How Does the Bradley Effect Work? Lessons Learned During the Indonesia's Regional Elections of DKI Jakarta in 2017

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ABSTRACT

This research aims to explain the mechanism of political identity during the 2017's Regional Elections of DKI Jakarta, vis-à-vis, Ahok-Djarot's defeat. The theoretical framework of the Bradley Effect has used in this qualitative-descriptive research. It is discovered that the DKI Jakarta's citizens realized Ahok's previous performance as the governor had formed various policies that sought to develop Jakarta. However, the identity bias that occurred, compounded by various party movements, including the Islamic defense actions, the media, and the case of Al-Maidah verse 51, a division of identity encouraged people not to vote for Ahok because Muslims were prohibited from electing non-Muslim leaders. Such incident sparked the constituent's hesitancy in voting for Ahok during the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Election. Therefore, there was an extreme disparity between the results of the poll survey on Ahok.

Keyword: Bradley Effect, 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada, Identity Sentiment, Ahok-Djaro

1. Introduction

This research aims to describe how the Bradley Effect theory works during Indonesia's Regional Election of DKI Jakarta in 2017. As a democratic country, Indonesia implements electoral politics as a sign of a good and running democratic country in Asia (Hood, 1998). In a broader point of view, many past researchers have given their attention to the electoral politics contest and how it impacts the development of democracy in Indonesia. For instance, (Diamond, 1999), who found that appreciation was deemed more important rather than the implementation of democratic consolidation in Indonesia through General Election from regional to national. Also, through a regular mechanism in each period to guarantee the power regeneration: elected honestly, fairly, and competitively. A remark from (Chu et al., 2016) who stated that Indonesia has a stabler democracy, compared to other countries with heterogeneous society in Asia. It is known that Indonesia guarantees and encourages the citizens to participate and give their impact during the electoral politics contestation. With these acknowledgements and achievements, Indonesia is faced by another question related to building a sustainable and substantial electoral politics contest.

Indonesia is a plural democratic country with Muslim as the majority of the citizen who takes up until 86,7% in the society (Kusnandar, 2022). This sole fact could be risky, as a finding by (Muhtadi, 2019b) discovered that the emerging and the reinforcement of identity politics during the electoral political contestation in Indonesia are mostly triggered by the unequal spread of the heterogenous citizen's identity in a certain region. As identity politics happen frequently during an electoral politics contest in Indonesia, it is known that in a democratic country, identity politics could flourish if the public has the access to express their political views. According to (Fukuyama, 1992), there is a massive shift in the division of the left-wing spectrum and the right-wing spectrum in the identity politics of the 21st century. In the 20th century, the left-wing political spectrum discussed inequality in regard to economics. However, the discourses then shifted to the freedom of marginalized groups as the world entered the 21st century. Within the same discourses during the 20th century, the right-wing political spectrum discussed a lot about the decrease of the state' role and individual freedom; it then shifted during the beginning of the 21st century which discussed a more traditional approach on nationalism, some of those specifically discussed religion and ethnicity.

The domination of identity politics implementation, especially in Indonesia, is often studied by many researchers. Specifically, the ones which focused on utilizing identity politics to the right-wing political spectrum which discussed ethnicity and religion. As discussed in (Lestari, 2018), who researched the fierce fight between the right-wing domination's blueprint of a new approach and a bigger scale plan that involved an identity politics that target the millennial generation (Soenjoto, 2019). The strategy of identity politics is pushing further the discourse of religion and primordial ethnicity on the stage of the local politics' contestation (Tiran, 2021; Pora et al., 2021; Salim, 2015), and connected it with the ideology of the local's political parties (Devi et al., 2018).

The identity politics issue during the local politics contest such as Regional Election has been discussed by researchers. However, those cases did not attract the public's attention yet. Historically, a significant anomaly happened in the case of identity politics during the Regional Election of DKI Jakarta in 2017. It involved three pairs of candidates (Sari, 2016), which are Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and Djarot Saiful Hidayat. The pair was supported by the coalition of several political parties: PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P), Golkar, Hanura, and Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem); next pair were Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni supported by the coalition of political parties such as Demokrat, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Kebangkitan

Bangsa (PKB), and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP); last candidates were Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno who were supported by two political parties; Gerindra and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) .

