — or Nigerian Taliban) was founded in the early 2000s. The Jama'atuAhl al Sunnawal Jihad (the Group of the People of the Sunna and Jihad) emerged in the early 2000s in the area of Maiduguri in Borno State, straddling a three-state arc in northeast Nigeria — the Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa states — with the goal of establishing a strict Islamic state in the north of Nigeria to address the corruption and poor governance that had overtaken the country and region.. The group, led mostly by Mohammad Yusuf, was initially centreed on nonviolent militancy concerned with the enforcement of Sharia (Islamic law), social justice, and, gradually, regional secession. They established a community of "genuine" Muslims in Kanama, Yobe state, near the Niger border. An anti-Western attitude, borne of hostility to the missionary ideal of education, was gradually added to these goals.

During the movement's early years in the mid-to-late 2000s, the neologism "Boko Haram," which translates as "Western education is forbidden," became the street term. If the group was gradually radicalized during its clashes with Nigerian authorities beginning in December 2003 (50 killed), and if it was already showing signs of transnationalism with militants flocking from across West Africa (particularly Chad, Cameroon, and Niger), its focus remained overwhelmingly on local political and religious authorities. Attacks against police precincts and border posts began in January, September, and October 2004, and continued for the next two years.The assassination of Yusuf's former mentor, Islamic scholar Jaafar Mahmoud Adam, in April 2007 at the Indimi Mosque in Kano — who had criticized the group's interpretation of the Koran and the Prophet's teachings — was attributed to Boko Haram and marked a turning point in the escalation of violence; there had been a series of skirmishes with Nigerian authorities, culminating in Yusuf'.

Yusuf's disappearance and the brutal manner in which he and several hundred militants were executed in 2009 paved the way for greater radicalization both within the group and in the geographical region in which it operated.As repression against the group mounted, and after a brief period of inactivity, a new leader, AbubakarShekau, emerged in 2010. (Shekau had already expressed his opposition to Yusuf, whom he regarded as too soft). From then on, the group entered a new phase characterized by: increased brutality delivered on soft targets; increased numbers reaching 5,000–6,000 core fighters by 2015; militarized urban guerrilla operations, including simultaneous suicide bombings (notably on the United Nations building in Abuja in August 2011, and on various targets, primarily police stations, in Kano in January 2012), use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and large-scale kidnappings (young girls, foreign workers).It also encouraged radical takfiri (excommunication) theological discourse while simultaneously delegitimizing political and religious authorities as well as more moderate groupings. Using the matrix of Al Qaeda video messaging, they became increasingly adept in their use of communication tools. Between 2010 and 2015, the frequency of car bombings, assassinations, and urban assault hit-and-run guerilla tactics increased, and the targets expanded to include government officials, young students (276 schoolgirls were kidnapped in Chibok in April 2014), religious leaders, mosques, churches, and market places.

As this occurred, Nigerian authorities displayed a startling incompetence and unwillingness to address the situation effectively, eventually declaring a state of emergency in May 2013. With 2,000 people killed in the first six months of 2014, and 2,500 killed in a single month of January 2015, the magnitude of the attacks reached unprecedented levels, despite widespread suspicions about the "ambiguity" of the security forces and the involvement of thousands of Chadian troops and hundreds of South African mercenaries. Aside from Shekau's ruthlessness, the evolution of Boko Haram's mode of operation was greatly influenced by the successive influences of Al Qaeda and subsequently the Islamic State in Iraq and al Shaam (ISIS) on the Nigerian organisation.With increasing swaths of land acquired beyond Borno State and spreading south into Adamawa state, Boko Haram was exhibiting an evolved organizational ability beyond local militia uprisings, copying ISIS tactics. Similarly, in January 2012, Boko Haram established its own franchise, Ansaru, following the "franchising" concept pioneered by al-Qaeda in previous years. This new organisation, formally called as Jama'atuAnsaru al Muslimina fi Bilad al Sudan (the Group of the Muslims' Companions in the Land of the Sudan, i.e., Black Africa), demonstrated a more international bent, pursuing relations with AQIM and Al Shabaab.Two of its top officers, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid Barnawi, who purportedly trained with the AQIM in the Sahel, allegedly carried out kidnapping operations for ransom of Westerners between January and December 2012, as well as February 2013. At the end of this sequence, Boko Haram — whose atrocities killed about 11,000 people in Nigeria and West Africa between 2000 and 2015 — made an oath of loyalty to the Islamic State on March 7, 2015, which ISIS spokesperson Mohammed al Adani acknowledged on March 12.

In a nutshell, Somalia is frequently categorized as a weak state. Poverty, long-term government neglect, corruption, waste of economic resources, underdevelopment, unemployment, and underemployment of youths and women created a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. Every action has a repercussion or consequence, as was the case in Somalia. Narratives of extreme upheaval and change, which appeal to the multilayered sense of grievance that envelops an individual whose horizons provide no road to growth, will stay appealing as long as underlying circumstances remain unresolved. Where there is injustice, suffering, and despair, violent extremist ideologies appear as a challenge to the current quo and a means of escape.

As a result, the following paragraph will attempt to look at the situation in Somalia, the lessons to be learned, and where Nigeria, as a nation, needs to make drastic efforts in addressing the issues found to have motivated religious extremism and terrorism in order to avert further escalation and destruction of economic goods, deter economic investors, and increase the spate of crimes and insecurity.Nigeria's society's diversity has resulted in a number of fault points. The social environment is a complex combination of ethnic, religious, and political forces, all of which have contributed to the current tensions in Nigeria. When analyzing the country's socioeconomic and political state, these variables must be considered.Due to the heinous operations of terrorist groups, modern Nigeria has become a theater of bloodshed and instability during the last few decades. Terrorists from various factions and camps wreak havoc on Nigerians. Religious fanaticism and terrorism have a safe harbor in Nigeria. What is currently happening across the country, such as banditry, Boko-haram, Fulani herders-farmers conflict, kidnapping and rape, is a sign of a weak state.

The battle between Islam and Christianity has also resulted in friction among vast swaths of the people, with both faiths seeking to gain a bigger number of followers.This religious battleground has had such an impact on Nigeria's current socio-economic and political environment that one has to wonder whether the country would be able to survive the struggle or be forced to follow Sudan's example and partition the country into two distinct religion-based states.Numerous scholarly works and literature point to issues such as economic deprivation, despair, and desperation as underlying causes of terrorism in Nigeria.Religion and ethnicity, on the other hand, cannot be disregarded. The findings of studies on the links between poverty and terrorism appear to support this contention (Bravo and Dias, 2006; Al-Badayneh, 2009; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003). Other elements supporting this notion are the social profile and social location of Nigerian youths. Their social profile is generally suggestive of significant inequalities in life chances. Boko Haram's rallying cry has been poor governance and corruption.When one examines Nigeria's socioeconomic and political situation after independence, one can observe that the country has been handicapped by a variety of reasons. Religious and communal violence, as well as a lack of social institutions and infrastructure development, have all hampered any type of social cohesion. The transition of power from democracy to the military has exacerbated emotions of marginalization and persecution for individuals who are not in authority at the moment.

According to Lewis (2011), Nigeria's economic situation has posed a challenge to the country's stability.During the first decade or two of independence, the allocation of profits from agricultural and natural resource exports laid the groundwork for different regional economies, which in turn fueled regional political instability. The instability was exacerbated when, in the 1970s, oil export profits altered the economy. The earnings were consolidated, allowing official patronage and corruption to flourish, making the economy more vulnerable to global oil prices and political mismanagement. Rising inequality and what appeared to be ever-increasing poverty exacerbated societal tensions.

The actions of Nigeria's alternating military and civilian leadership have also played an important part in shaping the country's current climate. Any hope of stability and effective functionality was thwarted by corrupt and dictatorial governance. Nigeria's history demonstrates that, even after independence, democracy was repeatedly threatened by military coups. It's difficult to say whether democracy or military rule was better for Nigeria's stability.

According to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (2010), "relative poverty" is most visible in the country's far north. In comparison to the southeast (67.0%) and southwest (59.1%) regions, the northeast (76.3%) and northwest (77.7%) are significantly higher. There is a consistent pattern in the other vital markers. However, it is crucial to highlight that the disparity in general deprivation levels between the South and North can also be attributed to northern Nigerian leaders' poor administration.With such high levels of poverty, there appears to be little chance for genuine growth. Unemployment goes hand in hand with this, and is yet another social and economic sign of Nigerians' predicament. According to the NBS, the youth unemployment rate was as high as 41.6 percent in 2010.385 As teenagers see no way out of their predicament, such a high percentage has contributed to emotions of hopelessness and ostracism. Terrorist organizations, such as Boko Haram in this case, are known to recruit hopeless adolescents. These young guys are drawn to terrorist organizations because they give the type of work and involvement that they seek.

In recent years, Nigeria has provided a climate conducive to extreme ideas. Human Rights Watch believes that a lack of equal access to education, health care, and other social services, endemic government and elitist corruption, and a failure to adequately investigate those responsible for religious, ethnic, and tribal violence are all factors that contribute to militancy not only in the Muslim north, but throughout the country.According to Index Mundi (2013) data, religion in Nigeria is primarily divided between Christianity and Islam. The warring faiths are evenly matched, with roughly 50 percent Muslim and 40 percent Christian (the remaining 10 percent assumed to be indigenous). The rivalry between the two religions has afflicted Nigeria since its independence, with leaders utilizing their preaching to indoctrinate their followers to more extremist beliefs, causing increased tension throughout the country. Religion appears to be exploited in Nigeria by both political and economic elites who are inherently provincial and materialistic.

However, the problem, or fundamental cause, of the conflict in northern Nigeria is not ‘religion.' Furthermore, it is the destructive exploitation of the country's religious temperament by individuals and groups such as Boko Haram that has resulted in religion becoming a key driver in the conflict. Boko Haram, in particular, has perverted Islamic values through deception, to the cost of Nigeria's stability. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution guaranteed the "right to alter his religion or belief... and freedom to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance." This caused friction between the two major faiths, as both Christians and Muslims strove to convert as many people as

possible to their respective causes.This religious division has resulted in the formation of a "belt" throughout Nigeria, separating the Muslim north from the Christian south. The struggle between the two faiths has played a significant influence in creating a climate favourable to the formation of religious fundamental groupings. The introduction of Sharia law in various northern Nigerian states has resulted in sporadic sectarian violence, primarily between Christians and Muslims. Following the implementation of strict Islamic law in Kaduna in February 2000, the first serious dispute between the two faiths occurred.

Looking at the precedents in Somalia and what is available in Nigeria, it is difficult to claim that there is much of a difference; even if the country has yet to be defined as a failed state, the factors that comprise a failed state are widely available in Nigeria. According to Rotberg (2003), in any situation where citizens feel frightened, or the government fails to create a sense of security and fights to preserve official power, the state's failure becomes more apparent, and rebel organizations acquire prominence. From the North to the South, a wave of assassinations and kidnappings has become the norm in Nigeria, and individuals no longer feel safe in the country.

National security is a precondition for national economic growth and development. This is due to the fact that tranquil nations attract foreign investors, while domestic investors can freely operate the economy with little or no tensions and apprehensions. Security, according to Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013), is the foundation upon which all real progress may be established and sustained. In the last few decades, Nigeria has witnessed an extraordinary sequence of agitations in the form of kidnapping and abduction, herders-farmers conflict, extremism and terrorism, and carnages of various sizes. Nigeria's insecurity seems to have taken on greater and more complex aspects.

Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist group from north-eastern Nigeria, has killed over 5000 people in bombings and gun attacks since July 2009. Its stated goal is to overthrow Nigeria's secular government and create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law (Agbiboa 2013a). These violent attacks, which show signs of increasing coordination and complexity, exacerbate Nigeria's already-existing security issues by escalating ethno-religious tensions and inter-communal violence in northern Nigeria (Maiangwa et al. 2012). As the issue worsens, the Nigerian government has increased its efforts to contain the group's menace.Boko Haram's official name is Jama'atuAhlus-SunnahLidda'AwatiWal Jihad, which translates as 'People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad' (American Foreign Policy Council 2013:1). According to popular belief, the group has been active since 2002.Boko Haram, on the other hand, became the focus of public attention in 2009, when it spread sectarian violence that predominantly enveloped Bauchi and Maiduguri, murdering over 1000 people, including its founding leader Mohammed Yusuf.Yusuf was allegedly slain by Nigerian police while being held in detention (Paris Model United Nations 2012:4). Aside from ushering in another 'phase of security forces ruthlessness in Nigeria' (Bamidele, 2012:35), the death of Yusuf in police custody and the failure of the Nigerian government to prosecute those security personnel responsible for the extrajudicial killing of the Boko Haram leader have been cited as major reasons for Boko Haram's ultra-radical turn (Maiangwa&Uzodike, 2012:3).

Although radical Islam is the theological ideology that drives groups such as Boko Haram, the relative deprivation hypothesis cannot simply be ignored in the Boko Haram narrative. To begin, northern Nigeria, particularly the north-east, is a prime illustration of poverty, as evidenced by widespread poverty, unemployment, infrastructural ruin, and environmental stress. All of these conditions, while not directly responsible for Boko Haram terrorism, encourage foot troops and promote a conducive climate for Boko Haram operations.Despite recent economic growth in Nigeria, poverty and income disparity are widespread. According to the International Crisis Group (2014:3), 112.5 million Nigerians (70 percent of the population) are classed as "poor and extremely poor." The North-East, Boko Haram's operating hub, has "the highest poverty rate of the six designated zones" (ICG 2014:3). This is exacerbated by illiteracy and climate change. Despite the fact that education in the north is underfunded, secular schools are sparse in the country's north-east.

Furthermore, because many children are sent to Quranic schools, where they frequently beg for alms on the streets; in the setting of severe poverty and societal degradation, this practice is vulnerable to misuse by groups like as Boko Haram (ICG, 2014:4).What matters in the context of relative impoverishment is how individuals perceive their social standing. For example, Moghaddam (2006:22) contends that "a Muslim may feel deprived because of the position of Muslims in relation to other groups." What is important to highlight here is that the sensation of deprivation in this context is not limited to a lack of tangible possessions. It could be egoistical, fraternal, or historical in nature.Feelings of relative deprivation in the Islamic world, according to Moghaddam (2006:47), can be regarded "in the historical framework of the near and Middle East." This brings us to another notable feature of the Boko Haram phenomenon: religiosity, which has been knitted into its fabric by historical processes of religious politicization in Nigeria.' Maiangwa (2014).