The DKI Jakarta Regional Election of 2017 was an electoral political contest in the regional scale which gained attention of the public until it became a national-scale issue, it was a big phenomenon compared to other region's elections. Several researchs have focused on the discourse of political identity studies during DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017, within the scope of ethnicity and religion. The past researchers believed that the identity politics during that time was impacted by the fact that Ahok was a *double minority* who follow Christianity and has Chinese as his ethnicity. Those were the main reasons why the Ahok-Djarot pair could not rise as victorious during that election. Those facts then were build to develop more sentiments which attract the attention of the muslim groups, a narration of prohibition to vote for Ahok was spread among the muslim groups as Ahok has different religion and ethnicity from the majority's population (Lestari, 2019); The narration was even more strengthened after the incident of Ahok's blasphemy related to the Qurán Al-Maidah verse 51. Such incident put Ahok in a bad light, he was referred as a blasphemer (Hariyanto, 2018) by his oppositions and was protested by a big movement by the muslim groups called the 212 Movement, it is later then became a tradition with annual reunion. (Jubba et al., 2020; Abdullah, 2017).

However, the political studies bachelors, whose focus is identity politics discourse, gave their attention to these series of events which led to Ahok's defeat during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election. They viewed such an event as happening because there was a power domination caused by identity's difference by clashing the public's view and sentiment building. Such a view was still limited, as the studies could not explain the anomaly of the fact that the people of DKI Jakarta had a higher satisfaction until up to 81.5% during Ahok's first period. However, such achievement could not help him to win the second round during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election (Prakoso, 2016). The researcher believes that the clash between visions and sentiment building had a contribution to Ahok's defeat. However, it could not explain the gap between the DKI Jakarta's people's satisfaction of Ahok's performance in his first period and the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017, where he lost with 42% votes (Amelia, 2017). The vote result of the Ahok-Djarot pair shows a negative trend until more than half of the public's satisfaction level on Ahok's performance. That was the anomaly which sparked long debates about the public's satisfaction on his performance compared to the Regional Election's result.

To explain such a phenomenon, researchers will use the theoretical framework of the Bradley Effect to explain the mechanism of the identity politics which happened during the defeat of Ahok-Djarot pair during the Regional Election in 2017. Bradley effect is a condition where the survey's result is not accurate because of an identity bias, which frequently happens during a fierce political election (Payne, 2010). The Bradley Effect theorize that there is an undetected inclination in the behaviors of the voters who belong to a majority group identity in a certain region who have contributed their views to the electability surveyors, in this case, public satisfaction survey. The majority of people in this region tend to vote for those who have a similar identity background. There are also other opinions which stated that they wanted to elect a political candidate who belongs to the minority group. Thus, there is a bias and gap between the survey's result and the election's result. In the end, it became a problem to the accuracy of the surveyor's projection of the survey result. There are two factors which triggered the Bradley Effect, first, a fiercely competitive election. Second, there was a problem related to social identity, such as candidate's labeling which affected the voter's choice.

2. Research Method

This research uses a Descriptive Qualitative with a secondary data as the main data for this research (Moleong, 2018). Descriptive Qualitative method was chosen to explore and describe the mechanism of the identity politics which happened during the Ahok-Djarot's defeat during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 in the perspective of the Bradley Effect's theory. The main data sources for this research are scientific articles and mass media who focused their studies on: The Bradley Effect; Political Contestation during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017; Identity Politics; 212 Resistance Movement and other sources of secondary data which have relevance to the research's topic. The obtained data then analyzed interactively (Miles & Huberman, 1992) through these steps: research's data mapping, presenting the data and mapping results, and then concluding. The conclusion aims to see the identity politics mechanism that happened during Ahok-Djarot's defeat during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 in the perspective of the Bradley Effect's theory.