The current Boko Haram issue is the most serious threat to Nigeria's unity since the end of the three-year civil war in 1970.According to the International Crisis Group (2014:40), the Boko Haram crisis has divided Nigerians along religious lines, reversing some of the country's hard-won successes in fostering national unity and stability. Furthermore, the pervasive sense of fear, as well as the prevalence of bomb scares, has inflicted a significant damage to political and socioeconomic activities in northern Nigeria. As the 2015 elections approached, Boko Haram remained unyielding, and as a result, local populations became increasingly concerned due to regular bombings, shootings, and arbitrary murders by state security personnel. Unfortunately, military crackdowns have failed to stop the rising bloodshed in northern Nigeria or to stop Boko Haram's deadly attacks; in fact, they may have bolstered Boko Haram's commitment against the Nigerian state while alienating the local populace.

## Methodology

### Study Design

The Ex Post Facto or After the Fact design was chosen for this paper. This is a type of design in which the investigation begins after the incident has occurred, with no intervention from the observer (Neil, 2010). The ex post facto design was chosen because it is a systematic empirical study in which the independent variables cannot be controlled or modified in any way because the circumstance of investigation already exists or has occurred.

**Population of the Study**

According to the Population Estimation Survey, Somalia's population was 12.3 million in 2014, and it is expected to have risen to more than 15 million by the end of 2018. Its population is quite youthful. Children (aged 0–14) account for around 46% of the Somali population, while adolescents and youth (aged 15–29) account for the remaining 27%. They constitute nearly three-quarters of the Somali population... 42% of the population lives in cities, 23% in rural areas, 26% are nomadic, and 9% are internally Displaced Persons... The Somali Diaspora is a significant part of the Somali people and may be found all over the world (The UN-Somalia Common Country Analysis 2020 report).

**Nature/Sources of Data**

The data collected is qualitative, and it was derived from secondary sources. By secondary source, we indicate that the data was derived from existing materials, publications, and other sources other than the researcher's own knowledge.

**Methods of Data Collection**

The vast data collections were compiled from books, journal papers, the internet, and other unpublished sources.

**Methods of Data Analysis**

In order to analyze the data gathered throughout the study, the content analysis method was used. Content analysis is a technique for determining the existence of specific words, topics, or concepts within a set of qualitative data (Hodder, 1994). The researcher can use content analysis to qualify and analyze the presence, meanings, and linkages of such terms, topics, or concepts.

**Validity/Reliability of Instrument**

The study was heavily reliant on data from published sources. As a result, the risk of manipulation is minimal or even non-existent. To increase the study's validity, efforts were made to ensure that the data addressed the key points identified in the study. The reliability resulted in a valid conclusion to the research problem. As a result, data were acquired from a variety of sources, such as journals, newspapers, magazines, and various forms of documentation that were dependable since their topics and views aligned with the research problem and goals. As a result, the risk of bias was greatly reduced, and precision was improved and achieved. As a result, the study's data were reliable, valid, and satisfying, yielding valid and dependable results.

**Religious extremism and Terrorism and the effects on Somalia**

Extremism and terrorism have severe consequences for Somalia. We'll start by identifying a couple of these consequences.

**a. Economic effect**

Terrorism and religious fanaticism have a negative impact on the economy. Economic activities will be halted, with the direct result being a reduction in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), tourism and transportation, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), mining and agriculture activities.

Somalia's economic growth has been severely harmed. The attacks significantly exacerbate ambiguity, limiting development and undermining foreign direct investments [FDI] (Abadie&Gardeazabal, 2008). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a significant source of savings for Somalia's economy to fund investment. However, religious extremism and terrorism compelled the government to increase defense spending in order to secure potential targets and develop programs to apprehend terrorists and any assets they may have obtained.Increaseddefense expenditures tends to limit spending on sectors that can boost economic growth, both in public and private investments (Gaibulloer& Sandler, 2008).

It also had an impact on vital industries such as transportation, tourism, and export. The negative impact on these industries has the ability to reduce the GDP and development in general (Enders & Sandler, 2006).

**Humanitarian effect**

The crisis's impact on the Somali people has surpassed even the persistent insecurity of the 1990s. The magnitude of the violence and internal displacement has severely harmed the coping strategies acquired over the course of two decades of statelessness. As many as 3.25 million people require humanitarian aid; 330 000 Somali children are malnourished, and nearly 1.3 million Somalis are internally displaced (UN Security Council, 2009). There are roughly three million Somali refugees in all, including those who were able to evacuate Somalia in the 1990s and 2000s to North America, Europe, and the Middle East (Ould-Abdallah, 2008: p. 2).

In May 2009, 204, 000 persons were displaced from Mogadishu, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While many went west to Afgooye, which is home to over 400,000 IDPs, the bulk continued on to the Lower and Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud, Bay, and Lower Juba regions. Meanwhile, a western non-governmental organization (NGO), Medicins Sans Frontières, has abandoned the capital's clinics for the first time in 17 years, leaving people without essential medical treatment (MSF Press Release, 2009).

**b. Political effect**

Religious extremism and terrorism have also had an impact on Somalia's political activities, contributing to political instability. Religious fanaticism and terrorism, which began with the goal of deposing the long-serving ruler, were unable to establish a functioning governance framework. Even with a new transitional administration in place in January 2008 – 17 years later – political developments in Somalia do not appear to be promising

of long-term stability, let alone peace.

The Transitional Federal Institutions, which included the government (the parliament and the president) during peace talks in Kenya in 2004, have yet to demonstrate its ability to bring stability or address the country's dire humanitarian crisis. Almost every day, the media reports on brutal clashes and assassinations in the southern portions of Somalia between Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and the so-called multifaceted insurgency, which also includes remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).The northern sections of the country, where two semi-independent entities (the self-proclaimed "Republic of Somaliland" and the "Regional State of Puntland") are in effect, have enjoyed higher levels of security. Fighting between the various military forces of both states, however, reoccurs across parts of the Sanaag and Sool provinces.

**Measures adopted to counter extremism and terrorism in Somalia**

There are national, regional, and international policies in place to combat religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia, which we will examine in turn.

**a. National strategies**

The Somali Federal Cabinet submitted an anti-terrorism law to Parliament for passage in April 2014, with the goal of punishing terror-related entities. Its goal was to assist in the elimination of groups that are compromising Somalia's security and endangering the society. In 2012, the Defector Rehabilitation Programme was implemented as a result of this process.