3. Discussion

3.1 The History of Bradley Effect

The Bradley Effect is an illustration of a phenomenon related to the disparity between the electability survey result and the final voting result during a general election. Such a result happened due to the bias among the constituents towards the identity differences from the political candidates within the electoral area (Payne, 2010). The Bradley effect first emerged as a phenomenon of a regional election in one of the US's states. The election involved two candidates with contrasting identity backgrounds in a homogeneous population of a certain identity. Emerged in 1982, Tom Bradley who is a black skinned man was elected as a political candidate for the Democrat Party for the election of California's Governor. He was against a Republican's party white-skinned candidate named George Deukmejian who was an Armenian descent. In the electability survey result, most opinions are favored to Tom Bradley significantly (Marx, 1996). A result from the *exit poll* revealed that some media projected Bradley as the winner and aired news taglines such as "Bradley Win Projected". Even though Bradly won the majority votes during the electability survey before the election day, he still lost during the real election after all the polls were counted (Tarrance, 2008). Research after the California Governor Election in 1982 was conducted to understand the cause of the Tom Bradley's defeat phenomenon. The result shows that there was a smaller percentage of the white-skinned voters who actually voted for Tom Bradley during the election, even though most of the white-skinned people claimed their support for Bradley during the electability survey. In the end, the Californian majority group which consisted of the white-skinned people gave their vote to Deukmejian who has the same skin color as them (Bee,

2008). Further research revealed that the reason why the white-skinned voters gave their favor to Tom Bradley during the electability survey was because they wanted to reduce the prejudice on racial issues. The white-skinned voters worried that if they gave their support to Deukmejian, they would be labeled as a racist group who only votes for the white-skinned candidate. That was why they gave a fake support to Tom Bradley during the survey, where in reality, they supported Deukmejian during the real election day. Such a phenomenon creates a bias and a gap between Tom Bradley's survey percentage and the final election result (The New York Times, 1982). In the end, a Bradley Effect theory was born, it theorizes how inaccurate opinion survey results are influenced by the social bias and needs derived from identity differences (Bee, 2008).

3.2 The Dynamics of Identity Politics during DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017

The Dynamics of Identity Politics during DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 attracted the attention of Political Studies academicians, especially those whose focus is identity politics studies. This is the impact of a fierce political contestation, dominated by identity sentiments between the political candidates during the Regional Election. In the first round, there were three pairs of candidates; Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and Djarot Saiful Hidayat. The pair was supported by the coalition of several political parties: PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P), Golkar, Hanura, and Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem); next pair were Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni supported by the coalition of political parties such as Demokrat, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP); last candidates were Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno who were supported by two political parties; Gerindra and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) (Carina, 2016). The study related to the first round's identity politics during the campaign did not attract much attention. For instance, the study by (Ardipandanto, 2017) focused on the failure of Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni's strategy in winning the election; which is not dominated by the identity issue. Although we cannot deny that the candidate Agus-Sylvi was contributing in halting the direct effect of identity politics which created an extreme division in the society during the election.

After the first round ended by the defeat of Agus-Sylvi (Mazrieva, 2017), the dynamics of the election gradually gaining the attention of the political studies academicians, as the candidates left were Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) - Djarot Saiful Hidayat and Anies Baswedan - Sandiaga Uno. Ahok identified as a minority in the DKI Jakarta's society, he is a Christian and ethnically Chinese; but along with that fact, Ahok was also an incumbent candidate who has experienced in the position of DKI Jakarta's Governor in 2014-2017. Although we cannot put aside the fact that Ahok won his position due to the initially elected Governor, his partner, Joko Widodo's strategic position before he ran for presidential candidacy. As his vice, Ahok replaced Joko Widodo's position as DKI Jakarta's Governor in 2014-2017(Hadiningtyas et al., 2014).