**The Defector Rehabilitation Programme (DRP)**: The Defector Rehabilitation Programme (DRP) was implemented as part of a strategy to combat extremism and terrorism in South Central Somalia. The policy was implemented by the Ministry of Internal Security under the aegis of the Federal Republic of Somalia (International Crisis Group, 2002). Since its inception in 2012, the program has undergone multiple adjustments, and there are now over nine rehabilitation clinics in various places around South Central Somalia. The initiative was funded by international organizations in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (Tervahartiala, 2017).The DRP is divided into five phases, as outlined in the program's policies and procedures: outreach, reception, screening, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The outreach activities include disseminating information about the program to individuals and communities, with the goal of encouraging Islamist fighters to embrace peace and leave the group. People entering the program were greeted by national or international forces during the welcoming phase.

The screening phase is concerned with assessing individuals to determine if they are at low or high risk. The National Intelligence Security Agency is in charge of this (NISA). The high-risk group was either sent to a safe house or sentenced and imprisoned. Individuals in the low-risk group were sent to rehabilitation institutions, while juveniles under the age of 18 were housed in different facilities. Participants in the rehabilitation institutes received basic education as well as several sorts of vocational and skill training.During the reintegration phase, program participants leave the centres to live in local communities. The rehabilitation process was prioritized during the program's first launch. However, efforts have been made in recent years to develop and strengthen the program's other four phases, such as establishing new screening procedures, scaling up outreach initiatives, and further refining the reintegration framework (Khalil, et al. 2019). Leaving a violent extremist group entails significant risks. People considering leaving such groups should think carefully about whether it feels safe to do so. Safety for oneself, as well as family members, dependents, and others, is at the top of the "basic needs list" in an exit process.

The rehabilitation process, which takes place at rehabilitation centres, is the fourth step of the program for the low-risk group. The typical length of stay in the centres for program participants varies each centre and is determined by the individual participant's requirements and circumstances (the National Programme Policies and Procedures document 2017). Because the initiative was designed to weaken al-Shabaab, the rehabilitation centres are possible targets that may be targeted. As a result, it is a constant challenge to guarantee that the facilities are appropriately secured and that the people who work there are safe. Al-Shabaab infiltration posed an additional problem.

There have been reports of active al-Shabaab fighters entering the program and claiming to wish to disengage. In certain circumstances, it was difficult to tell who was a potential infiltrator and who was actually looking to leave the group. Information security was consequently critical to prevent sensitive information about the centres, as well as the personnel and participants who stayed there, from getting into the wrong hands. However, providing a safe environment, training, education, and exposing individuals to other worldviews may have a positive impact, even on infiltrators. In one case, an al-Shabaab member entered a centre and then elected to continue with the program after leaving al-Shabaab.

There were also security hazards in bringing together people who had been active in a violent organization within the same facility. People who have been trained in and committed acts of violence are more likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and aggressive and violent behaviour. Some had also been victims of violence. To reduce levels of dissatisfaction and violence within the centre, psychosocial treatment must be given first emphasis. Furthermore, the command and control structure of al-Shabaab subgroups was incorporated inside the centres in some situations. It was critical to detect this early and have enough trained personnel on hand to recognize and destroy such group dynamics.

Security was also a key issue throughout the program's last step, the reintegration phase. Because of al-tactics, Shabaab's it was difficult to know who to trust in a neighbourhood. Al-Shabaab has "sleeper cells," in which members are rooted in local populations and their membership in al-Shabaab is concealed until the cell is activated. Furthermore, there are still places under al-Shabaab control where the organization has widespread support from the local populace. All of these factors combine to make a thorough assessment of potential locations for relocating program participants when they leave the rehabilitation centre a difficult but critical task.Participants must carefully examine if they will feel safe living with family, relatives, or others in their networks. Some people may have family or friends who are still active members or supporters of al-Shabaab. In some circumstances, relocating persons to a different place than their community of origin is the best solution.

## Regional Interventionist approach

In this aspect of this paper we will consider the interventionist approach of AMISOM

**African Union Mission in Somalia:** Somalia is another example of a predominantly military counter-al-Shabaab engagement. AMISOM was established by the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2007. The mission, which began with a six-month mandate, aimed to provide support to Somalia's transitional government and to take all necessary measures, as well as to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in coordination with Somali national defense and public safety institutions. AMISOM has been collaborating with the Somali National Army (SNA) and, via concerted efforts throughout 2014, reclaimed certain towns that had been captured by the rebels.While AMISOM and the SNA's counter-efforts have achieved some progress, al-Shabaab maintains its attacks, deliberately targeting these military operations. Apart from the attacks and human rights violations carried out by al-Shabaab, Human Rights Watch adds that government security forces, AU troops, and associated militias have also been involved in indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, and incarceration.

With Somalia declared a failed state following the fall of the SiadBarre dictatorship, the United Nations' efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Somalia also failed, owing mostly to severe violence in southern Somalia. As the US-backed Ethiopian incursion in 2006 established the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), al-Shabaab arose to continue its struggle. The African Union was given permission by the United Nations Security Council to form a peacekeeping force known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to help stabilize the country (AMISOM, 2006).

AMISOM was established on January 19, 2007, and the majority of its 22,000 soldiers are from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone. AMISOM is sponsored by a United Nations logistical assistance package, bilateral donations, and voluntary contributions from United Nations Member States. AMISOM was initially tasked with "doing Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in order to create conditions for the performance of Humanitarian activities and an immediate takeover by the United Nations."Its original responsibilities included facilitating dialogue and reconciliation among all stakeholders in Somalia; protecting Transitional Federal Institutions so they could carry out their functions; supporting disarmament and stabilization efforts; facilitating humanitarian operations; and protecting AMISOM personnel, installations, and equipment.

AMISOM, working with the Somali army, has driven Al-Shabaab out of Somalia's major cities. Many of Al-organized Shabaab's operations target AMISOM bases and partner countries, especially Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. According to reports, Al-Shabaab views AMISOM as a foreign occupation imposed by Western foreign policy. Al-Shabaab has killed around 200 individuals in Kenyan cities and communities along the Somali border since 2014. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated in September 2015 that Al-Shabaab bombings have killed at least 1,100 AMISOM personnel since 2009. (U.S. Department of State, 2015; National Counterterrorism Centre, 2015; Council on Foreign Relations, 2015; East African, 2015).

The United Nations Security Council extended AMISOM's mandate in July 2016 to include actions specific to Somalia's primary terrorist threat, Al-Shabaab. The Security Council authorized AMISOM to "reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition organizations," including the continuation of "offensive operations" against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. It also authorized AMISOM to gradually relinquish security responsibility to Somali security forces. Since October 2015, the European Union has been in charge of soldier allowance payments.However, in January 2016, the EU reduced AMISOM funding by 20% in order to reallocate funds to the battle against ISIS (United Nations, 2016; AMISOM, 2016; Daily Beast, 2016; European Union, 2016).

## International Counter Extremism and Terrorism Approach in Somalia

Attempts by the United Nations to define and criminalize transnational terrorism were stymied in the General Assembly over semantics (i.e. deciding on a terrorist definition), while other cooperation initiatives were successful.

**United States of America (U.S.) Intervention in Somalia**

In December 1992, the United States sent troops into Mogadishu as part of a U.N. Security Council-backed action. Their objective was to free the southern region from warring warlords who had slaughtered hundreds of civilians. The US operation came to an end in August 1993, when militias shot down two US Black Hawk helicopters, killing 18 American soldiers in a 15-hour fire fight. More least 700 Somali militiamen and civilians were killed during the incident known as Black Hawk Down, according to estimates (United Nations, 1993; U.S. Army, 1993).