Apart from that, the second round of the election became a regional election with the highest level of domination from identity politics, especially the fierce competition between the nationalists and the religious groups. The fact that Ahok-Djarot will go against Anies-Sandi in the second round showed that Ahok-Djarot were in a non-strategic position, as Ahok belongs to a minority group in DKI Jakarta as a Christian who is ethnically Chinese. Due to that fact, there was a big resistant movement from majority groups, such as people who is originated from Jakarta and the muslim groups. Shown by the movement's campaign on not voting for a non-muslim candidate during the election. In the textualist group, as illustrated by organization or fundamental muslim groups who view Islam fundamentally was clearly stated that Muslim is strictly prohibited to elect a non-muslim as a leader for muslim during the regional election. There were also a moderate muslim group who was debating the two historical events of the Prophet Muhammad who rejected an unbeliever's offering of help during the Badar War. However, in the other event, it was mentioned that the Prophet had elected an unbeliever as a leader/guide during the great migration. Another event also mentioned that the prophet accepted the help of an unbeliever during the Hunain War (Bilhaq, 2018).

The debates between the two groups that happened during the campaign of the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 became fiercer. Added by the Ahok's response about Islam's rule that prohibits its followers to elect a non-muslim leader as mentioned in the Al-Maidah verse 51 were triggering the escalation of the situation, until finally it became a blasphemy case (Dermawan et al., 2019). The digital media contributed to the diversification of identity politics by arranging and hosting long debates about Ahok's blasphemy case. Thus, it was found that the media has a tendency to be not neutral which diversifies society even further. These are the result of successful identity politics (Sarohmawati & Ashaf, 2017). In the end, the blasphemy case was blown up and even triggered a major-scale demonstration attended by people all over Indonesia in the National Monument (Monas). The movement was known as a "defending islam" movement which started on the 2nd of December in 2016. The movement showed the success of big-scale mass mobilisation which was started only through digital media and then developed into a real movement caused by religion identity sentiment and solidarity of fellow identity group who was oppressed, in this case, by uniting several elements of muslim organizations. This "defending islam" movement was able to unite various muslim groups who have different views daily, but uniting as one due to this incident. They have one same goal, to identify Ahok as a blasphemer and to demand for justice. Various established arguments were emerging as well, for instance: a view that the "defending islam" movement was actually a form of competition between the elite oligarchs who had relevant political interest (Murtadho, 2016); a larger scale of Islamization motive to merely disrupt the euphoria of the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 (Kusumo & Hurriyah, 2018); an islamic populism movement who takes an advantage of their Islamic identity as a movement to unite the followers (Prayogi, 2019).

Apart from many findings, this research is more focused on the fact that the 212 "defending islam" Movement was a pseudo-Islamic populism. Even though there are new Islamic populism aspects such as multiclass alliance and "one ummah" narration. However, the "defending islam" movement could not maintain its alliance any longer and there were also debates related to the interpretation of the term "ummah" which was too diverse and would not be able to represent the whole elements of the muslim groups (Kusumo & Hurriyah, 2018). This is reflected by some rejection by the muslim groups who refused to re-join back the annual reunion of the "defending islam" movement. Even though they ardently joined the 2nd of December's movement in 2016 (BBC News Indonesia, 2018). With that fact, Ahok's position was threatened and finally, he was sentenced to 2 years of prison for committing blasphemy before the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 (Atriana, 2017). In the more extreme level, the impact of this feud reached a stage where people in the grassroots level were fighting each other as well; as reflected by a case where a community ignored their dead muslim neighbour just because he was Ahok's supporter (Muslim, 2017). There are several facts which were explained by the researcher which illustrates that the identity

political movement during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017 was a turning point of an Identity Political rise in a regional scale that received national-scale attention from the people. These facts also confirm Ahok-Djarot's vulnerable position in reaching the Governor and Vice position.

3.3 The Bradley Effect during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017

The 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada is a regional level election that became a national issue, especially in the second round between Ahok-Djarot and Anies-Sandi. Ahok is a political candidate who adheres to Christianity as his belief, while at the same time Ahok is also of Chinese descent.