Since 2001, the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has allegedly conducted covert military operations inside Somalia, including surveillance, reconnaissance, bombing, and assault and capture operations. Drone strikes by the United States in the country began in June 2011. Terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Shabaab, have been the major targets of these operations. In 2006, JSOC backed Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, which served as a cover for JSOC to conduct more aggressive operations against insurgents, typically employing helicopter and gunship airstrikes as well as ground soldiers. JSOC forces are still operating in Somalia. On March 9, 2016, they aided Somali troops in a raid against Al-Shabaab fighters in the town of Awdhegele, which resulted in the deaths of 15 militants (Washington Post, 2016; Daily Mail, 2016; BBC News, 2016).

A US Navy Seal was killed and two other US soldiers were injured in a gunfight on May 5, 2017. Somali troops and US Special Forces were attacked shortly after exiting a US chopper that had dropped them near an al-Shabaab facility in the village of Barire. The killing represented the first combat fatality for the United States in Somalia since 1993.The Seals were aiding Somali troops in an operation that resulted in the deaths of a senior al-Shabaab leader and three of his companions.

On September 26, 2016, US troops killed nine al-Shabaab fighters in an airstrike in the port city of Kismayo in southern Somalia. Another US drone targeted al-Shabaab terrorists near Kismayo on April 12, 2016, killing 12. According to US Pentagon spokesperson Capt. Jeff Davis, such actions were carried out when there was an imminent threat to US forces stationed in the country (CNN, 2016; Critical Threats, 2016; Military Times, 2016).On April 1, 2016, a US drone strike in southern Somalia killed top al-Shabaab intelligence official Hassan Ali Dhoore and two others. According to US military officials, Dhoore was involved in a Christmas Day 2014 strike at Mogadishu airport and a March 2015 attack at the Maka al-Mukarama hotel. On March 5, 2016, a US attack killed around 150 al-Shabaab fighters at the al-Shabaab training centre Camp Raso, 120 miles north of Mogadishu. Officials in the United States suspected that these al-Shabaab terrorists had just finished preparing for a large-scale attack on US and AMISOM forces. On November 21, 2017, the United States launched an airstrike on an al-Shabaab training centre, killing approximately 100 militants (New York Times, 2017; Los Angeles Times, 2017; CNN, 2017).

The United States Department of State authorized $17 million in aid to Somalia through 2015. The assistance was designed to help the Somali Police Forces establish capacity to investigate complex crimes, including terrorism, and successfully prepare and refer cases for prosecution, thereby supporting the country's key security aims.On July 25, 2015, then-US President Barack Obama pledged the US government's commitment to a more aggressive fight against terrorists in East Africa, increasing support for counterterrorism operations in Kenya and Somalia, including training and finance. The President recognized that US drone strikes have reduced al-Shabaab territory and promised to "keep that pressure going even as we empower the Somali government" (Washington Post, 2016).In June 2016, the US Department of Defense proposed $200 million in Counterterrorism Partnership Fund financing for East Africa for fiscal year 2017. A portion of these monies were used to give AMISOM with essential armored vehicles, as well as training in tactics, driving, equipment maintenance, and radio operation. Congress authorized $750 million for a Counter-ISIS Fund in December 2016, which includes funding for AMISOM needs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016).President Donald Trump approved recommendations from the Pentagon in February to increase the US military presence in Somalia, allowing the US greater flexibility to work with Somali troops and unleash airstrikes against extremists, effective March 29, 2017.General Thomas Waldhauser, commander of US Africa Command, stated that the US wanted to take advantage of the chance to engage with newly-elected Somali President Mohamed Abudllahi Mohamed to train Somali national security forces to the point where they could take on al-Shabaab on their own (Associated Press, 2017; Voice of America, 2017; Newsweek, 2017).

The Trump Administration declared sections of Somalia as "an area of on-going hostilities" in April 2017, making it simpler for US military commanders to conduct counterterrorism operations without prior White House clearance.Since then, the Pentagon has increased the number of US troops on the ground to 500 as of January 2017. The United States is also assisting in the fight against terror financing. On April 6, 2017, the US Department of State offered a contract opportunity worth approximately $1 million to provide counterterrorism finance mentoring and advise to Somalia's Financial Reporting Centre (U.S. Department of Defense, 2017; Foreign Policy, 2017; Wall Street Journal, 2017).
The United States stated on June 17, 2019, that it would reopen its permanent USAID Mission in Somalia. Despite the fact that the United States is the greatest supplier of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the mission has been closed for 28 years, having stopped in 1991 following civil war and the collapse of the country's central authority.

In February 2019, USAID reported on its CVE efforts in Somalia, claiming that its Strengthening Somali Governance (SSG) initiative enhances government outreach, boosts public involvement, strengthens key government institutions' functional capabilities, and expands women's empowerment and leadership. The Somalia Stabilization Initiative (SSI) of the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives aids the Somali government in re-establishing its legitimacy in areas recaptured from al-Shabaab while also strengthening capacity for local municipalities. SSI organizes events for adolescents and communities to help them become more resilient to extremism.Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS+), another USAID program, has promoted discourse, arts, culture, and sports in places where al-Shabaab prohibits such activities. TIS+ built and developed sports facilities and projects that benefit over 50,000 at-risk Somali adolescents (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2019). On October 2, 2019, the United States reopened its embassy in Somalia, over three decades after the country descended into civil war and the ambassador was flown to safety by the US military.

**The number of places and Locations Attacked by Religious Extremist and Terrorist organizations in Somalia**

Efforts in this section of the study were aimed at gathering information on the frequency of attacks in various locations across Somalia's territory, as well as why they occurred. Some of the attacks are listed below:

**Mogadishu Hotel Bombing and Siege on October 28, 2017**

Al-Shabab fighters detonated a suicide car bomb near the Villa Somalia Presidential Palace at the entry gate of Mogadishu's Hotel Nasa-Hablod. A second car bomb exploded nearby not long after. The hotel was then besieged by gunmen, who held it hostage for almost fifteen hours. Around 27 persons were killed in that attack. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, claiming that they chose the hotel because politicians and security people frequent there (BBC News, 2017; CNN, 2017; Al Jazeera, 2017 and Guardian, 2017).

**Mogadishu Centre Attack on October 14, 2017**

The death toll from Saturday's blast in Mogadishu's centre continues to increase, with more than 300 people now estimated to have been killed and hundreds more gravely injured. The magnitude of the loss puts the attack, which featured a truck loaded with hundreds of kg of military-grade and homemade explosives, one of the most destructive terrorist operations in recent years anywhere in the globe.The bombing killed 276 people and injured at least 300, according to Somalia's communications minister. Within hours, however, AbdikadirAbdirahman, the director of Amin ambulances, announced that his service had confirmed 300 persons were killed in the blast. "The death toll will continue to rise because some people remain missing," Abdirahman told Reuters. More victims are still being recovered from the rubble that has stretched across hundreds of meters in the city centre.