These two facts indicate that Ahok is a representation for the minority DKI Jakarta in 2016 is consisted by 83.4% Muslim community (Lokadata, 2016), despite Djarot being a muslim as the Vice Governor candidate. While his second round's opponent, Anies – Sandi who were followers of the Islamic religion. Ahok was fighting against a political candidate whose social identity is the same as the majority of his constituents in DKI Jakarta in 2017.

As an incumbent, Ahok's performance and achievements as governor who replaced Jokowi in the previous period were also taken into account as a tool to support his electability ahead of the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada. Based on a poll survey to measure public satisfaction with the incumbent's performance, it was found that 81.5% of DKI Jakarta residents felt satisfied with Ahok's performance during his first term (Prakoso, 2016). In fact, many political observers at that time gave their appreciation and responses, that the Ahok-Djarot pair had a big chance of victory as a result of the encouragement of public satisfaction with Ahok's performance during his tenure; where observers give the opinion that there will be a strong correlation between the level of public satisfaction on the performance of the incumbent with the level of electability in electoral political contestation (Purnama, 2016). This fact also illustrates the similarity of the phenomenon that occurred to Tom Bradley in the California governor election in 1982, where Tom Bradley obtained great results from a very satisfactory poll survey of the Californian public compared to his political opponents.

However, the results of a high public satisfaction survey on Ahok in fact have no correlation with the results of the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada; where the Ahok – Djarot pair only got 42% of the votes in the second round (Amelia, 2017). Again, the same thing also happened to the case experienced by Tom Bradley in 1982, where Tom Bradley, who led the poll results significantly, had to lose to his political opponents in the official results of the 1982 California Governor election. Based on these facts, the researcher can conclude that the two cases, both Ahok's in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada and Tom Bradley's in the California governor election in 1982, have high similarities related to the issue of identity sentiment.

The people of DKI Jakarta at that time realized that Ahok's performance had paid off in the form of his various policies that sought to develop Jakarta. However, the identity bias that occurred was compounded by encouragement from various parties such as the Islamic defense action movement, the media, and the case of Al-Maidah verse 51 which further strengthened the division of identity not to vote for Ahok on the grounds that Muslims were prohibited from choosing non-Muslim leaders; increasingly made constituents hesitate to vote for Ahok in the election. As a result, there is an extreme disparity between the poll results of Ahok and the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada. The classic assumption that dominates the discussion of political academician is the fact that Ahok is a double minority in his constituency; he is a Christian and also of Chinese descent in Muslim-majority areas (Muhtadi, 2019).

However, in this context, there is one discussion of Ahok's identity which was not discussed much in the case of the Bradley Effect in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election. The author argues that Ahok's character tends to be harsh on the poor or the lower middle class (Romadhoni, 2016), which is also a minority characteristic who does not represent the majority of politicians at that time. Thus, the author concludes that this factor can also be added as the cause of the Bradley Effect that occurred in Ahok's case during the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2021.

4. Conclusion

According to the discussion, it is concluded that the Bradley Effect theorizes that there is an undetected inclination in the behaviors of the voters whose identity is the same as the majority group's identity in a certain region. In which they have given their opinion to the public satisfaction and electability surveyors. In this context, the voters who have the majority group's identity tend to vote for the candidate who has a similar identity wholeheartedly. Strangely, their opinion during the survey was the opposite; they wanted to vote for the political candidate who has the minority group's identity.

In the context of the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017, the defeat of Ahok was caused by his identity as a double minority who follow Christianity and have Chinese as his ethnicity. Those were believed as the main reasons why the Ahok-Djarot pair could not win the election. Such identity differences were used to build a sentiment which attracted the attention of the muslim groups who then prohibited voting for Ahok as he follows a different religion and has a different ethnicity. The election result shows Ahok-Djarot's negative trend up to more than a half of the public's satisfaction percentage on Ahok's performance survey result. In the end, such facts became an anomaly that sparked long debates about the disparity between the public's satisfaction on Ahok's performance and the election result.

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the final results from the 2017 DKI Jakarta election. This research concluded that Ahok's case in the DKI Jakarta Election has similarities with Tom Bradley's case during the 1982 California Local Leaders Election, in terms of identity sentiments.