According to rescue personnel, a definitive death toll may never be known because the high heat caused by the bomb meant that many people's remains would not be found. Others may have been buried swiftly by family members. The horrific bombing, which drew international outrage, will draw attention to Somalia's decade-long struggle against the Islamist group al-Shabaab. The incident was described as "revolting" by Michael Keating, the UN special envoy to Somalia. According to the US mission in Somalia:Such heinous assaults reaffirm the US commitment to assisting our Somali and African Union partners in combating the scourge of terrorism.

Al-Shabab pledged to intensify its assaults early this year after both the Trump administration and Somalia's newly elected government declared additional military efforts against the group.More than 110 victims of the blast have already been buried, according to officials. "One hundred and sixty of the victims could not be identified, therefore the government buried them," said Aden Nur, a doctor at the city's Madina hospital. "Their families buried the others." More than a hundred injured people were also taken here."Senior civil workers, five paramedic volunteers, and a journalist were among those killed, but the majority were ordinary citizens on one of Mogadishu's busiest thoroughfares, which has been rocked by many attacks in recent years. The bomb, which is likely to have been aimed for Somalia's foreign ministry, was hidden in a truck and exploded near a hotel, destroying it and several others.According to sources close to the Somali administration, the truck was halted at a checkpoint and was ready to be searched when the driver suddenly accelerated. It crashed through a barrier, and then exploded. This set fire to an adjacent fuel tanker, resulting in a tremendous firestorm.

**Mogadishu Restaurant Attack on June 15, 2017**

Al-Shabaab militants assaulted two prominent restaurants in Mogadishu, killing at least 31 people. Terrorists exploded a vehicle bomb outside the restaurants before storming them with firearms. According to survivors, shooters proceeded from room to room hunting for anyone to shoot and killing them on sight. For about 11 hours, the eateries were cordoned off. According to senior Somali police Captain Mohamed Hussein, who talked to reporters, the police response to the attack was hindered by darkness, with officers waiting until the morning to attempt to seize the building where the eateries are located. Al-Shabaab fighters claimed they attacked the eateries because the women who work there sell their bodies for money (Voice of America, 2017; Fox News, 2017).

**Mogadishu Port Attack on December 11, 2016**

A suicide truck bomber drove into Mogadishu, Somalia's major port, and detonated his explosives, killing 29 people and injuring 48 more. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that it was carried out to disrupt the country's legislative elections, which were set to take place at the end of the month. According to Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, spokesman for Al-military Shabaab's operations, the objectives of the attack were police officers stationed at the port since the officers had been trained to provide security during the elections. Previously, al-Shabaab accused Somali presidential and parliamentary candidates of being Western-backed puppets (Telegraph, 2016; Global Terrorism Database, 2016; CNN, 2016).

**Airport Attacks in February and March 2016**

On February 2, 2016, a passenger on Daallo Airlines Flight 159 from Mogadishu to Djibouti detonated a laptop bomb. The attack was claimed by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. According to investigators, the passenger, AbdullahiAbdisalamBorleh, snuck the device past airport security in order to target Western intelligence officials and Turkish NATO forces who were believed to be aboard the plane. The device, which killed just Borleh, exploded shortly after take-off. According to investigators, the bomber knew where to sit and where to lay the device to maximize damage, but the explosive detonated too soon.

The bomb would have created a far greater secondary explosion in the fuel tank and destroyed the plane if the plane had reached its higher cruising altitude. Instead, the jet was able to return to Mogadishu safely, despite a hole in its fuselage caused by the explosion. The bombing highlighted al-ability Shabaab's to plan complex strikes as well as its readiness to target Western interests (CNN, 2016; Combating Terrorism Centre, 2016).

Similarly, on March 7, 2016, an al-Shabaab laptop bomb exploded in Somalia's Beledweyne airport, killing one soldier and injuring six others. The explosion happened at a screening facility where cargo and baggage are inspected before being loaded into planes. Two more bombs, according to officials, were also defused. "A laptop computer exploded at the screening area, and security forces also defused two more explosive devices, one of which was planted in a printer," Police Lieutenant-Colonel Ali DhuhAbdi told reporters (Quartz, 2016; BBC News, 2016 and Al Jazeera, 2016).

**Maka al-Mukarama Hotel Attack on March 27, 2015**

Six gunmen exploded a car bomb outside Mogadishu's Maka al-Mukarama Hotel, popular with government officials and visitors, on the evening of March 27, 2015. The extremists stormed the building and battled Somali Special Forces in a 17-hour fire war. The Somali army killed the terrorists, one of whom detonated a suicide belt, but the attack killed 20 others, including a United Nations envoy. The following day, al-Shabab claimed credit for the attack, which was allegedly plotted by Hassan Ali Dhoore, a top al-Shabaab intelligence official. Dhoore was afterwards reportedly killed in a US attack on March 31, 2016.

**Al-Shabab Attacks on AMISOM and Foreign Forces in July 2016**

Al-Shabaab has repeatedly mounted successful attacks against AMISOM forces deployed in Somalia. Two suicide bombers detonated car explosives near AMISOM's headquarters at the Mogadishu airport on July 26, 2016, killing 13 people. On April 21, 2016, Al-Shabaab insurgents detonated an IED on an AMISOM convoy in Awdinle, Baay area, killing six Ethiopian soldiers. Al-Shabaab militants stormed an AMISOM military post in the southern Somali town of el-Adde on January 15, 2016, killing 63 Kenyan soldiers. AMISOM verified the attack on Twitter. Al-

Shababfighters stormed the AMISOM Janale military base in southern Somalia on September 1, 2015, killing 70 soldiers.According to witnesses, the attack began with a suicide bombing at the base's gate, followed by an hour of intense gunfire. According to a Somali army official, the terrorists blasted a nearby bridge before the raid to prevent AMISOM soldiers from fleeing (BBC News, 2016; Shabelle News, 2016; Newsweek, 2016).

Al-Shabaab fighters attacked the headquarters of an AMISOM peacekeeping force at an airfield outside Mogadishu on December 25, 2014. Al-Shabaab fighters camouflaged as Somali forces stormed the military base and started fire, according to an AMISOM statement. There were eight al-Shabab fighters killed, five AMISOM forces dead, and one American civilian contractor killed. The incident was claimed by an al-Shabaab spokesperson. Hassan Ali Dhoore, an al-Shabaab commander who US officials alleged was involved in the attack, was killed in an April 2016 drone strike (BBC News, 2014; Voice of America, 2014; Global Terrorism Database, 2014).

**Relevant Lessons for Nigeria**

Religion, heroism, perceived injustice, identity, and belonging, among other factors, were key motivators for people to join terrorist organizations, according to Subramanyam (2018). He emphasized that joining a terrorist organization fosters a sense of self-importance as well as revolutionary heroism (Subramanyam, 2018). The European Institute of Peace (2020) concurred that motivations for joining groups are various, as evidenced by a poll performed in Somalia, which found that only 15% of those who joined al-Shabaab did so for religious reasons, while 13 percent were forced to join (European Institute of Peace, 2020).

According to the Institute, 27 percent of respondents, particularly those who were recruited locally, were motivated by economic incentives (European Institute of Peace, 2020). Others indicated that ethnic/religious prejudice, social and political isolation, as well as bad governance institutions, led them to join the group, while many do not have an obvious answer to why they joined. In contrast, 21% were driven by a sense of belonging, and 11% were motivated by a sense of responsibility (European Institute of Peace, 2020).

According to Subramanyam (2018), religious fanaticism is the primary indication of individuals' motivation to join groups. He emphasizes that the indoctrination processes utilized for moral reasons for their brutal activities are religious/ideological teachings targeted at scaring the general people in order to enable them to achieve goals they were unable to attain through traditional means (Subramanyam, 2018). Religion, he claims, is useful in the hands of Muslim terrorists for explaining their participation and recruiting people into the groups, and it alters the worldview of potential terrorists (Subramanyam, 2018).

In a study supported by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Anneli Botha proved that religion has a significant impact in group motivation (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).According to the institute, religion was the motivating factor for 87 percent of respondents in the study to join al-Shabaab in Kenya, and 73 percent of respondents indicated that they hated people of other religions, with 49 percent blaming the government for their hatred of people of other religions (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).According to the institution, Magnus Ranstorp stated that culture, which includes belief systems, creates a collective identity for terrorists and serves as a motive for social action that supports and legitimizes terrorism (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).Many major elements are driving the growing trend of religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia (Jakkier colliers, 2015). According to the findings of a study on the workings and interventionist approach to counter-terrorism in Somalia, military solutions do not work, and, contrary to popular belief, religion and ethnicity are not the actual fundamental causes of conflicts. Deep structural inequalities, poverty, underdevelopment, and political persecution, as well as the destructive effects of climate change and government negligence, are the sources (Mustapha, 2012).

Counter-terrorism operations, whether conducted by the US or its Western partners, have proved disastrous. Intervention in the Sahel region exemplifies the issue (Hoffman, 2016). Countless unarmed civilians have been killed in Somalia as a result of government activities in insurgency regions and externally directed drone and missile strikes. Local support for insurgent forces has risen as a result of such activities. Military victories are often fleeting, as religious extremists recover and shift their focus to defenseless civilians (Gunning & Jackson, 2011).Local governments backed by the US and its allies rarely address the structural problems that triggered the crises initially (Agbiboa&Okem, 2016). As a result, local populations, neglected by their governments have turned to extremist groups for survival, basic services and protection. Peace agreements imposed from above and outside, fail to give voice to affected populations and jihadist organizations have been denied a seat at the table, even though they are critical parties to the conflicts. Not surprisingly, most of the accords have collapsed.Foreign action in Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries has had similar outcomes. In Somalia, the increased ferocity of US airstrikes has fueled increased extremist activity and a matching emphasis on civilian targets. Abuses by unaccountable regimes and foreign forces have sparked public outrage, and externally mediated peace treaties that ignored local voices have resulted in a string of failed governments (Human Right Watch, 2011).

Even after restoring peace in Somalia, the government has done little to address poverty, unemployment, inequalities, marginalization, and underdevelopment indicators (Arena &Arrigo, 2016). This begs the question, "What have we learned as a nation?" There will be no peace unless the underlying grievances are addressed; foreign intervention may not be the solution, but purposeful and resourceful leadership determined to provide its citizens with basic necessities of life such as good health care, education, empowerment, and job opportunities may be (Agbiboa, 2013b). These factors have the potential to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, resulting in societal harmony and tranquillity.So, in order for Nigeria to progress, we must first adopt a broader understanding of human security that emphasizes people rather than territory (including health, education, employment, the environment, and respect for human rights and civil liberties) as important contributors to human well-being. Human security demands a multifaceted approach that addresses the core causes of religious extremism and terrorism, which currently threaten the world.

Second, we must engage in grassroots efforts to support economic policies such as agricultural cooperation and lending facilities, trade unions, women and youth groups, and so on, in order to bridge the gap of poverty and inequality and the conflicts that ensue.Third, the Nigerian government should promote local peace initiatives that involve all parties impacted. Key actors should not be side-lined at their discretion. Finally, as a people, we must abandon any support for corrupt and repressive regimes in favor of global initiatives that promote democracy, human rights, and economic, environmental, and climate justice. Increased human security on a global scale is the best road to greater security. Despite the fact that fundamental political, economic, and social transformations will take decades, they are the only way to combat religious extremism and terrorism in Nigeria.In this regard, the government is advised to take decisive action and implement strategic policies aimed at addressing the root causes of religious extremism and terrorism, which are embedded in poverty, massive youth unemployment, illiteracy, corruption, inequality, and so on, in order to avoid further escalation of terrorist acts and insecurity, which led to the collapse of Somalia's civil government. The capture of the central government and territory by Somalis Al-shabaab, which resulted in years of unrest and killings in Mogadishu and other parts of the country and around the Horn of Africa, had a significant impact on Africa's economic and political progress. If Nigeria, Africa's economic powerhouse, is faced with such a threat, many economic activity in Africa will suffer.

## Results and Discussion

***Religious extremism and Terrorism has negative effects on the development and growth of Somalia***

Extremism and terrorism can have a wide range of consequences, including casualties, destroyed buildings, increased fear, and a slew of economic expenditures. Clearly, the September 11, 2001 attacks incurred huge costs, which have been estimated to be in the region of $80 to $90 billion when future economic losses such as lost earnings, workers' compensation, and diminished commerce are factored in (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, and Porter, 2003). Terrorism can inflict costs on a targeted country in a variety of ways. Terrorist acts have economic implications because they divert foreign direct investment (FDI), destroy infrastructure, redirect public investment money to security, and hinder trade.If a developing country loses enough FDI, which is a major source of savings, it may face slower economic growth, just as capital may flee a country ravaged by civil war. A sufficiently aggressive terrorist campaign might significantly decrease capital inflows.

Religious extremism and terrorism, for example, have a negative impact on development and growth in Somalia, owing to their implications for the general economy (decrease in FDI, tourism, agricultural production, etc.), humanitarian effect (killing of productive workforce, destruction of economic and natural resources, increase in the number of IDPs), and political instability (distortion of government activities-policies formulation and implementation).

There have been several cost disparities made in relation to terrorism losses in Somalia. Direct costs, for example, include the immediate losses connected with a terrorist attack or campaign, such as damaged commodities, the value of lost lives, the costs of injuries (including lost income), destroyed structures, damaged infrastructure, and reduced short-term commerce. In contrast, indirect or secondary costs are associated with attack-related subsequent losses, such as increased insurance premiums, increased security expenses, increased compensation to persons living in high-risk areas, and costs associated with attack-induced long-run changes in trade. Indirect costs may manifest as decreased GDP growth, lost FDI, changes in inflation, or higher unemployment.

Decades of terrorist attacks and executions in Somalia had an indirect and direct impact on all aspects of the economy, politics, and ecology. According to Andrea (2009), attacks on commercial operations such as telecommunications facilities, transportation and tourism industries, markets, and other business areas in Somalia have reduced economic growth by 17% over the last two decades. Because of the frequency of the attacks, investors have been discouraged from patronizing the economy through investments and infrastructure, resulting in a failure to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).In this way, the political climate is not immune. Religious extremism and terrorism have had an impact on government actions and policy priorities. Terrorist activity in Somalia facilitated lawlessness, murder, extortion, insecurity, and political instability. This terrorist group's attacks in Somalia resulted in the deaths of over 3,183 people and the destruction of property worth millions of dollars (START GTD, 2013).

***The strategic responses and counter terrorism approaches adopted by the Government of Somalia actually made relative impacts, even though it also failed to address certain critical issues in the country***

The Somali government's strategic response and counter-terrorism effort achieved some success despite failing to address crucial concerns such as poverty, unemployment, the safety of defectors and their direct family members, clan disparity, economic suffering, and religious indoctrination.Disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of members of violent extremist groups during a crisis are difficult issues. DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs are often implemented following the signing of a peace treaty. This, however, was not the case in south central Somalia, or in other conflict-torn places around the world today. Providing proper protection for persons seeking to quit violent extremist groups is arguably a critical success factor for programs functioning in such settings.

Lessons from the DRP in south central Somalia reveal that disengaging, rehabilitating, and reintegrating al-Shabaab members while the fight is still ongoing is a difficult endeavor. The backdrop is complex, with high levels of insecurity, and al-operating Shabaab's model makes it difficult to safeguard disengaging members from risks and threats throughout the program's several phases. Al-Shabaab attacks, infiltration, and retaliation from local people are among the difficulties facing.Lessons from the DRP in south central Somalia reveal that disengaging, rehabilitating, and reintegrating al-Shabaab members while the fight is still on-going is a difficult endeavor. The backdrop is complex, with high levels of insecurity, and al-operating Shabaab's model makes it difficult to safeguard disengaging members from risks and threats throughout the program's several phases. Al-Shabaab attacks, infiltration, and retaliation from local people are among the difficulties facing.However, in Somalia, the issues that push people to engage in terrorism and religious extremism have not been adequately addressed. Failure to address issues such as non-inclusive government, poverty, unemployment, totalitarian administration, and military and police intimidation of citizens, inequality and supremacy of one clan over another in

political and administrative positions may increase the country's rate of violent extremism and terrorism.

***The public places (churches, markets and mosques) and hotels frequently attacked by religious extremist organization are gatherings of politicians, foreign humanitarian support groups and other soft targets***

Terrorist groups carried out several attacks on public and social gatherings, government institutions, religious sites (including churches and mosques), hotels, and critical economic infrastructure (like telecommunication facilities, tourist centres and transportation industries). These locations were suspected of harboring politically significant individuals, international humanitarian support groups, AMISOM fighters, US personnel, and other entities deemed a threat to the terrorist organizations' modes of operation.

**There are a few lessons for the Nigerian government:**First, the government should recognize the importance of religion and ethnic identity. Second, if the government wants to address the issue of religious extremism and terrorism in Nigeria, it must begin by addressing the root cause (such as addressing inequality, marginalization, poverty, and youth unemployment) rather than the symptoms.Every indication pointed to religion and ethnic identity politics playing a big role in Somalia's crises. It was a vital instrument for oppressed and economically marginalized people to use in order to resist the failures of the government and political system.

In Somalia, for example, religious leaders used the existence of the Islamic religion and clannism to organize individuals against the state and the administration of Bare, resulting in several years of crisis and the emergence of numerous religious extremist organizations and clan-based terrorism. This is also true in Nigeria. The desire of some groups to secede from Nigeria in order to form their own sovereign nation is rooted in marginalization, discrimination, and ethnic chauvinism, particularly in the South East, where members of the indigenous People of Biafra (BIAFRA) as well as the Yoruba Nation in the south west are all clamoring to secede.These groups have continued to express their dissatisfaction with the government's failures, marginalization, inequality, insecurity, poverty, and unemployment. Most of the time, these organizations come into conflict with security forces in Nigeria, which frequently leads in violence and killings, causing casualties on both sides and contributing to political instability if not treated immediately and correctly.This is why the government must take religious and ethnic identity concerns very seriously.Indeed, rather than pursuing the kind of military antics it is currently pursuing, the government should seek ways to meet with religious leaders and leaders of these various ethnic groups to dialogue on the issues, because religion and ethnic identity are deeply embedded in the hearts of the people and are not easily addressed through the application of military strategy. Taking Somalia as an example, the use of military force merely developed into /spurred the development of additional resistance organizations such as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Al-Shabaab, which became a thorn in the flesh of the Somali government/. This resulted in years of insecurity, humanitarian toil, mortality, political unrest, and economic degradation.

The Boko Harm and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) groups operating in Northern Nigeria arose as a result of long-term economic and political marginalization of the majority of the people; the failure of the state (i.e., government) to address poverty and bridge the gap between the few wealthy and the majority of poor. Terrorist organizations usually take advantage of the flaws of the state in order to recruit new members.First, by making the disadvantaged and oppressed recognize what is wrong with their current situation and giving them a reason to mobilize against the government by opposing all types of government policies and acts. On this basis, it is recommended that the government address the issues of poverty, inequality, economic deprivation, and youth unemployment. A hungry guy might easily be persuaded to join any deviant group in order to find purpose for himself or herself or his family.

## Conclusion

The study investigated religious extremism and terrorism in Somalia: lessons for Nigeria, and it indicated that religious extremism is not just an issue linked with one religion because every religion has adherents who strictly adhere to the principles and beliefs of their faith. However, in the case of Somalia, where Sufi Islam is practiced by over 90% of the people, it focuses emphasis on a certain faith. Religion, which was anticipated to be a unifying force for Somalis in the fight to stop bad governance, instead became a problem and a major source of concern in Somalia as religious groups adopted the extreme doctrines of Jihad and Sharia to wreak havoc on the country's whole people.According to the report, Islamic extremism and terrorism in Somalia have damaged the country's economy and political landscape, and efforts to confront the problem have also fallen short, because major factors such as poverty, young unemployment, illiteracy, and inequality have not been addressed.

## Recommendations

To successfully counter the threat of radical Islamic ideology, the Federal Government of Somalia must pursue alternative options, which necessitates the implementation of socioeconomic and political changes capable of improving people's lives regardless of ethnic or religious origin.
To resist radical groups' attempts to win widespread support in Somalia, governments must support measures aimed at accommodating the interests of various ethnic and religious groups, as well as integrating ethnic minorities into the country's political structure and governance.

The government must also understand the benefits of involving religious organizations and their leaders in round table conversations in order to achieve long-term peace, by embracing more liberal teachings rather than the radical approach that has been discussed in religious houses and gatherings.Repressive techniques used against religious extremist groups are ineffective and should be avoided at all costs. The use of brutal counter-terrorist and counter-extremist operations to crush religious extremism and terrorism will incite hatred toward the governing regimes rather than establish the groundwork for stability in Somalia.

Again, the lessons for Nigeria reveal that religious extremist and terrorist groups thrive on socioeconomic and political shortages, as well as structurally defective governmental institutions. It is recommended that the Nigerian government consider adopting measures and implementing strategic plans to address unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and corruption, as well as dealing decisively with police brutality across the country. Rather than the carrot approaches it has used recently, they are the most effective ways of combating the threat of religious extremism and terrorism.

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